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One of the most striking changes in U.S. equity markets has been the proliferation of 
trading venues. My dissertation studies the impact of market fragmentation on 
liquidity and price discovery from three different perspectives.  
 
The first section, coauthored with Maureen O’Hara, examines how fragmentation of 
trading is affecting the quality of trading.  We use newly-available trade reporting 
facilities volumes to measure fragmentation levels in individual stocks, and we use a 
matched sample to compare execution quality and efficiency of stocks with more and 
less fragmented trading.  We find market fragmentation generally reduces transaction 
costs, as measured by effective spread and realized spread, and increases execution 
speeds.  Fragmentation does increase short-term volatility, but prices are more 
efficient in that they are closer to being a random walk.   
 
The second section focuses on a particular type of new trading mechanism, crossing 
network, in which buy and sell orders are passively matched using the price set by the 
stock exchange. The results show that the crossing network harms price discovery and 
the relative lack of revealed information most strongly affects stocks with high 
uncertainty in their fundamental values. I find that an increase in the uncertainty of the 
fundamental value of the asset increases the transaction costs in both markets, but 
stocks with higher fundamental value uncertainty are more likely to have higher 
market shares in the crossing network. The impact of different allocation rules in the 
crossing network on market outcomes is also examined. 
 
The third section tests the theoretical prediction of the second essay. I find that 
crossing networks have lower effective spread and price impact of trade, but they also 
have lower execution probability and speed of trade. Non-execution is positive 
correlated with price impact, decreases in trading volume and increases in volatility. 
Crossing networks have higher market share for stocks with lower volatility and 
higher volume. We also find that the underlying assumption in previous literature, that 
stocks with higher effective spreads have higher reductions in effective spread by 
trading in crossing networks, is not supported by data. 
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CHAPTER 1 
IS MARKET FRAGMENTATION HARMING MARKET QUALITY? 
 
One of the more striking changes in U.S. equity markets has been the proliferation of 
trading venues.  While the traditional exchanges continue to execute orders, they now 
face a host of competitors ranging from electronic platforms such as ECNS (electronic 
communication networks) and ATS (alternative trading systems), to the trading desks of 
broker/dealer firms, and even to a variety of new entrants such as futures and options 
markets.  The addition of these new trading venues has created a marketplace in which 
equity trading can take place in ways and places unimagined but a few years ago.  And 
these changes are not just confined to U.S. markets.  European equity trading has seen 
dramatic growth of electronic platforms such as Chi-X and BATS, and even Canada, 
where the Toronto Stock Exchange enjoyed a virtual monopoly on trading, has 
experienced fragmentation with the addition of electronic venues Alpha, Pure and 
MATCH Now1
 
. 
What is less clear is how this fragmentation of trading is affecting the quality of trading.  
Certainly, the addition of new trading venues has increased competition, forcing the 
traditional exchanges to lower trading charges and other fees.2
                                                 
1 From its launch in 2007, Chi-X has now captured 19% of EU trading volume market share and in June 
2010 it was the second largest trading venue in terms of volume.  Alternative trading venues have grown 
rapidly in Canada following the launch of the consortia-owned Alpha trading system on November 7, 
2008.  As of March 20010, ATSs have captured 33% of the trading volume in Canada.  
  The proliferation of 
venues has also provided a wealth of trading options to the trading community, 
fostering innovations such as reductions in latency and more sophisticated crossing 
networks.   But there is a deeper concern that fragmentation of trading may also be 
2 See, for example, “NYSE Adjusts Charges in Bid to Draw Traders”, Wall Street Journal, Feb. 3, 2009, 
which discusses the NYSE’s strategy of lowering trading fee rebates to attract more high frequency 
traders. 
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harming the quality of markets by reducing the liquidity available not only in individual 
markets but in the aggregate market as well. Such a degradation of market quality could 
occur, for example, if fragmentation reduced the enforcement of time priority across 
markets, thereby dis-incentivizing traders from posting limit orders. A related concern 
is that because many of the new trading platforms are proprietary systems, not all 
traders can access all trading venues.  This raises the specter that markets may not be 
fragmenting so much as they are fracturing into many disparate pieces.   
 
In this research, we investigate how fragmentation is affecting equity market quality.  
This question has long interested researchers but empirical investigations have been 
limited by the difficulty of measuring both the extent of fragmentation and the quality 
of executions in diverse venues.  Our analysis draws on new data sources to provide 
better metrics for addressing these issues.  We calculate the extent of fragmentation in 
individual stocks by using volumes reported by the newly-established Trade Reporting 
Facilities (TRFs).  Whereas before off-exchange volume was simply aggregated with 
exchange-executed volume for reporting purposes, now exchanges must report only 
their on-exchange volumes, with off-exchange volumes handled by TRFs.3  Because all 
trades must be reported to the consolidated tape, TRF data provides an accurate measure 
of the trades being executed in non-exchange venues.4
                                                 
3 TRFs were mandated by the SEC as a condition for approval of Nasdaq’s application for exchange 
status.  The SEC required that as of March 5, 2007, all non-exchanges must report to a trade reporting 
facility, which in turn would report trades to the consolidated tape. 
  
4 TRF data does not disaggregate trades into specific execution venues so we cannot determine the 
specific volume of trading in each of the many non-exchange venues.  We can determine the aggregate 
off-exchange volume per stock, however, giving us comparable, and much improved, metrics for 
fragmentation.  An alternative fragmentation metric is the volume of trade executed away from the listing 
exchange.  Results using the two fragmentation metrics are similar, but for brevity we report only the 
TRF results.   
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To address market quality issues, we use SEC Rule 605 data, which is a set of execution 
metrics reported monthly on a per stock basis by all execution venues.5
 
  This data was 
generously provided to us by TAG/Audit, and it allows us to compare execution quality 
as measured by effective spreads, realized spreads and execution speeds across stocks 
with more fragmented or more consolidated trading.  We also use more standard TAQ 
microstructure data to investigate quality issues related to price efficiency.  Our analysis 
here examines short-term return volatility and variance ratio tests. 
Determining the effects of fragmentation on execution quality is complicated by 
endogeneity issues. As previously demonstrated (see SEC (2001); Boehmer (2005)), 
different stocks may have different costs of trading for reasons unrelated to 
fragmentation.  For example, small stocks generally have higher trading costs.  If small 
stock trading is also more likely to fragment, then finding higher trading costs for 
fragmented stocks may be spurious due to the failure to control for firm size.  
Additionally, market-related issues (see Bessembinder (2003); Boehmer, Jennings and 
Wei (2007)) may lead to fragmentation for reasons unrelated to the trading costs of 
stocks.  If particular venues only trade specific stocks, a finding of lower trading costs 
for fragmented stocks may be spurious due to a failure to control for this selection bias. 
 
Previous research has addressed these endogeneity concerns in a variety of ways, 
including matched samples, regression analysis and the Heckman correction.  We use 
each of these approaches in our research.  We use the Heckman correction to test for 
                                                 
5 Rule 605 data arises from an SEC requirement that all market centers publicly disclose on a monthly 
basis execution quality statistics.  Not all trade executions must be included,   but data must be provided 
for orders meeting the following criteria:  orders must be held; limit price must be less than 10 cents from 
the quote; order must be straight market or limit order; and the order must be for 10,000 shares or less.  
Bennett and Wei (2006) also use what was then known as SEC 11Ac1-5 data to address market quality in 
their study of firms moving from the Nasdaq to the NYSE, as do Goldstein et al (2008) in their interesting 
study of competition for Nasdaq securities.  
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selection bias in how stocks fragment across markets, and we use a matched sample 
approach to compare the execution quality of stocks with more fragmented trading to 
that of stocks with more consolidated trading.  We also use regression analysis to 
investigate more fully how spreads are affected by fragmentation and other economic 
variables.   
 
Our analysis yields a number of results.  We provide compelling new evidence on the 
extent and nature of fragmentation in U.S. equity markets. We find that off-exchange 
venues are executing almost 30% of all equity volume. While fragmentation levels vary 
widely across stocks, all firms now exhibit fragmented trading, and major markets and 
TRFS now trade virtually all stocks. These results are in stark contrast with earlier 
findings that only sub-sets of stocks fragmented and that markets were selective 
regarding the stocks they chose to trade.  Results from the Heckman correction confirm 
that selection bias is not a factor in explaining the relation of fragmentation and market 
quality. 
 
Turning to the main focus of our paper, we find fragmented stocks generally have lower 
transaction costs and faster execution speed.  The specific effects of this fragmentation 
differ across firm sizes, and it differs as well for NYSE-listed and Nasdaq-listed firms.  
For large firms, fragmentation is associated with faster execution time. For small firms, 
effective spreads are lower, but there are no significant effects on speed.  For NYSE-
listed stocks, large, liquid stocks appear to gain the most from fragmentation, whereas 
for Nasdaq-listed stocks, it is small, illiquid stocks benefiting from fragmentation.  
Fragmented stocks (particularly on the NYSE) do have higher short-term return 
volatility, but prices appear to be more efficient in the sense that they are closer to being 
a random walk.  These efficiency effects also exhibit differences with respect to firm 
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size and listing venues.  Regression analysis provides confirming evidence that market 
quality, as measured by effective spreads, is not harmed by market fragmentation.   
 
An immediate application of our results is to the on-going policy debate regarding the 
desirability of allowing fragmentation to occur in markets.  In the United States, 
fragmentation was an expected outgrowth of Reg NMS, particularly because of the 
changes required by Rule 611 (the “trade through” rule).  Our research provides a first 
analysis of how market quality as measured by transactions costs and efficiency 
measures has fared in this new market structure. 6   In Europe and in Canada, 
fragmentation is more nascent, and our results may be helpful for regulators struggling 
to decide whether to encourage or discourage more off-exchange trading.  In many 
emerging markets, off-exchange trading is prohibited.7
 
 Our finding that fragmentation 
does not appear to have detrimental effects on market quality suggests reconsidering 
such policies.  
We caution, however, that as with prior empirical work, our analysis has limitations.  
We do not have trade data identified by specific trading locale, limiting our ability to 
relate how execution quality differences reflect differences in particular trading 
mechanisms.  We also do not observe many factors that could influence routing 
decisions, such as payment for order flows, the use of indications of interest (IOIs), or 
smart routers.  These data deficiencies limit our ability to address the ex ante causes of 
fragmentation.  More recently, concerns have arisen regarding the stability of 
                                                 
6 Reg NMS, originally proposed in August 2005, entailed a variety of changes to market linkages and 
structure.  Among the most important changes was Rule 611 which essentially imposed a price priority 
rule across all market centers.  By requiring that orders must be sent to the market center with the best 
price, this rule allowed for greater competition by non-exchange venues.  Rule 611 was very contentious, 
and was only fully implemented for all stocks in October 2007.  
7 China, for example, strictly prohibits all off-exchange trading, as do most Asian markets.   
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fragmented markets in abnormal market conditions.  These conditions do not arise 
during our sample period, so an analysis of stability issues is beyond the purview of our 
research.8
 
  Our analysis is thus best viewed as providing empirical evidence on the ex 
post relation between fragmentation and market quality in normal market settings. 
This chapter is organized as follows.  The next section sets out theoretical arguments 
surrounding market consolidation and fragmentation, endogeneity issues and our 
empirical testing approach.  Section 1.2 sets out the data and sample period, and 
discusses the roles played by trade reporting rules and the newly-established trade 
reporting facilities. Section 1.3 presents results on the current state of fragmentation, 
both in the aggregate and conditional on firm and market characteristics.  Section 1.4 
presents empirical results from the Heckman correction, matched sample investigation, 
and regression analysis of how fragmentation affects various metrics of market quality.  
Section 1.5 is a short conclusion. 
 
1.1 Fragmentation versus Consolidation 
1.1.1  Theory and Empirical Evidence 
Whether trading is best consolidated into a single setting or dispersed across multiple 
venues has long interested researchers. The arguments underlying this debate generally 
rely on features of the trading process (specifically, the fixed cost structure of markets 
and network externalities) on the one hand, and the role of competition on the other.  
Traditionally, setting up exchanges was extremely costly.  Trading involved not only 
expenses related to the trading platform, but also to ancillary services such as 
                                                 
8 The causes of aberrant market behavior on May 6, 2010, generally known as the flash crash, remain 
undetermined.   
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monitoring and listing functions, and costs of clearing and settlement.9
 
  With much of 
this cost fixed, it followed that the larger the scale, the smaller could be the trading cost 
per share traded, and so the greater the gains from consolidation.  Network externalities 
convey a similar benefit in that the ability to match buyers and sellers is greater the 
more buyers and sellers there are in a market, and so trading costs also benefit from 
greater scale.  Thus, the notion that “liquidity begets liquidity” favors consolidation, 
even leading some to view exchanges as natural monopolies.  Of course, the downside 
of a monopoly is that it behaves non-competitively, so one argument for fragmentation 
is that the increased competition it engenders reduces trading costs. 
Much of the early theoretical work looking at fragmentation and consolidation argued in 
favor of consolidation.  Mendleson (1987) was perhaps the first to advance the network 
argument, while Pagano (1989) argued that equilibrium with trading in two markets was 
inherently unstable as orders would naturally gravitate to the market with greater 
liquidity.  Chowdry and Nanda (1991) advanced another case for consolidation by 
arguing that adverse selection costs increase with the number of markets trading the 
asset.  Madhavan (1995) argued that consolidated markets would not fragment if trade 
disclosure rules were mandatory across markets, but would do so otherwise.  In his 
model with non-disclosure, dealers benefit from fragmentation by being less 
competitive, and informed traders and large traders also benefit by being able to hide 
trades.  Madhavan stated that “fragmentation increases price volatility and induces other 
distortions as well.”10
 
 
                                                 
9 See, for example, Macey and O’Hara (1999) for a discussion of issues relating to exchange and trading 
system functions. 
10 See Madhavan (1995) pg. 581. 
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More recent research focused on whether competitive effects might shift the arguments 
in favor of fragmented markets. Economides (1996) argued that welfare losses 
connected with monopoly providers are not offset by network externalities, suggesting 
welfare improvement can obtain under fragmentation.  Harris (1993) noted that markets 
fragment in part because traders differ in the types of trading problems that they 
confront.  Hendershott and Mendelson (2000) demonstrated that fragmentation can 
reduce inventory risk of individual dealers.  Bias (1993) proposed conditions under 
which fragmentation would have no effect on market quality where quality is measured 
by the mean of spreads. 
 
Empirically, Battalio (1997) found that spreads narrowed on the NYSE after a third-
market broker (Madoff Securities) initiated trading.  Boehmer and Boehmer (2003) 
found a similar positive effect on liquidity when the NYSE began trading ETFs listed 
on the American Stock Exchange.  Fong, Madhavan, and Swan (2001) found positive 
effects on trading costs for large Australian stocks executed off-exchange.  Foucault and 
Menkveld (2008) looked at competition for Dutch stocks between EuroSETS, the 
London Stock Exchange trading platform, and NSC, the trading platform of Euronext 
Amsterdam.  They concluded that liquidity as measured by depth increased when 
trading expanded, supporting the notion that fragmentation may be the better outcome.  
 
Yet, other empirical work reaches a different conclusion.  Bennett and Wei (2006) 
examine stocks voluntarily moving from the more fragmented Nasdaq market to the 
more consolidated NYSE, and find overall execution costs fell when the stocks began 
trading on NYSE.  A study by the SEC (2001) also found lower effective spreads on 
NYSE than on Nasdaq for a matched sample of stocks, although other execution quality 
measures were mixed.  Gajewski and Gresse (2007) examine trading in Europe, finding 
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that trading costs are lower in a centralized order book than when orders are split 
between an order book and competing dealers.11
 
 Amihud, Lauterbach and Mendelson 
(2003) provide evidence from warrant exercise on the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange that 
consolidation is more beneficial.   Overall, the empirical evidence to date is mixed as to 
whether market quality is higher in a fragmented or consolidated market.   
1.1.2. Testing for Fragmentation Effects 
An immediate challenge to testing for fragmentation effects on market quality are the 
endogeneity issues noted previously.  Endogeniety problems can arise if firm, market, 
and order characteristics influence market quality measures for reasons unrelated to 
fragmentation.  Regression analysis provides one way to control for such differences 
and we use variables suggested by Bessembinder (2003), Madhavan (2000), and Stoll 
(2000) to investigate these effects. Another approach to deal with this problem (see SEC 
(2001); Boehmer (2003)) is to construct a matched sample of firms differing only with 
respect to fragmentation levels.  In Section 1.4 we discuss in more detail our matched 
sample analysis. 
 
Potentially more challenging endogeneity problems arise if markets selectively choose 
which stocks to trade.  This was clearly an issue in earlier studies of fragmentation.  
Bessembinder (2003) found that of the 500 NYSE listed stocks in his sample, other 
markets centers only traded between 77 and 163 stocks.  Boehmer, Jennings and Wei 
(2007) had 1435 stocks in their sample, but only 258 traded continuously in market 
centers other than the listing market.   
 
                                                 
11 Domowitz et al (2008) add a new dimension to this debate by looking at execution statistics for orders 
left in a single dark pool as opposed to sent sequentially to many dark pools.  They find that resting orders 
in a single venue enhances execution quality, consistent with an inter-temporal consolidation story.  
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A standard approach to control for selection bias is the Heckman correction.  This 
approach first uses a probit model to capture the variables affecting the proportion of 
trade in TRFs (our fragmentation measure).  The second stage then regresses effective 
spreads (a market quality measure) on variables affecting market quality including the 
fragmentation level (more precisely, the Inverse Mills ratio calculated in the first step).  
We develop this analysis in more detail in Section 1.4. 
 
Finally, endogeneity problems can also arise at the order level.  As markets fragment, 
orders go to new locales and leave old ones.  We can see the execution metrics in both 
venues, but we cannot know whether the types of orders moving to the new venue are 
the same as orders remaining on the old venue.  We control for this potential bias by 
comparing execution metrics only for specific order types. 
 
1.2. Measurement Issues, Data, and Sample Selection   
1.2.1. Measuring Market Fragmentation 
Market fragmentation refers to the extent trades execute in different locales. 
Traditionally, U.S. listed securities traded only on stock exchanges, or since 1971 on 
Nasdaq, but this has changed dramatically.  New technologies gave rise to trading 
venues such as electronic communication networks (ECNs) and alternative trading 
systems (ATS’s), and regulatory changes removed barriers that generally favored 
exchange locales.  Of particular importance was the passage of Regulation National 
Market System (or Reg NMS) in 2005 which changed order routing priorities and 
imposed caps on access charges that exchanges and other venues could impose.   
 
The result has been an explosion of trading venues, with more than 40 trading platforms 
available to traders in 2008. Table 1.1 lists these trading venues, which include seven 
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U.S. registered stock exchanges, 5 ECNs, 20 or more ATS platforms, as wells as a 
variety of new entrants to equities trading such as the Chicago Board of Options 
Exchange, the International Securities Exchange (an electronic options market), and the 
Chicago Mercantile Exchange (a futures market).  Add to this the internalization of 
orders by the more than 100 broker/dealer firms, and the number of venues executing 
trades becomes larger still. 
 
Table 1.1:  Trading Venues for U.S. Equities 
This table gives trading venues executing equity trades during the period January-June 2008.  
ECNS refers to Electronic Communication Networks and ATS refers to Alternative Trading 
Systems.   
 
EXCHANGES ECNS ATS 
NASDAQ BATS ITG POSIT CITIMATCH 
NEW YORK STOCK 
EXCHANGE 
DIRECTEDGE BIDS CS 
CROSSFINDER 
ARCHIPELAGO TRADEBOOK LEVEL LX 
NATIONAL STOCK 
EXCHANGE 
LAVA LIQUIDNET MLXN 
AMERICAN STOCK 
EXCHANGE 
TRACK MATCHPOINT SIGMA X 
CHICAGO STOCK 
EXCHANGE 
 INSTINET MORGAN 
STANLEY POOL 
PHILADELPHIA 
STOCK EXCHANGE 
 MILLENNIUM UBS PIN 
BOSTON STOCK 
EXCHANGE 
 PIPELINE BNY 
CONVERGEX 
INTERNATIONAL 
STOCK EXCHANGE 
 PULSE FIDELITY 
CROSS STREAM 
CHICAGO BOARD 
OPTIONS EXCHANGE 
 ESPEED AQUA LAVA ATS 
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Ideally, one would measure fragmentation by simply collecting data on trade executions 
by venue on a per-stock basis.  Unfortunately, such data is not available.  To understand 
why, it is useful to differentiate between execution and reporting venues.  In the U.S., 
all trades of listed equity securities must be reported to the consolidated tape.  Until 
recently, only exchanges could report trades, meaning that any off-exchange venue had 
to report trades to an exchange, which in turn would report those trades to the tape.  
Such trades would indicate only the reporting venue’s identifier, resulting in the 
reported trades of Nasdaq, for example, including both trades executed there and trades 
only reported there.  This aggregation limited previous studies of fragmentation as it 
was not possible to know where trades actually executed. Several studies, including 
SEC (2001) and Bennett and Wei (2006), simply assumed that Nasdaq was more 
fragmented than NYSE, and analyzed differences between market executions using 
venue as a proxy for fragmentation. 
 
In addition to complicating matters for researchers, reporting protocols raised important 
competitive issues. As exchanges and markets converted to for-profit status, exchange 
volumes became a competitive metric, with venues vying for listing business based on 
their claims of market size.  The SEC, responding to concerns of bias in these numbers, 
required that trades only reported on venues be separated from trades actually executed 
there.  Such segregation would be accomplished by the establishment of Trade 
Reporting Facilities that would report directly to the consolidated tape.  As of March 5, 
2007, all non-exchange executed trades must report to a TRF. 
 
In our analysis, we use TRF volumes to measure fragmentation on a stock-by-stock 
basis.  Because exchange-reported volume now includes only trades executed on that 
exchange, TRF data provide an accurate measure of each stock’s volume executing in 
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off-exchange venues. These data are not perfect, however, in that we cannot determine 
specific volumes for non-exchange execution venues (by individual ECN or ATS, for 
example). 12 Consequently, our TRF number is not a homogenous measure, reflecting as 
it does fragmentation into what are often very diverse trading platforms.13
 
 
1.2.2. Measuring Market Quality 
Market quality refers to a market’s ability to meet its dual goals of liquidity and price 
discovery.  In general, markets with lower transactions costs are viewed as higher 
quality, as are markets in which prices exhibit greater efficiency.  While these concepts 
are straightforward in theory, actually measuring such effects is problematic.  
Transactions costs can be measured in a variety of ways, and different traders place 
different value on different execution features. Market efficiency is even more difficult 
to measure, with a variety of proxies used in the literature to capture this concept. 
 
We use three measures to capture the transactions cost aspect of market quality:   
effective spread, realized spread, and execution speed.  As discussed later in the paper, 
Rule 605 data is based on orders, not simply on trade executions.14
                                                 
12 Due to concerns about the size and significance of off-exchange trading venues such as dark pools, the 
SEC has proposed adopting a uniform method for reporting equity trading volumes by venue.  Such a 
reporting protocol would provide greater transparency into where volume is actually executing. As of 
June 2010, however, this proposal has not been adopted, although some venues have begun voluntary 
reporting. 
  Thus, the effective 
spread is given by twice the difference of the trade price minus the midpoint of the 
13 While all reporting exchanges have established Trade Reporting Facilities, over our sample period only 
NYSE TRF, Nasdaq TRF, and National Stock Exchange (NSX) TRF were active.  In addition, the 
Alternative Trade Facility (ADF) also operated as a TRF.  The ADF was originally created by NASD in 
response to Nasdaq’s conversion to for-profit status.  The ADF includes both a reporting and display 
facility, allowing trading platforms who do not wish to post quotes on Nasdaq an alternative venue in 
which to display quote and trade information. 
13 Boehmer (2005) provides an excellent discussion of the properties and potential problems with Rule 
11Ac1-5 data, which is now known as Rule 605 data. 
14 Boehmer (2005) provides an excellent discussion of the properties and potential problems with Rule 
11Ac1-5 data, which is now known as Rule 605 data. 
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consolidated best bid or offer at the time of order receipt.  Effective spread is a standard 
measure in microstructure, and it captures the overall cost of executing the trade from 
the point-of-view of a trader submitting a marketable order.15
 
 Realized spread is twice 
the difference between the execution price and the midpoint of the consolidated quote 
five minutes after the trade.  Realized spread is sometimes viewed as a proxy for the 
profits available to market makers in making the trade.   Execution speed measures the 
time from order receipt until execution.  For some traders, speed is more important than 
spread. In general, faster markets are viewed as higher quality.  
We measure price efficiency using two standard proxies from the literature:  short term 
volatility and variance ratios.  Short-term volatility is the return volatility measured over 
a 15-minute interval.  The SEC views excessive short-term volatility as a negative 
metric of market quality in that some groups of traders may be disadvantaged by short-
term price movements unrelated to long term fundamentals. 16
 
  The variance ratio (see 
Lo and MacKinlay (1988)) captures the notion that, in an efficient market, prices should 
approximate a random walk.  The variance ratio is defined as the absolute value of the 
ratio of the variance of 30 minute log returns divided by 2 times the variance of 15 
minute log returns minus one.  The closer this number is to zero, the more prices behave 
like a random walk, and so the more efficient is the market.   
                                                 
15 A trader can also submit a non-marketable order, which is typically a limit order to trade at some price 
not currently at the market.  For such a trader, transaction costs would also have to include some measure 
of non-execution risk.   
16 SEC Concept release No. 34-61358 notes: “short term price volatility may harm individual investors if 
they are persistently unable to react to changing prices as fast as high frequency traders. As the 
Commission previously has noted, long term investors may not be in a position to access and take 
advantage of short term price movements. Excessive short term volatility may indicate that long-term 
investors, even when they initially pay a narrow spread, are being harmed by short-term price movements 
that could be many times the amount of the spread. ”     
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Hasbrouck (1993) suggests using a variance decomposition approach to measure price 
efficiency in markets.  This approach uses signed order flow to separate the noise 
variance component of price movements from the information-based variance 
component.  We do not use this approach because the aggregation of volumes across 
various market venues means that TRF trades are not homogenous.  An added 
complication is the difficulty of assigning trade direction, an increasingly important 
problem as more and more trades take place within quoted spreads.   
 
1.2.3. Data and Sample Selection   
The time period for our analysis is January 2 – June 30, 2008.  The data are drawn from 
TAQ, CRSP, and SEC Rule 605 data provided to us by TAG Audit.  Trading volume 
and price information are taken from TAQ data.  We also use TAQ data to calculate 
short-term return volatility and variance ratios.  We use CRSP data to provide 
information on market capitalization and price.    We use Rule 605 data to provide 
execution quality measures relating to transactions costs.  SEC Rule 605 requires all 
stock exchanges, dealers, and other market centers executing trades to provide specific 
data on selected order executions.  These data must be provided monthly on a stock by 
stock basis.17
 
  The data do not include all executed trades and are limited to specific 
order types.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
17 These include all orders meeting the following criteria: orders must be held; the limit price must be less 
than 10 cents from the quote; order must be straight market or limit order; and the order must be for less 
than 10,000 shares.  
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Table 1.2: Sample Selection Criteria 
The sample is selected from all listed securities in January 2, 2008.  We remove all securities 
that are not included in CRSP at December 31, 2007.  Those include warrants, preferred, and 
units bundled with warrants. We apply CRSP filters to remove non-common stock equities, 
common stocks of non-U.S. companies, close-end funds, Real Estate Investment Trusts, and 
Americus Trust components and dual class stock. Volume and quote filters are applied to 
eliminate infrequently traded stocks and low price stocks.  
 
 
We use data based on marketable limit orders for 9999 shares or less.  This data 
captures the largest category of transactions and seems most representative of general 
market quality, but it does mean that our analysis does not capture all trading in a stock.  
Market centers report data separately, so the data must be aggregated to provide an 
average execution metric for each stock.  We used data provided by TAG/Audit to form 
a volume-weighted average execution measure for each stock.  The data exhibit 
substantial outliers, so following standard practice we winsorize the data to set outliers 
to the 2.5 and 97.5 percentile levels.  
 
Table 1.2 gives information on our sample selection criteria.  We begin with all listed 
stocks on NYSE and Nasdaq. We follow Boehmer (2005) and apply standard filters to 
Criterion NASDAQ NYSE 
CRSP Filter (December 31, 2007) 
All securities in Jan 2, 2008 3134 3251 
No data in CRSP on December 31, 2007 -104 -762 
Non-common stock equities (ADRs, units, certificates and 
Shares of Beneficial Interest) -159 -564 
Common stocks of non-U.S. companies, close-end funds, Real 
Estate Investment Trusts and Americus Trust Components, 
ETFs 
- 211 -551 
Dural class stock  -123 -145 
 
2537 
 
1229 
 
Volume and Quote Filter (January 2, 2008-March 31, 2008)  
Missing volume, any day -507 -17 
Price<5 -442 -46 
Mean daily volume<1000 0 0 
Final Sample 1588 1166 
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remove non-common equities, dual class shares, REITS, and common stocks of non-US 
companies.  We also exclude stocks with prices below $5.00, with mean daily volume 
below 1000 shares, and stocks not in the CRSP data base.  Our final sample is 2754 
stocks, with 1588 firms being Nasdaq-listed and 1166 firms listed on the NYSE.  We 
refer to this as the universe sample. 
 
We use a smaller sub-sample of stocks in testing for market quality differences which 
we refer to as the select sample.  We form this smaller sample by selecting from our 
universe sample every tenth stock listed on NYSE (112 stocks) and every tenth stock 
listed on Nasdaq (150 stocks).  In the matched-pairs analysis, discussed later, we 
augment these 262 stocks with an additional 262 stocks chosen to match the selected 
stocks on attributes of price and market capitalization.  
 
1.3 Market Fragmentation 
How fragmented is trading in U.S. equity markets?  We address this basic question by 
first looking at trading volumes across the various executing and reporting venues for 
the period January – March 2008.  During this interval there were 9 exchanges, 3 TRFs, 
and the ADF reporting trades.  Table 1.3 provides data on trading volumes reported by 
each venue.  As is apparent, Nasdaq had the largest volume, followed by New York 
Stock Exchange. Archipelago, the fourth largest venue, is part of NYSE group, but it is 
treated as a separate location for regulatory reporting purposes (combining ARCA and 
NYSE volume results in larger overall volume than on Nasdaq).  The data also show 
that regional exchanges (i.e. National Stock Exchange, American Stock Exchange, 
Chicago Stock Exchange, and Philadelphia Stock Exchange) execute a very small 
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fraction of trades in the market.18
 
  Similarly, new non-equity exchange entrants (the 
Chicago Board of Options Exchange and the International Stock Exchange) did not 
establish any significant market presence during this time period. 
Table 1.3: Consolidated volume by reporting venue 
The consolidated volumes of all securities listed in NYSE, NASDAQ, American Stock 
Exchange (now known as NYSE Alternext U.S.) and NYSE ARCA. Sample period is from 
January 2, 2008 to March 31, 2008.   
Trading Venue 
Volume in 
Millions of Shares 
Share of Total Volume  
in percent 
Consolidated Volume 495548 100 
NASDAQ 153743 31.025 
NYSE 105418 21.273 
NASDAQ TRF 88302 17.819 
ARCA 82305 16.609 
NYSE TRF 31643 6.385 
National Stock Exchange TRF 12207 2.463 
National Stock Exchange 7701 1.554 
International Stock Exchange 5259 1.061 
American Stock Exchange 2872 0.58 
ADF 2684 0.542 
Chicago Stock Exchange 2260 0.456 
Chicago Board Options Exchange 717 0.145 
Philadelphia Stock Exchange  439 0.089 
Boston Stock Exchange  0 0 
American Stock Exchange TRF 0 0 
Boston Stock Exchange TRF 0 0 
International Stock Exchange TRF 0 0 
Chicago Stock Exchange TRF 0 0 
ARCA TRF 0 0 
Chicago Board Options Exchange TRF 0 0 
Philadelphia Stock Exchange TRF 0 0 
 
This is not the case for Trade Reporting Facilities, which rank 3rd, 5th, and 6th in overall 
trade volume, reporting in aggregate approximately 27% of trading volume.  The 
                                                 
18 The Boston Stock Exchange, which was acquired by the Nasdaq, was not active during this time 
period.  Similarly, while most exchanges had set up TRFs, most of these were not active during our 
sample period.  For an interesting discussion of the evolution of regional exchanges see Arnold et al 
(1999). 
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overall role of TRFs can be better seen in Figure 1.1, which depicts the share of trading 
volume for all Nasdaq-listed equities, AMEX-listed equities and NYSE-listed equities.  
For Nasdaq-listed equities, more than one-third of trading volume is taking place in 
TRFs.  For NYSE and AMEX-listed securities, TRFs play a smaller role, but still report 
almost 25% of volume in those stocks.19
 
  By any metric, TRFs report a substantial 
fraction of total U.S. equity volume.  As these trades are actually executing in myriad 
off-exchange venues, fragmentation is clearly an important feature of US equity 
markets.   
Figure 1.1: This figure gives the percentage share of trading volume for all NASDAQ, 
AMEX (now know as NYSE Alternext U.S.) and NYSE-listed equities. The sample 
period is from January 2, 2008 to March 31, 2008. The NASDAQ sample has 3348 
equities and the NYSE and AMEX sample has 5414 equities.   
                                                 
19 This finding that trading in Nasdaq-listed stocks is more fragmented than trading in NYSE-listed stocks 
is consistent with the intuition of earlier researchers such as SEC (2001) and Bennett and Wei (2006).   
46.87%
16.23%
33.85%
3.04%
NASDAQ NYSEplusARCA
TR FS Others
NASDAQ Equities
Share of Trading Volume
24.20%
47.21%
24.35%
4.25%
N ASDAQ N YSEplusARCA
TR FS Others
AMEX and NYSE Equities
Share of Trading Volume
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How important fragmentation is for individual stocks can be seen from the distribution 
of volumes across listed securities.  As Figure 1.2 (a) shows, individual Nasdaq-listed 
stock TRF trading ranges from a low of approximately 15% to a high of greater than 
75% of volume.  For individual NYSE-listed stocks, depicted in Figure 1.2(b), 
dispersion is smaller, but at the upper range TRFs report almost 40% of volume in some 
stocks.  Equally significant, fragmentation is the reality for all stocks; there are no 
stocks in our sample with zero TRF volumes.    
 
Figure 1.2: Distribution of Volume in Trade Reporting Facilities (TRFs) and Off-
Primary Exchange 
Figures (a) and (b) demonstrate the distribution of share of volume in TRFs for the 1588 
NASDAQ and 1166 NYSE stocks in our filtered sample. The x axis demonstrates the 
share of volume in TRF, with each bin has a width of 0.02. The y axis counts the 
number of shares that fall in each bin. Figures (c) and (d) provide the distribution of the 
share of volume in each stock executing off of the primary listing market.  The sample 
period is from January 2, 2008 to March 31, 2008   
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Which venues trade particular stocks?  Table 1.4 shows the number of stocks with 
reported trades in each venue.  The data show that TRFs trade all 2754 stocks in our 
universe.  This is also the case for Nasdaq.  Although the NYSE only trades stocks 
listed on NYSE, Archipelago trades both NYSE and Nasdaq-listed issues.  Thus, 
analysis at NYSE group level is not subject to a selection bias, nor is it the case for the 
regional exchanges which collectively also trade all 2754 stocks.  The new entrants to 
equity trading (ISE and CBOE) are not trading every issue, but as noted earlier their 
market share is negligible.  These results illustrate important features of the current 
competitive landscape for equity trading.  The sheer size of TRF volumes testifies to the 
important competitive challenges that off-exchange trading is posing for established 
markets.  Both NYSE and Nasdaq have been losing market share to TRF venues, and 
regional exchanges are diminishing in importance as well.  For at least some stocks (i.e. 
those in the right tail of the volume distributions), it appears that TRF trading is now the 
“market” in terms of trade execution.  
 
But what types of stocks are most likely to trade in TRF venues?  We investigate this is 
more detail in the next section, but we can provide some basic analysis by looking at 
simple fragmentation patterns by firm size and listing venue.  Nasdaq stocks are 
generally smaller than NYSE-listed firms, so in our universe sample we divide the firms 
listed on each exchange into large, medium, and small sub-samples based upon firm 
market capitalization as of January 2, 2008.  
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Table 1.4: Number of sample stocks traded in each venue 
This table gives the number that are traded, or in the case of TRFs reported, in each venue.  
There are 2754 stocks in our sample.  TRF refers to a trade reporting facility, and ADF refers to 
the Alternative Display Facility.  The other trading venues were not active during our sample 
period. 
 
Venue Number of Stocks Traded 
NASDAQ 2754 
National Stock Exchange 2754 
Arcapelago 2754 
NASDAQ TRF 2754 
National Stock Exchange TRF 2754 
NYSE TRF 2754 
ADF 2751 
International Stock Exchange  2674 
Chicago Stock Exchange  2502 
Chicago Board Options Exchange 1717 
New York Stock Exchange 1166 
Philadelphia Stock Exchange   690 
American Stock Exchange  15 
 
 
Table 1.5: Fragmentation for large, medium and small NYSE and NASDAQ listed 
stocks 
 
The total sample has 1166 NYSE-listed stocks and 1588 NASDAQ-listed stocks. Large stocks 
are the largest one third of stocks in each market, small stocks are the smallest one-third and 
medium stocks are in-between. The sample period is from January 2, 2008 to March 31, 2008. 
The asterisks ***, **, and * indicate significance level of one percent, five percent or ten 
percent.  
 
Panel A – TRF Volumes 
 NYSE Stocks NASDAQ Stocks 
 Observations Mean Observations Mean 
Large 388 0.219 529 0.301 
Medium 389 0.205 529 0.314 
Small 389 0.204 530 0.368 
Panel B – Differences in TRF Volumes 
 Difference P-Value Difference P-Value 
Large-Medium 0.014*** 0.00 -0.032*** 0.00 
Large-Small 0.016*** 0.00 -0.095*** 0.00 
Medium-Small 0.002 0.35 -0.063*** 0.00 
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Table 1.5 demonstrates different fragmentation patterns across NYSE-listed and 
Nasdaq-listed stocks.  For Nasdaq stocks, TRF fragmentation is more important, and it 
affects small stocks more than it does large stocks.  Many venues reporting to TRFs are 
crossing networks or ECNs, and these venues provide traders with opportunities to 
transact within the spread.   Because small stocks tend to have the highest trading costs, 
these data are consistent with off-exchange locales attracting order flow by providing a 
more competitive alternative for high trading cost stocks.   
 
For NYSE-listed stocks, TRFs play a smaller but still very significant role. 
Interestingly, for NYSE-listed stocks, fragmentation is higher for large stocks than it is 
for small stocks.   Large NYSE stocks are the basis for most major stock market indices, 
and so these stocks are particularly attractive to institutional investors.  Crossing 
networks provide institutions greater ability to trade large orders, while ECNs have 
typically featured faster execution speeds than the NYSE platform.  Greater 
fragmentation for large NYSE stocks may reflect competition by alternative trading 
venues for institutional traders.  
 
In summary, we find that U.S equity markets feature substantial fragmentation.  There 
is considerable dispersion in fragmentation across individual stocks and across different 
listing venues.  We now turn to investigating whether there are also differential effects 
of fragmentation on market quality.  
 
1.4 Fragmentation and Market Quality 
If fragmentation affects market quality, then we would expect to find significant 
differences in market quality metrics between stocks with greater fragmented trading 
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and those with more consolidated trading.  In this section, we provide a variety of 
empirical analyses to investigate this issue.  Because these analyses rely on firm-
specific order execution data, we analyze the 262 firm select sample composed of every 
10th firm listed on Nasdaq and NYSE.  This provides a large, random sample of firms to 
test for market quality differences. 
 
We first use the Heckman correction to investigate whether selection bias across 
markets affects the relation of fragmentation and market quality as measured by 
effective spreads.  We then use a matched-pairs investigation to control for other firm-
specific factors that could affect market quality.  In this matched-pairs analysis, we 
examine a broader range of market quality metrics relating to both transactions costs 
and market efficiency. Finally, we provide evidence from regression analysis to control 
for a larger set of factors potentially affecting the relationship of fragmentation and 
market quality.   
 
1.4.1. Selection Bias and Markets:  The Heckman Correction 
As noted earlier, a bias can arise if markets or trading venues selectively chose stocks to 
trade.  An econometric specification to control for selection bias is the two-stage 
estimation procedure commonly referred to as the Heckman correction (see Heckman 
(1979).   This approach has been applied to compare trading costs across various trading 
venues by Madhavan and Cheng (1997), Bessembinder and Venkataraman (2004), and 
Conrad, Johnson and Wahal (2003).20
                                                 
20 See Bessembinder (2003b) for discussion of this approach and its application to trading cost 
comparisons. 
 The first stage of the Heckman correction is to 
run a Probit model for choice of venue.  The Probit estimation then produces a new 
variable which is included with regressors as controls for selectivity bias in a second 
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stage regression of market quality.  Because our fragmentation measure is a proportion, 
we use the Probit model specification for when the dependent variable is continuous 
between 0 and 1 (see Fleiss, Levin and Paik (2003)).   For comparability with previous 
work, we use effective spreads as the market quality measure. 
 
Suppose that the proportion of trade in TRFs is determined by the following model: 
 
where Φ  is the standard normal cumulative distribution function (cdf) and iZ  are the 
economic variables to explain market fragmentation. We estimate the regression: 
 
Given the estimate
∧
γ , we then compute the inverse Mills ratio 
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is the standard normal pdf and Φ  is the standard normal cdf function.  
 
The second stage of the procedure is to run the regression: 
iiii Xspreadeffective ελθβ ++=
∧
_  
where iX  are the variables to explain market quality (here captured by effective spread) 
including the fragmentation level.  A simple test of selection bias is given by the t-
statistic on iˆλ If the iˆλ  is not significant, we can reject the presence of a sample 
selection problem.  
 
For the choice of iX  and iZ , we follow Bessembinder (2003b). The explanatory 
variables iZ  include the logarithm of market cap of the stock on January 2, 2008, the 
logarithm of average daily trading volume from January, 2   2008 to March 31, 2008, 
)( iii uZTRFpercent +Φ= γ
iii uZTRFpercent +=Φ
− γ)(1
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the average order size and the average price impact. 21
iX
  We also run the two-stage 
analysis excluding the price inverse variable. The  include the TRF percent, the log 
of number of trades, the price inverse, the average trade size, and an indicator variable 
equal to 1 when the listing market is Nasdaq and 0 otherwise.   
 
Table 1.6: Regression Results with Heckman Correction 
Panel A presents the estimates from the probit model of the likelihood that an order is executed 
in TRFs. The dependent variable is the probit transformation of proportion of volume executed 
in TRFs. logmkt_cap is the log of the market cap in January 2, 2008. logvol is the log of 
consolidated volume from January 2, 2008 to March 31, 2008. trade_size is the average trade 
size from January 2, 2008 to March 31, 2008. price_impact is the average price impact from 
April 1, 2008 to June 30, 2008. Panel B presents the second-stage regression that use inverse 
Mills ratio obtained from the first stage regression to correct for endogeneity. TRFpercent is the 
share of consolidated volume executed in TRFs from January 2, 2008 to March 31, 2008. 
logtradenumber is the total number of trades from January 2, 2008 to March 31, 2008. 
price_inverse is 1 over the closing price in January 2, 2008. , dummy equals one if the stock is 
listed on Nasdaq and 0 otherwise. Standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
Panel A: First-stage Probit Regression 
  (3.1) (2) 
VARIABLES pro_TRF pro_TRF 
      
logmkt_cap -0.0585*** -0.0457** 
 -0.0154 -0.0188 
logvol -0.00676 -0.0104 
 -0.0144 -0.0148 
trade_size 2.417*** 2.251*** 
 -0.231 -0.27 
price_inverse  0.578 
  -0.485 
Constant -0.656*** -0.724*** 
 -0.075 -0.0941 
Observations 262 262 
R-squared 0.413 0.416 
 
 
  
                                                 
21 Bessembinder (2003) also uses quoted spread in different trading venues as an explanatory variable in 
his analysis of market competition. We do not include this variable because we have a different focus in 
our analysis and the quoted spread in our dataset is aggregated quoted spread across all market centers.         
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Table 1.6: Panel B: Second-stage Heckman 
Correction 
VARIABLES effective_spread effective_spread 
mills_ratio 8.622 11.53 
 -5.906 -7.488 
TRFpercent -9.263** -9.262** 
 -3.739 -3.735 
logtradenumber -1.852*** -1.906*** 
 -0.223 -0.244 
price_inverse -44.92*** -39.74*** 
 -6.903 -9.092 
trade_size 33.36*** 36.74*** 
 -9.77 -11.35 
 
dummy 1.842*** 1.844*** 
 -0.56 -0.56 
Constant 4.851 0.709 
 -8.06 -10.32 
Observations 262 262 
R-squared 0.435 0.435 
 
The results in Table 1.6 show two important results.  First, the lack of significance on 
the Mills ratio also means that we can reject the hypothesis of a selection bias in the 
data.  Consequently, selection bias at the market level is not the important problem that 
it was for investigators of earlier fragmentation studies.  We caution, however, that our 
results are at the TRF and market center level.   We cannot, and do not, investigate how 
orders fragment across the individual ATS, ECNs, and broker/dealer desks reporting to 
the TRF where selection issues may still be present.22
 
   
                                                 
22 A second difficulty is that we do not have individual orders (or even trades) in each stock but rather 
overall traded volumes.  This difference matters because orders are now typically split into pieces and 
routed to multiple venues.  Boehmer, Jennings and Wei (2007) analyze the order routing decision across 
trading venues.  They find that “broker-dealers face competitive pressures to route to low-cost and/or fast 
execution venues”, which is consistent with fragmentation being driven by competitive factors.  They 
note, however, that practices such as payment for order flow, or the use of IOIs may also be explaining 
order flow, but the unavailability of data precludes analysis of these effects.  
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Second, we find that after implementing the Heckman correction an increase in TRF 
trading decreases effective spreads.  This is direct evidence that market fragmentation 
does not appear to harm market quality as captured by effective spreads.  The results in 
Panel B also show that spreads are positively related to trade size and to listing on 
Nasdaq, and negatively related to the number of trades (a proxy for volume) and to the 
price level.  These latter results are consistent with the findings of previous research. 
 
1.4.2.  Matched Pairs Analysis 
Another standard approach for investigating market quality differences is a matched 
pairs analysis.  Such an analysis can control for firm-specific factors than can influence 
market quality measures.  Following Davies and Kim (2008), we match firms based on 
market capitalization, price, and listing exchange.  Thus, using our select sample of 150 
Nasdaq-listed firms and 112 NYSE-listed firms,  we seek a corresponding firm on 
Nasdaq or NYSE, respectively, that minimizes the matching error given by:  
i i
ij
j j
MCAP PRCD 1 1
MCAP PRC
= − + −  
For each pair of stocks, we place the stock with the higher TRF volume into the 
fragmented group, and the other stock into the consolidated group.   By construction, 
firms in the TRF-fragmented sample have higher TRF volumes, but otherwise are 
identical to firms in the consolidated sample.    We refer to this as the “pairs sample”. 
We use data from the period January- March 200 to sort the matched pairs into 
fragmented and consolidated samples, and we use execution data from April –June 
2008 to test for statistical differences in the two samples with respect to market quality 
measures.  
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1.4.2.1 Execution Quality Results 
We first investigate whether fragmentation affects transactions costs which we measure 
using effective spreads, realized spreads, and execution speeds.23
 
    Table 1.7 Panel A 
provides evidence on these trading cost measures across the fragmented and 
consolidated samples.  In the post-Reg NMS world, effective spreads are extremely 
low, with average spreads in the 3-4 cent range.  The data show that effective spreads 
are lower in the fragmented sample on average by .29 cents, with median spreads lower 
by .11 cents.  These results are statistically significant.  As effective spreads measure 
trading costs from a trader’s perspective, this result is consistent with the competitive 
effects of fragmentation into TRFs being greater than the network externality effects of 
consolidation.   Fragmentation also lowers average execution speed, with significant 
differences on the order of 7 seconds between the consolidated and fragmented samples. 
Realized spreads are not significantly different between the two samples.  
Panel B reports results segmented by firm size.  We divided the 262 pairs of stocks into 
two groups based on market capitalization.  We find that fragmentation tends to benefit 
large and small stocks, but in different ways.  Effective spreads are statistically 
significantly lower for small stocks but are essentially unchanged for large stocks.  
Average execution speed falls for large stocks, but it is unaffected for small stocks.  
These differential effects across firm sizes suggest that different forces may be at work 
in explaining why trading fragments for different firm types. 
 
 
 
                                                 
23 The data exhibit substantial outliers, so following standard practice we winsorize the data to set outliers 
to the 2.5 and 97.5 percentile levels. We report both t-tests based on averages and Wilcoxon signed 
ranked tests based on medians.  
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Table 1.7: Execution Quality for Consolidated and Fragmented Samples 
Panel A contains the pair-wise difference of execution quality statistics of the112 NYSE pairs 
and 150 NASDAQ pairs in our sample. Those pairs are matched based on market capitalization 
and closing price on January 2, 2008. We consider marketable limit order of all sizes executed 
in all market centers. Effective spread and realized spread are in cents and average speed is in 
seconds. All variables are calculated using weighted averages based on executed shares across 
different sizes and market centers in the SEC 605 data.  Panel B contains the pair-wise 
difference of execution quality statistics of large and small stocks based on market cap. Each 
category has one half of the observation in our 262 pairs of NYSE and NASDAQ stocks. The 
sample period for execution statistics is from April 2008 to June 2008. The asterisks ***, **, 
and * indicate significance level of one percent, five percent or ten percent. 
Panel A. Overall Pairs Sample 
 Consolidate Fragment 
Consolidate
-Fragment p-value 
Effective Spread 
T-test Mean 3.61 3.33 0.29* 0.07 
Wilcoxon Signed 
Rank Test  
Median 2.48 2.26 0.11** 0.05 
Realized Spread 
T-test Mean 0.97 1.07 -0.09 0.31 
Wlicoxon Signed 
Rank Test  
Median 0.56 0.47 -0.08 0.25 
Average Speed 
T-test Mean 86.58 79.18 7.40* 0.08 
Wlicoxon Signed 
Rank Test  
Median 64.11 55.74 3.68* 0.07 
 
Panel B.   Large versus Small Stocks 
 Large Stocks Small Stocks 
Effective Spread 
Consolidate-
Fragment 
p-
value 
Consolidate-
Fragment 
p-
value 
T-test Mean 0.13 0.33 0.45** 0.05 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test  Median 0.04 0.36 0.23** 0.03 
Realized Spread      
T-test Mean 0.11 0.34 -0.30 0.11 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test  Median 0.01 0.43 -0.24 0.13 
Average Speed      
T-test Mean 10.12** 0.03 4.68 0.31 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test  Median 4.33** 0.03 2.84 0.34 
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To investigate this further, we examine in Table 1.8 execution costs segmented by firm 
size for Nasdaq-listed stocks and for NYSE-listed stocks.  Segmenting by firm sizes 
across markets helps us to control for listing standard effects as well for the fact that 
Nasdaq-listed stocks are smaller in general than NYSE listed stocks.  Looking first at 
Nasdaq  results, we find significant differences in both average and median effective 
spreads for small firms.  These differences are consistent with small fragmented firms 
having lower spreads than their consolidated matched firms.  This effect is not 
statistically significant for large firms.  Turning to NYSE results, we find no significant 
effects on spreads, but average speeds are improved by fragmentation for small firms.  
Because NYSE firms are larger overall, this result clarifies that execution speeds 
improvements are accruing not to the largest firms but rather to firms in the lower half 
of the NYSE size distribution.  Overall, our results suggest that fragmentation as 
measured by TRF volumes generally helps small firms, and does not harm larger firms.  
 
Our implication of these findings is that conflicting results in the literature may be at 
least partially due to sample selection biases.  Bennett and Wei (2006), for example, 
find that both effective spreads and execution speeds decrease for their sample of firms 
moving their listing from Nasdaq to NYSE.  They attribute these beneficial effects to 
the consolidation of trading on NYSE relative to Nasdaq, and so conclude that 
fragmentation is harmful to stocks.  But most stocks shifting from Nasdaq to NYSE are 
the larger stocks in Nasdaq, and as we show here fragmentation has no significant 
effects on those stocks.  A more likely explanation for Bennett and Wei’s result are 
different trading rules or corporate governance requirements between the two venues.24
                                                 
24 One such rule could be the NYSE requirement in place during their sample period that specialists faced 
restrictions on the size and movement of spreads.   Macey, O’Hara, and Pompilio (2009) found that firms 
delisted from the NYSE had differential effects on trading costs when moving to the Pink Sheets.  While 
the spreads of large firms actually decreased due to the sub-penny pricing allowed on the Pink Sheets, the 
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Table 1.8 Execution Quality for Large and Small Stocks by Listing Venue 
The table contains the pair-wise difference of execution quality statistics of in each market 
based on market cap. Panel A has 112 pairs of NYSE stocks and Panel has 150 pairs of 
NASDAQ stocks. The NYSE and NASDAQ samples are divided into large and small stocks 
based on the market cap on January 2, 2008. We consider marketable limit order of all sizes 
executed in all market centers. Effective spread and realized spread are in cents and average 
speed is in seconds. All three variables are calculated using weighted averages based on 
executed shares across different sizes and market centers in SEC 605 data.   The sample period 
for execution quality is from April 2008 to June 2008.  The asterisks ***, **, and * indicate 
significance level of one percent, five percent or ten percent. 
 Large Stocks Small Stocks 
Panel A:  NYSE Stocks  
Effective spread  
Consolidate-
Fragment p-value 
Consolidate-
Fragment p-value 
T-test Mean 0.21 0.11 0.16 0.33 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test Median 0.08 0.14 0.08 0.45 
Realized Spread 
T-test Mean 0.12 0.35 -0.02 0.47 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test Median -0.03 0.47 -0.27 0.34 
Average Speed 
T-test Mean 7.14 0.13 7.96 0.23 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test Median 1.02 0.30 6.92* 0.08 
Panel B:  NASDAQ Stocks 
  Large Stocks Small Stocks 
Effective Spread  
Consolidate-
Fragment p-value 
Consolidate-
Fragment p-value 
T-test Mean -0.05 0.46 0.78** 0.04 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test Median 0.01 0.48 0.29** 0.02 
Realized Spread 
T-test Mean -0.15 0.36 -0.25 0.25 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test Median -0.23 0.28 0.10 0.39 
Average Speed 
T-test Mean 5.77 0.28 8.80 0.25 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test Median 5.58 0.24 6.34 0.31 
 
                                                                                                                                               
spreads of small and medium-sized firms increased.  These authors attribute this worsening to the cross-
subsidization of smaller stocks by larger stocks on the NYSE.   
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1.4.2.2. Market Efficiency Results 
Could fragmentation harm other aspects of market quality?  To address this issue, we 
look at differences across the fragmented and consolidated pairs with respect to two 
standard measures of efficiency, specifically, the short term return volatility and the 
variance ratio.  We divide the trading day into 26 fifteen-minute intervals starting at 
9:30 a.m.25  We calculate return over each interval based on the spread midpoint at the 
beginning and ending of each interval.26
Short-term volatility is defined as the standard deviation of these returns over the three-
month period.   Greater volatility is viewed as a trading friction, so the lower the 
volatility the more efficient the market.  The variance ratio is the absolute value of one 
minus the ratio of the variance of 15-minute log returns to one-half of the variance of 
30-minute log returns.  A ratio of zero is consistent with stocks following a random 
walk, hence, a smaller number is better in terms of efficiency (see Lo and MacKinlay 
(1988)).  
   
 
The results in Table 1.9 reveal interesting divergences in the effects of fragmentation 
across trading venues.  We find weak negative results with respect to volatility: 
fragmented stocks are more volatile as measured by medians (but not means) for the 
overall pairs sample. The results for the variance ratio, however, point to the opposite 
result.  The variance ratio is significantly smaller for the fragmented sample, consistent 
with prices of these stocks behaving more like a random walk.  
 
                                                 
25 We also computed the short-term volatility, return autocorrelation and variance ratio for 5 minute 
intervals and the results are similar. 
26 An interesting problem arises with respect to the treatment of the close-open period.  Deleting this 
period introduces noise into the variance ratio test because the sums of log returns from 3:45 p.m. to 4:00 
p.m. and log returns from 9:30 a.m. to 9:45 a.m.(both one period log returns)  is not equal to the log 
return from 3:35 p.m. to 9:45 a.m. (the two period log return).  To deal with this heteroscedacticity 
problem, we included the overnight return, although statistically whether we include the close-to-open 
interval has a very limited impact.  
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Table 1.9: Price Efficiency for Consolidated and Fragmented Samples 
 
Panel A contains the pair-wise difference of price efficiency statistics of the combined 112 
NYSE pairs and 150 NASDAQ pairs in our sample. Those pairs are matched based on market 
capitalization and closing price on January 2, 2008. We divide the regular daily trading hour 
into 26 15-minute intervals and also consider the time between date t close and date t+1’s open 
as an interval.   Short term volatility measures the standard deviation of return for the interval. 
Variance ratio is the absolute value of 1 minus the ratio of variance of one interval log return to 
one half of the variance of two interval log return. Smaller numbers in both measures mean 
more efficiency.  Panel B contains the pair-wise difference of price efficiency for stocks listed 
in different markets.  The sample period for execution quality is from April 2008 to June 2008.  
The asterisks ***, **, and * indicate significance level of one percent, five percent or ten 
percent. 
 
Panel A:  Overall Pairs Sample 
 
Consolida
te 
Fragme
nt 
Consolidate-
Fragment 
p-
value 
Short-term Volatility (in Percent) 
T-test Mean 0.728 0.749 -0.021 0.11  
Wilcoxon Signed Rank 
Test 
Median 0.642 0.716 -0.030** 0.05  
Variance Ratio 
T-test Mean 0.179 0.163 0.017*** 0.01  
Wilcoxon Signed Rank 
Test 
Median 0.166 0.153 0.014*** 0.01  
 
 
Panel B:  Pairs Sample by Listing Venue 
 NASDAQ NYSE 
 
Consolidate
-Fragment 
p-
valu
e 
Consolidate
-Fragment 
p-
valu
e 
Short-term Volatility (in 
Percent) 
     
T-test Mean 0.024 0.16 -0.081*** 0.00 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test Median 0.005 0.25 -0.061*** 0.00 
Variance Ratio 
T-test Mean 0.019** 0.02 0.014 0.11 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test Median 0.016** 0.02 0.009 0.12 
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Table 1.10: Price Efficiency for Large and Small Stocks in Each Market 
 
The table contains the pair-wise difference of price efficiency in each market based on market 
cap. The 112 NYSE pairs and 150 NASDAQ pairs are both divided into large and small stocks 
based on the market cap on January 2, 2008. Each category has one half of the observations. We 
divide the regular daily trading hour into 26 15-minute intervals and also consider the time 
between today’s close and tomorrow’s open as an interval. Short term volatility measures the 
standard deviation of return for the interval. Variance ratio is the absolute value of 1 minus the 
ratio of variance of one interval log return to one half of the variance of two interval log return.  
Autocorrelation means the absolute value of first order autocorrelation of each interval. Because 
of our standardization, small numbers in all three measures mean more efficiency.  The sample 
period for execution quality is from April 2008 to June 2008.  The asterisks ***, **, and * 
indicate significance level of one percent, five percent or ten percent. 
 
Panel A:  NYSE Stocks 
  Large Stocks Small Stocks 
  
Consolidate-
Fragment 
p-
value 
Consolidate-
Fragment 
p-
value 
Short-term Volatility (in Percent)     
T-test Mean -0.052** 0.02 -0.11*** 0.00 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test Median -0.037** 0.03 -0.10*** 0.00 
Variance Ratio 
T-test Mean 0.008 0.31 0.019* 0.10 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test Median 0.016 0.20 0.009 
       
0.17 
Panel B: NASDAQ Stocks 
  Large Stocks Small Stocks 
  
Consolidate-
Fragment 
p-
value 
Consolidate-
Fragment 
P-
value 
Short-term Volatility (in Percent) 
T-test Mean -0.026 0.19 0.074** 0.02 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test Median -0.031 0.14 0.055** 0.03 
Variance Ratio 
T-test Mean 0.012 0.15 0.026** 0.05 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test Median 0.013 0.13 0.032** 0.04 
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Examining these results by listing-firm market reveals that the positive effects on 
variance ratios are due to Nasdaq-listed firms; these effects are not significant for the 
NYSE-listed sample.  Similarly, the data show no fragmentation effects on volatility for 
Nasdaq stocks, but an increase in volatility for NYSE stocks These findings raise the 
intriguing possibility that fragmentation has enhanced the efficiency of Nasdaq-listed 
firms, while simply increasing volatility for NYSE-listed firms. 
 
To investigate these effects in more detail, we divide our sample into size groups by 
listing market.  Table 1.10  presents these results.  The Nasdaq-listed results clearly 
indicate that fragmentation is uniformly beneficial for small stock efficiency.  Small 
fragmented stocks have lower volatility than their consolidated counterparts, and they 
also have lower variance ratios.  Large Nasdaq stocks exhibit no statistical differences 
between fragmented and consolidated firms.  Overall, these results suggest that for 
Nasdaq stocks fragmentation has helped some stocks without harming others.   
 
For the NYSE-listed sample, results are more complex.  Consolidated stocks have lower 
volatility for large and small stocks.    However, there is weak statistical evidence from 
the variance ratio test that prices for small fragmented stocks are closer to being a 
random walk.  Fragmentation thus appears to raise volatility for NYSE-listed stocks but 
does not appear to harm (and may actually help) other metrics of price efficiency.   
 
1.4.3. Regression analysis 
A third empirical approach to investigate fragmentation effects is regression analysis. 
Regression specifications to study trading costs issues have been used by numerous 
authors including Bessembinder and Kaufman (1997), Madhavan (2000), Stoll (2000), 
and Bessembinder (2003).  Bessimbinder (2003) argues that regression analysis is 
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particularly appropriate for studying fragmentation issues in that it can control for 
variations in types of stocks traded in each market or variations in types of orders and 
market conditions.  
  
We first investigate the relationship between effective spreads and fragmentation. Using 
the select sample of 262 firms, we ran the following regressions: 
1 2 3
4 5
_ log _= + + +
+ + +
i i i i
i i i
effective spread trade tradesize price inverse
TRFpercent dummy
α β β β
β β ε
 (1.1) 
1 2 3
4 5 6 7
_ log _
log _
= + + +
+ + + + +
i i i i
i i i i i
effective spread trade tradesize price inverse
sd mkt cap TRFpercent dummy
α β β β
β β β β ε
  (1.2) 
where  logtrade is the log of the number of trades in stock I from Jan.2 - March 31, 
2008, trade size is the average trade size for stock i, price inverse is 1/price where price 
is the closing price of stock i on January 2, 2008, sd is the standard deviation of the 
return of stock i from Jan.2 - March 31, 2008, log market cap is the market 
capitalization of stock i on January 1, 2008, TRF percent is the percentage of orders in 
stock i executing in TRFs, and dummy is an indicator variable equal to 1 when the 
listing market is Nasdaq and 0 otherwise.   The variables in these specifications are 
suggested by Bessembinder (2003), Madhavan (2002) and Stoll (2000).  
 
The results in Table 1.11 show that fragmentation lowers effective spreads.  In both 
specifications, the coefficient on the TRF variable is negative and statistically 
significant, consistent with our earlier results on the effect of fragmentation on spreads.  
The regressions also show that spreads are lower for actively traded stocks, higher 
priced stocks and stocks traded on NYSE, and spreads are higher for stocks with greater 
volatility volatile, larger trade sizes, and market capitalization.  
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Table 1.11: Regression Results 
This table gives results from regressions where for each stock effective spread is the average 
effective spread across all market centers from April 1 -June 30, 2008, logtrade is the log of the 
number of trades from January 2 - March 31, 2008, trade_size is the average trade size from 
January 2 - March 31, 2008, price_impact is the average price impact equal to the difference 
between average effective spread and realized spread across all market centers from April 1 - 
June 30, 2008, price_inverse is 1/closing price in January 2, 2008, sd is the standard deviation 
of daily stock return from January 2- March 31, 2008 , logmkt cap is the log of market 
capitalization in January 2, 2008, TRF percent is the percentage of volume reported to the TRFs 
from January 2- March 31, 2008, dummy equals one if the stock is listed on Nasdaq and 0 
otherwise. Standard errors are in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES effective_spread effective_spread 
   
logtrade -1.592*** -2.014*** 
 (0.134) (0.226) 
trade_size 20.80*** 16.84*** 
 (4.642) (4.857) 
price_inverse -50.70*** -46.33*** 
 (5.669) (6.646) 
sd  40.94*** 
  (14.60) 
logmkt_cap  0.583** 
  (0.284) 
TRFpercent -9.772*** -8.710** 
 (3.731) (3.712) 
dummy 1.837*** 1.678*** 
 (0.562) (0.557) 
Constant 16.46*** 14.54*** 
 (1.304) (1.503) 
   
Observations 262 262 
R-squared 0.430 0.449 
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Table 1.12: Regression Using Pairwise Differences (262 Matched Pairs, 524 
Observations)  
This table shows the result based on matched samples. ∆  shows the differences between the 
Consolidate and Fragmented paired stocks. effective_spread is the average effective spread 
across all market centers from April 1 -June 30, 2008. logtrade is the log of the number of trades 
from January 2 - March 31, 2008, trade_size is the average trade size from January 2 - March 
31, 2008, price_inverse is 1/closing price in January 2, 2008, price is closing price in January 2, 
2008, sd is the standard deviation of daily stock return from January 2- March 31, 2008 , 
logmktcap is the log of market capitalization in January 2, 2008, Standard errors are in 
parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
     
 (3.1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES ∆ effective_spread ∆ effective_spread ∆ effective_spread ∆ effective_spread 
     
∆ logtrade -1.186*** -1.321*** -1.139*** -1.277*** 
 (0.177) (0.191) (0.176) (0.190) 
∆ trade_size 9.792*** 7.254** 10.34*** 8.035** 
 (3.377) (3.431) (3.214) (3.284) 
∆ pinverse 8.284 19.07   
 (58.08) (57.05)   
∆ price   0.107** 0.0926** 
   (0.0420) (0.0415) 
∆ sd  26.66***  25.31*** 
  (9.743)  (9.669) 
∆ logmktcap  6.066**  5.489** 
  (2.473)  (2.455) 
Constant 0.330 0.337* 0.334* 0.344* 
 (0.201) (0.197) (0.197) (0.194) 
     
Observations 262 262 262 262 
R-squared 0.181 0.220 0.201 0.234 
 
 
We also looked at the relationship between fragmentation and effective spreads use   
pair-differences in our matched-pairs sample. We use similar control variables to those 
used in regression (1.1) and (1.2), and add additional variables to control for residual 
matching errors. In the previous literature, the difference of prices enters the regression 
in two different ways (see Boehmer, (2005); Huang and Stoll (1996)), so we ran the 
following regressions:  
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         (1.6) 
 
 
The dummy variable does not enter into these four equations because each pair has the 
same listing market. A positive α  in these regressions implies that the consolidated 
group has higher transaction cost, and Table 1.12 shows that this is case. In general, we 
find that consolidated stocks’ trading cost is about 0.33-0.34 cent higher than the 
fragmented group, which is similar to the result we find using the matched sample 
approach.   
 
1.5 Conclusions 
Is market fragmentation harming market quality?  Our results suggest the answer is 
generally no. From a transactions cost perspective, fragmentation appears to reduce 
effective spreads and increase execution speeds.  While the magnitude of these effects 
differs across listing and size regimes, we find that fragmentation is particularly 
beneficial for small stocks, suggesting that fragmentation has increased competition for 
iii
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traditionally less liquid stocks.  Moreover, while short-term volatility appears to have 
increased particularly for NYSE-listed stocks, overall efficiency seems to be enhanced 
in that stocks with more fragmented trading exhibit price behavior closer to being a 
random walk. These results suggest that fragmentation has enhanced the competitive 
nature of U.S. equity markets without degrading its transactional or informational 
efficiency. 
 
One might wonder how these ameliorative effects arise given the presumed positive 
network externality effects that arise from consolidated trading.  We believe the answer 
is that while U.S. equity markets are spatially fragmented, they are, in fact, virtually 
consolidated.  The development of sophisticated order routing combined with the 
existence of a consolidated tape and the “trade through” rule have resulted in a single 
virtual market with many points of entry.  This allows the positive benefits of greater 
competition and specialization to prevail without the negative effects that accompany 
the loss of consolidation. 
 
This result has particular importance for the debates surrounding fragmentation in 
global markets.  In Europe, the development of multi-lateral trading facilities (MTFs) is 
accelerating the movement of trades away from the established exchanges.  However, 
the lack of a consolidated tape collecting price feeds from all execution venues greatly 
inhibits the ability to establish market-wide trade-through protection.  Without such 
protection, it is hard to see how a single virtual market can emerge.  Similarly, in 
Canada, fragmentation has begun, but there is not yet regulatory policy regarding access 
to new venues, nor a trade-through rule to require orders to flow to the most competitive 
venue.  It remains to be seen whether benefits from fragmentation can emerge without 
such protections. 
 42  
 
 
Our results may have particular importance for developing economies.  Emerging 
economies have traditionally banned off-exchange trading, but the benefits of new 
trading technologies can be substantial if combined with appropriate regulatory 
protections.  In China, for example, putting in place trade-through protection and 
unified trade and price reporting protocols could set the stage for substantial 
improvements in market quality.  Conversely, in markets where such protections have 
not or cannot be implemented, fragmentation is likely to be more detrimental than not, 
suggesting that off-exchange trading prohibitions may be appropriate. 
 
Finally, the recent “flash crash” has raised concerns that fragmentation may raise 
stability issues for markets.  Our analysis does not include any periods of instability, 
and as yet this conjecture is unproven. But these concerns underscore the importance of 
understanding how market structure affects market performance.  We believe this is an 
important issue for future research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
A GLIMPSE INTO THE DARK: 
   PRICE FORMATION, TRANSACTION COST AND MARKET SHARE OF THE 
CROSSING NETWORK 
2.1 Introduction 
No trading mechanisms are more controversial than crossing networks, defined by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as "systems that allow participants to enter 
unpriced orders to buy and sell securities. Orders are crossed at a specific time at a price 
derived from another market." (SEC (1998)).27  According to a report by Tabb group, 
crossing networks account for 11.5% of average daily volume in the U.S. 28 Recently, 
this kind of trading platform has received increased public attention, partly because of 
"the industry's curious choice of the name ‘dark pool’."29 In June 2009, NYSE Euronext 
executive vice president Thomas Callahan asked Congress to pressure the SEC to 
reexamine its regulatory regime for dark pools because they can "harm price discovery 
and worsen short term volatility."30  A month later, Nasdaq CEO Robert Greifeld made 
an even more aggressive claim in a letter to SEC Chairman Mary Shapiro, in which he 
called for the elimination of dark pools because they are "market structure policies that 
do not contribute to public price formation and market transparency."31 On the other 
hand, proponents of dark pools claim that "undisplayed liquidity adds to execution 
quality" and "on behalf of all investors, dark liquidity adds to execution."32
                                                 
27 Examples of crossing networks are Goldman Sachs Sigma X, ITG POSIT, Liquiditynet and Pulse 
Trading BlockCross. For a list of these crossing networks, refer to Domowitz, Finkelshteyn and 
Yegerman (2009). 
  The SEC 
28 "Study: 'Dark Pools' Account for 4% of European Trades", Wall Street Journal, November 2, 2009. 
29 "Exchanges should unite to end flash orders", by Nasdaq CEO Robert Greifeld, Financial Times, 
August 6, 2009. Interestingly, even though Robert Greifeld is an opponent of "dark pools", he 
acknowledges that "dark pool" is a "misnomer and has inevitably gained a negative connotation." In the 
survey paper by Degryse, Achter and Wuyts (2008) on dark pools, all of the papers cited are actually on 
crossing networks. 
30 "NYSE Euronext Asks Congress to Press the SEC On Dark Pools", Trader's Magazine, June 10, 2009, 
31 "Dark Pools Fire Back at Call for Ban", Wall Street Journal, July 31, 2009, . 
32 "Dark Pools Fire Back at Call for Ban", Wall Street Journal, July 31, 2009. 
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now considers dark pools an area that "will have a significant impact on individual 
investors and the readers of the financial press,"33 and they are "expected to solicit 
comments and meet with proponents and opponents of dark pools."34
 
 
The finance literature provides surprisingly little insight into crossing networks and the 
following questions are not well addressed. Do crossing networks harm price 
discovery? Do crossing networks increase stock price volatility? How and to what 
extent do crossing networks affect liquidity and transaction costs in the public 
exchange?  Should crossing networks provide so-called "fair access" to all traders? 
What stock properties create a comparative advantage for crossing networks over 
exchanges or vice versa? 
 
Two obstacles prevent the previous literature from addressing these questions. First, in a 
model including both an exchange and a crossing network that also allows price 
discovery, we face two dimensions of uncertainty: price uncertainty and execution 
uncertainty. Current literature has not found a way to characterize these two uncertainty 
simultaneously. In classical models of price discovery, execution is guaranteed. 
Therefore, the volume is equal to the traders' order size, and the only uncertainty of 
profits comes from price. When not all submitted orders are executed, traders' expected 
profits are based on the expected volume as opposed to the submitted order size. 
Therefore, to define a profit function and optimal strategy, we first need to know the 
conditional expectation of the volume based on the order size, which usually resides 
within a very complex functional form. When the price is also a random variable, the 
problem becomes even more complex, because the profit is now a function of two 
                                                 
33 Speech by SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro, June 18, 2009. 
34 "SEC Plays Keep-Up in High-Tech Race", Wall Street Journal, August, 20 2009. 
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random variables. Second, if traders with better information can choose where to trade, 
the uninformed agents must guess informed traders' strategies in both markets, making 
the learning problem difficult to characterize. 
 
Due to these two obstacles, the previous literature on crossing networks relies on very 
strong assumptions. For example, Dönges and Heinemann (2006) and Degryse, Achter 
and Wuyts (2009) eliminate price uncertainty and assume that transaction costs in the 
exchange are fixed. These two assumptions enable these authors to focus on the 
complex problem of execution probability. However, the fixed price precludes them 
from studying price discovery and price volatility. Crossing networks also have no 
impact on the transaction costs in the exchange, which are assumed to be fixed.  In 
Hendershott and Mendelson (2000), traders with better information cannot choose 
where and how much they trade. Even under this strong assumption, the Hendershott 
and Mendelson model can only be analytically solved as the liquidity order flow goes to 
infinity, that is, when both information asymmetry and execution uncertainty disappear. 
 
This paper contributes to the literature by solving the obstacles encountered when 
considering two-dimensional uncertainty and two simultaneous markets. An analytical 
solution is obtained, which in turn provides theoretical predictions consistent with the 
empirical literature and sheds some light on the current policy debate. The paper also 
provides a number of predictions to be tested, which are summarized in the conclusion. 
 
This paper extends the frameworks of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) and Kyle (1985) 
frameworks to multiple markets: an exchange with guaranteed execution but also with 
price impact, and a crossing network with no price impact but without guaranteed 
execution. Two mechanisms are essential for this model. First, the informed trader 
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needs to balance two types of trading costs. In the exchange, his order has guaranteed 
execution, but each trade shifts the market price in an unfavorable direction. The 
informed trader's order does not have a direct price impact in the crossing network, but 
it has a probability impact in that the execution probability decreases as the order size 
increases. Second, the price impact of the informed trader's trade on the exchange not 
only affects his profit in the exchange, but it also creates an externality to his profit in 
the crossing network, where orders are matched at the price set by the exchange. This 
externality makes the informed trader trade less aggressively in the exchange than the 
Kyle model predicts. 
 
This reduction in informed trading in the exchange makes the order flow in the 
exchange less informative than it is in the Kyle model. Therefore, price discovery is 
reduced, as the order flow reveals less information to the market maker. The relative 
lack of revealed information most strongly affects stocks with high fundamental value 
uncertainty, because information on those stocks is more valuable to the informed 
trader, which creates a higher incentive for him to hide in the crossing network. 
 
However, less informed trading in the exchange decreases the adverse selection 
problem and increases the liquidity of the exchange as measured by Kyle's λ.  This is in 
contrast to the prediction of previous literature based on cream-skimming. Cream-
skimming predicts that the creation of new trading mechanism worsens the liquidity in 
the primary exchange, because new trading platforms may attract liquidity traders out of 
the primary exchange while leaving the informed traders in the exchange. Therefore, the 
adverse selection problem in the primary exchange becomes more serious, and liquidity 
of the primary exchange is harmed. Empirically, Fong, Madhavan and Swan (2004) do 
not find that crossing networks increase the adverse selection problem of the primary 
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exchange, and Gresse (2006) finds that crossing networks increase the liquidity of the 
exchange, which suggests that cream-skimming from the crossing networks must be 
offset by other mechanisms. My model suggests that the externality of price impact on 
the crossing network is one such mechanism. 
 
Due to its ability to characterize both price impact and non-execution, this model 
generates predictions on the relationship between these two transaction costs, which 
explain several anomalies found in the empirical literature. Ready (2009) finds 
empirically that stocks with a higher volatility are more likely to be traded in crossing 
networks, while Dönges and Heinemann (2006) suggest the opposite on theoretical 
grounds. My predictions differ from those of the Dönges and Heinemann model 
because their model assumes a fixed transaction cost in the exchange, whereas the 
transaction costs in both markets are endogenous in this model. My model shows that 
both price impact and non-execution probability are positively correlated with volatility, 
but an increase in fundamental value uncertainty creates a comparative advantage for 
the crossing network, because the informed trader has a higher incentive to hide his 
trading in the crossing network. Also, I show that crossing networks may have a higher 
market share for stocks with lower execution probability, which provides an explanation 
for the empirical anomaly raised by Ready (2009) that crossing networks' volumes are 
not high in stocks where the likelihood of finding counterparts is expected to be high. 
 
The behavior of the optimizing informed trader leads to a rather surprising prediction on 
execution probability. I find that an increase in liquidity trading in the crossing network 
may decrease execution probability, because the resulting increase in informed trading 
may be greater than the increase in liquidity trading. This prediction is opposite of the 
predictions of the model with no informed trader (Dönges and Heinemann (2006)) and 
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of the model with exogenous informed traders (Hendershott and Mendelson (2000)). 
This counterintuitive result is driven by differences in market structure. While the 
market maker in the exchange can actively adjust quotes to protect himself from the 
informed trader, a crossing network with a fixed allocation rule is passive. As liquidity 
trading in the crossing network increases, the informed trader considers the crossing 
network to be more favorable and moves even more trades to the crossing network than 
the liquidity traders do. 
 
The paper then shows how the crossing network can change its allocation rules to 
protect itself from the informed trader. To my knowledge, this is the first paper that 
studies how market outcomes are affected by different allocation rules in the crossing 
network. The main discussion in the paper is based on the rule that the informed trader 
trades first. Then two alternative rules are considered. One is to give the informed trader 
a lower trading priority, and the other is to exclude the informed trader from the market 
altogether. Both of these strategies decrease the non-execution probability due to a 
decrease in the level of adverse selection in the crossing network, but price impact 
increases as adverse selection in the exchange increases. Price discovery, however, is 
always enhanced by these two strategies. Interestingly, while the main purpose of the 
crossing network adopting one of these two strategies is to increase the execution 
probability, these strategies also minimize the negative impact of crossing networks on 
price discovery. As a result, the proposed change to enforce fair access in crossing 
networks will have two undesirable consequences. First, fair access always harms price 
discovery, because informed traders will hide in the crossing network. Second, fair 
access will lead to higher adverse selection problems in crossing networks. Liquidity 
traders on the same side as the informed trader would be crowded out. If a liquidity 
order is executed, it will be more likely to be an order on the wrong side of the market. 
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The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 provides institutional details about the 
crossing networks. Section 2.3 develops the model and solves for the unique linear 
equilibrium. Section 2.4 analyzes the crossing network's impact on information 
revelation and price volatility. Section 2.5 analyzes the price impact and the non-
execution probability as well as the relationship between them. Section 2.6 considers 
the competition for order flow between the exchange and the crossing network. Section 
2.7 considers the impact of different allocation rules on price discovery and liquidity. 
Section 2.8 concludes the paper and discusses the directions for future research. 
 
2.2 Institutional Details 
In crossing networks, traders anonymously enter unpriced buy and sell orders. The trade 
is priced by reference to a price derived from some other market. Crossing networks 
originated in the early 1970s as private phone-based networks among buy-side traders. 
In the 1980s, crossing networks went electronic with the introduction of Instinet and 
POSIT. Currently, there are about 40 crossing networks in the U.S. and 60 globally. A 
partial list of them can be found in Domowitz, Finkelshteyn and Yegerman (2009). As a 
thorough description of trading procedures of crossing networks would be voluminous, 
I focus my introduction on three key elements that define crossing networks and 
distinguish their types. 
 
First, crossing networks all have a benchmark price, which can be bid-ask midpoint, 
closing price, volume weighted average price, or national best bid and offer price. Here 
are examples offered by Hasbrouck (2007). For some crossing networks, the price is 
determined after the quantity match. In ITG's POSIT system, for example, potential 
buyers and sellers enter quantities to buy or sell, which are not made visible. At the time 
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of the crossing, the system matches buyers and sellers and the execution price is the 
midpoint of best bid and ask in the listing exchange. To discourage either side from 
manipulating the price in the listing market to obtain a favorable matching price, the 
exact time of a cross is random within a time window. For some other crossing 
networks, price is determined before the quantity match. For example, the Instinet 
closing cross allows traders to submit orders after the regular market closes. These 
orders will be matched and executed at closing price. Because price is determined 
before the quantity match, crossing networks need to be designed to discourage 
predatory trading. 35
 
 For example, Instinet cancels crosses when there are news 
announcements and monitors participants, expelling those whose strategies appear to be 
news driven. 
Second, prices of the crossing networks do not have the market-clearing function 
because they are derived from other markets. If buy and sell orders are not balanced, 
only the side with fewer orders can be fully executed. Therefore, crossing networks 
need proprietary matching algorithms to determine the trading priority for the side with 
the larger quantity. Examples of basic allocation rules include the time priority rule and 
the pro rata rule; rules in reality may be complex functions of these basic rules and are 
mostly confidential.36
                                                 
35 A strategy of predatory trading involve submitting orders in response to news announcements made 
after the determination of the closing price in the hopes of picking off unwary counterparties. 
 As crossing networks are not public exchanges, their customers 
can be selected and some traders can be excluded. This can be considered as an extreme 
allocation rule in which some traders always get 0 execution. Crossing networks' 
preferred customers are "buy-side" firms, particularly those who manage "passive 
portfolios" such as index funds. Two kinds of traders are often excluded from the 
36 As the paper will show, allocation rules are the key for crossing networks to minimize the adverse 
selection problem created by informed traders. Therefore, crossing networks adopt complex allocation 
rules, keep them confidential, and frequently change them. 
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crossing network. The first kind is potentially informed traders such as hedge funds, 
brokers and proprietary traders from sell-side firms; the second kind is traders who 
submit small orders to extract information contained in the order flow. 
 
Finally, crossing networks differ in their matching frequency. Some only match orders 
once a day, whereas others may match several times a day or have continuous matching. 
 
There are several advantages to trade in crossing networks. First, there are usually no 
bid-ask spreads in crossing networks, as buy and sell orders are executed at the same 
price. Second, trades also do not have price impacts, as their prices are independent of 
order sizes. Conditional on execution, crossing networks usually have lower transaction 
costs than does the exchange (Keim and Madhavan (1998), Conrad, Johnson and Wahal 
(2003), Næs and Ødegaard (2006) and Sofianos and Jeria (2008)). In addition, 
institutional traders like to use crossing networks because they prevent information 
leakage. If information associated with an institutional order leaked out, opportunistic 
front runners could trade in advance of the order in the same direction, thereby driving 
the price in an unfavorable direction. 
 
The three benefits of trading in crossing networks prompt Conrad, Johnson and Wahal 
(2003) and Ready (2009) to ask why crossing networks are not more widely used. The 
answer is that the probability of execution in crossing networks is significantly lower 
than that in the exchange. Gresse (2006) finds that the execution probability of the 
crossing network is as low as 2.63% to 4.13%, whereas the order fill rate in the 
exchange is as high as 90% (Keim and Madhavan (1995) and Perold and Sirri (1993)).37
                                                 
37 These numbers are for all types of orders. The fill rate for limit orders, especially nonmarketable limit 
orders, are lower. Hasbrouck and Saar (2009) find that the fill rate for nonmarketable limit order is 
6.37%. 
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If we measure trading costs for both executed orders and nonexecuted orders using the 
implement shortfall developed by Perold (1988), we can say that crossing networks 
have lower execution costs but higher opportunity costs. 
 
Non-execution can occur for noninformational reasons. The Hendershott and 
Mendelson model shows that even if there is no information asymmetry, expected 
probability of execution cannot be higher than 70% because of random mismatch of 
geometrically distributed buy and sell order flow. Non-execution can also occur for 
informational reasons. On one side of the market, there are both liquidity and informed 
traders, and on the other side there are only liquidity traders. The noninformational and 
informational causes of non-execution have different implications. In a world without 
information asymmetry, the expected price change is 0 after each trade. On the other 
hand, non-execution caused by informational sources has an adverse selection effect. 
An order on the same side as the informed order may be crowded-out by the informed 
trader. On the other hand, an executed order is more likely to be on the wrong side of 
the market. By analyzing an institutional buyer, Næs and Ødegaard (2006) show that 
stocks that fail to execute in the crossing network have significantly higher cumulative 
abnormal returns than stocks that successfully execute, an indication of the adverse 
selection problem in crossing networks. 
 
2.3 Model 
2.3.1 Setup of the Model 
This model is a variation of the canonical strategic trade model developed by Kyle 
(1985).  I consider a two-period model with two markets: an exchange and a crossing 
network. A single risky asset is traded by three types of agents: a risk-neutral informed 
trader, many liquidity traders, and a market maker. The asset has a stochastic liquidation 
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value 𝑣𝑔� with𝐸�𝑣𝑔� � = 𝑝0. The informed trader observes in advance the realization of 
𝑣𝑔�, denoted 𝑣𝑔, and submits 𝑥𝑒 ∈ ℝ to the exchange and 𝑥𝑑 ∈ ℝ to the crossing network 
to maximize the value of his information. 
 
As in the Kyle model, liquidity traders are passive players and their motives for trade 
are not explicitly modeled. Dönges and Heinemann (2006), Degryse, Achter and Wuyts 
(2009), Foster, Gervais and Ramaswamy (2007) and Hendershott and Mendelson 
(2000) show that heterogeneous liquidity preferences of liquidity traders, which 
represent their willingness to pay for the immediacy of execution, can lead to non-zero 
liquidity trading in both markets. These four papers also show that crossing networks 
generate new liquidity traders who are unwilling to trade in the exchange.  In addition to 
liquidity preference, trade size is also a consideration in the choice of market. Index 
funds or other institutional traders who manage passive portfolios may make large 
liquidity trades, which will cause a substantial price impact if they trade in the 
exchange. Therefore, these traders may opt to trade in the crossing network. 
Conversely, small traders may prefer the exchange because the price impact of their 
trade is trivial. It is very hard to incorporate the choice of both informed and liquidity 
traders when there are different kinds of trading mechanism.38 The previous literature 
either assumes that there are no informed traders (Parlour and Seppi (2003)) or that 
there are only exogenous informed traders (Hendershott and Mendelson (2000)). The 
assumption of exogenous liquidity traders is certainly closer to the standard assumption 
in the market microstructure literature.39
                                                 
38 Chowdhry and Nanda (1991) and Baruch, Karolyi and Lemmon (2007) model the choice of both 
informed and liquidity traders when assets are traded in several markets with the same trading 
mechanism. 
 
39 In reality, exchanges and crossing networks coexist, which is a strong indication of liquidity trading in 
both markets because informed traders cannot trade among themselves. My model reduces to the Kyle 
model if there are no liquidity traders in the crossing network. No equilibrium exists when all of the 
liquidity traders are in the crossing network. The reason is as follows. Suppose that the informed trader 
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The liquidity order flow in the exchange is denoted as 𝑢𝑒� ∈ ℝ. For the convenience of 
modeling, the buy order flow and sell order flow are defined separately in the crossing 
network. Let 𝑢𝑑𝑏� ∈ ℝ⁺ and 𝑢𝑑𝑠� ∈ ℝ⁺ be the unsigned aggregate liquidity buy and sell 
order flows in the crossing network, respectively. I assume that 𝑣𝑔�, 𝑢𝑒�, 𝑢𝑑𝑏� and 𝑢𝑑𝑠�  are 
independently distributed, and their distributions will be specified below. 
 
The timing of events is depicted in Figure 2.1. At time 0, all four random variables are 
realized. The informed trader observes 𝑣𝑔  but does not observe 𝑢𝑒� , 𝑢𝑑𝑏�  or 𝑢𝑑𝑠� . His 
trading strategy {𝑋𝑒 , 𝑋𝑑 } assigns an order size in the exchange and the crossing 
network to each 𝑣𝑔 . The crossing network only accepts orders before time 1, even 
though it opens in the second period, because after time 1, the informed trader knows 
both the realization of 𝑣𝑔� and the price 𝑝�. He could then compare these two values and 
conduct predatory trading in the crossing network. At time 1, when the exchange opens, 
the market maker observes the aggregate order flow in the exchange 𝑦� =  𝑥𝑒� + 𝑢𝑒� but 
cannot know the individual values of 𝑥𝑒� and 𝑢𝑒�. He also does not know 𝑣𝑔�, 𝑥𝑑�, 𝑢𝑑𝑏�  or 
𝑢𝑑
𝑠� . The market maker sets the semi-strong efficient price 𝑝�  to clear the imbalance 
between the buy and sell orders. The market maker's pricing rule is 𝑃, which assigns to 
each outcome of 𝑦� a price 𝑝� based on his conjecture of the informed trader's strategy 
{𝑋𝑒, 𝑋𝑑}. At time 2, the crossing network opens. 𝑝� is used to match the buy and sell 
orders. The stock liquidates at the end of period 2. As there is no market maker to offer 
liquidity for the trade imbalance in the crossing network, only the side with less volume 
gets full execution; the side with more volume, on the other hand, gets partial execution. 
                                                                                                                                               
trades in the exchange; then his information would be fully revealed to the dealer based on Grossman and 
Stiglitz (1980) and he would earn 0 profit. Therefore, the informed trader would not trade in the 
exchange. However, if the informed trader does not trade in the exchange, then the exchange shuts down, 
and there is no price for the crossing network. Alternatively, it can be assumed that the market maker sets 
a price equal to p₀ when nobody trades. A price of p₀, however, would lead the informed trader to trade in 
the exchange. Therefore, no equilibrium exists. 
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Figure 2.1: Time line of the model 
 
Because 𝑝� is determined before time 2, the informed order size 𝑥𝑑  does not have a 
direct price impact in the crossing network.40
 
 This would lead the risk-neutral informed 
trader to submit an infinite size 𝑥𝑑. To rule out this possibility, I follow Hendershott and 
Mendelson (2000), Seppi (1997), Parlour and Seppi (2003) and Foucault and Menkveld 
(2008) and assume that there is an up-front order submission cost of 𝑐 per share, which 
applies to both the exchange and the crossing network. Because all orders in the 
exchange are executed, 𝑐 can be understood as the commission, whereas the cost in the 
crossing network will "capture any incremental opportunity or shoe leather costs 
investors bear when trading from off the exchange." (Seppi (1997)). My model holds 
for any positive 𝑐 so the value of 𝑐 can be set to be arbitrarily small. 
Because of the cost 𝑐, the informed trader's profit per unit is (𝑣𝑔 − 𝑐) − 𝑝� when he buys 
and is 𝑝� − (𝑣𝑔 + 𝑐) when he sells. The cost 𝑐 has an asymmetric effect for the informed 
trader: it increases the fundamental value to the informed buyer and decreases the 
fundamental value to the informed seller. Moreover, when 𝑣𝑔 ∈ [𝑝0 − 𝑐,𝑝0 + 𝑐], the 
                                                 
40 At equilibrium, 𝑥𝑑  indirectly impacts the price because the market maker has a correct belief regarding 
𝑋𝑑. 
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potential revenue of trading is lower than the up-front submission cost. Therefore, the 
informed trader neither buys nor sells. To rule out the possibility of non-trading, the 
Hendershott and Mendelson model assumes that informed traders always trade. In this 
paper, I make the following assumption on 𝑣𝑔, whose only purpose is to make all of the 
proofs in the paper rigorous. Without the assumption, it can be proven that the model 
holds asymptotically by letting 𝑐 approach 0. 
 
To define the distribution of 𝑣𝑔� , I assume that a new variable 𝑣� , which is the 
fundamental value of the asset to the informed trader after adjusting for 𝑐, follows the 
normal distribution 
𝑣� ∼ 𝑁(𝑝0,𝜎𝑣2). 
 
Then 𝑣𝑔� is defined by the following transformation of 𝑣�: 
𝑣𝑔� = �𝑣� + 𝑐 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑣� ≥ 𝑝0𝑣� − 𝑐 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑣� < 𝑝0                               (2.1) 
Intuitively, this transformation means that the value of the information is normally 
distributed after deducting the up-front submission cost. In addition, Pr�𝑣𝑔� ∈[ 𝑝0 − 𝑐,𝑝0 + 𝑐]) = 0; thus, the information always leads the informed trader to submit 
orders. The Kyle model makes assumption about 𝑣� directly because it does not model 
commission or other submission cost; by contrast, I need to make assumptions about 𝑣𝑔�, 
because the up-front submission cost is part of the model. The value 𝑣𝑔� will only show 
up in the intermediate steps of the proofs, whereas the major results of the paper only 
contain 𝑣�  because c cancels out in the derivation. Finally, 𝑣𝑔� and 𝑣� are informationally 
equivalent because they have a one-to-one mapping such that 𝐸�. �𝑣𝑔�� = 𝐸(. |𝑣�).  In 
addition, it is easy to show that 𝐸�𝑣𝑔� � = 𝐸(𝑣�) = 𝑝0.  
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As in the Kyle model, I assume that the liquidity order flow in the exchange,  𝑢𝑒� , 
follows a normal distribution with mean 0 and variance 𝜎𝑒2, where 𝑢𝑒� > 0 represents a 
net buy order flow and 𝑢𝑒� < 0 represents a net sell order flow. The standard deviation 
𝜎𝑒 serves as a proxy for the level of liquidity trading in the exchange.
41
 
 
The unsigned liquidity buy, 𝑢𝑑𝑏� , and the unsigned liquidity sell, 𝑢𝑑𝑠� , follow power law 
distributions. The fact that U.S. trading volume follows a power law distribution has 
been found by Gopikrishnan, Plerou, Gabaix and Stanley (2000). This result is extended 
to France and the UK by Gabaix, Gopikrishnan, Plerou and Stanley (2006) and by 
Plerou and Stanley (2007).  
 
The following equation defines 𝑢𝑑𝑠� . The distribution of 𝑢𝑑𝑏�  can be similarly defined. 
 
The cumulative distribution function (C.D.F.) of 𝑢𝑑𝑠�  is 
𝐹𝑠(𝑧; 𝑘) = 𝑃�𝑢𝑑𝑠� ≤ 𝑧� = �0,                       𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑧 < 01 −� 𝑘
𝑧+𝑘
,   𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑧 ≥ 0        (2.2) 
    which also implies the following probability distribution function (P.D.F.) of 𝑢𝑑𝑠� 
𝑓𝑠(𝑧; 𝑘) = �0,                           𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑧 < 01
2
𝑘
1
2(𝑧 + 𝑘)−32   𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑧 ≥ 0                                (2.3) 
The parameter k, which is called the scale, is an inherent parameter of the distribution. 
Figure 2.2 shows that a distribution with a higher k stochastically dominates a 
distribution with a lower k. Therefore, k captures the level of liquidity trading in the 
                                                 
41 The unsigned order flow, |𝑢𝑒�|, , follows a folded normal distribution with 𝐸|𝑢𝑒�| = �2𝜋 𝜎𝑒 . Thus, the 
expected size of uninformed order flow is linear in 𝜎𝑒. 
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crossing network. As k increases, the level of liquidity trading in the crossing network 
increases. 
 
 
Figure 2.2: The cumulative distribution function of the power law distribution 
This figure illustrates the cumulative distribution function (C.D.F.) of the power law 
distribution for different k. The horizontal axis measures the order size and the vertical 
axis measures the value of the C.D.F. A distribution with larger k stochastically 
dominates a distribution with smaller k. 
 
2.3.2 Allocation Rules 
Market microstructure is the study of the process and outcomes of exchanging assets 
under explicit trading rules (O'Hara (1995)). The key rule affecting the market 
outcomes in my model is the allocation rule of the crossing network. First, let us 
consider a rule that defines a scenario in which the crossing network can successfully 
exclude the informed trader. Then, the exchange in my model reduces to that in the 
Kyle model. Each trade reveals half of the information, and the information revelation 
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is independent of the fundamental value uncertainty 𝜎𝑣 and the level of noise trading in 
the exchange 𝜎𝑒 . Therefore, price discovery is not harmed. A crossing network 
operating under the conditions defined by the informed-excluded rule still has a non-
execution problem because of the random mismatch between buyers and sellers. 
However, it is easy to verify that a change in the level of liquidity trading k will not 
affect the non-execution probability in this model. Hence, instead of capturing the 
network externality in which more liquidity traders lead to a higher execution 
probability (Dönges and Heinemann (2006) and Hendershott and Mendelson (2000)), 
my model focuses on the non-execution caused by informed trading. 
 
Certainly, it is unrealistic to expect that the crossing network can always exclude the 
informed trader. Næs and Ødegaard (2006) find evidence of informed trading in the 
crossing network by examining cumulative abnormal returns of the stocks. In addition, 
there is a proposed policy change to enforce "fair access" to the crossing network. 
Suppose this policy change is implemented; then the crossing network cannot exclude 
any trader. I consider the case where informed trader can trade in the crossing network, 
which is both realistic and also sheds some light on the effect of the proposed "fair 
access" policy. 
 
This model can be analytically solved in two cases. In the first case, the informed trader 
has priority over liquidity traders. This case can be understood as a crossing network 
with a time priority rule and the informed trader, who has better technology and 
information, trades faster than the liquidity traders do. In the second case, liquidity 
buyers and sellers trade first and the informed trader can only trade with the residual of 
the liquidity order flow. This rule corresponds to the situation in which the informed 
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trader is detected and is placed at the end of the queue.42 These two rules impose an 
upper bound and lower bound on the informed trader's impact in the crossing network, 
where all other rules can be considered combinations of these two extremes. Solving the 
model under other allocation rules such as a pro rata rule is a formidable task. 43
 
 
Fortunately, the qualitative results of the informed-first and the liquidity-first rules are 
very similar because the only effect of the liquidity-first rule is to decrease the amount 
of liquidity trading available to the informed trader, whereas the key mechanisms 
driving the results remain the same. The discussions and proofs in this paper will focus 
on the informed-first rule, and the liquidity-first rule will be considered in the section on 
alternative allocation rules. 
2.3.3 Equilibrium 
 
In this subsection, I solve the model in two steps. The first step derives the profit 
function, which is in a complex functional form. Then the model is solved in the second 
step. The final part of this subsection discusses the comparative statics of the 
                                                 
42 In reality, crossing networks do not like informed traders, and they have all kinds of anti-gaming 
techniques to minimize the impact of potentially informed order flow. 
43 Pro rata rule means that all the traders get an equal proportion of executed shares for each share he or 
she submits. If we want to solve the problem under the pro rata rule, we must calculate the expectation of 
the ratio of two random variables. That is, we must generate the expected volume for the informed trader 
who wants to submit 𝑥𝑑 buy orders in terms of the following function form 
𝑥𝑚� = �𝑥𝑑 ∗ 𝑢𝑑𝑠�𝑢𝑑𝑏�+𝑥𝑑     𝑖𝑓 𝑢𝑑𝑠� ≤  𝑢𝑑𝑏� + 𝑥𝑑
𝑥𝑑   𝑢𝑑𝑠� >  𝑢𝑑𝑏� + 𝑥𝑑  . Then, it is very hard to write the functional form of E(xm� |xd) for 
the following two reasons. First, the expectation of ratio of two random variables is generally not equal to 
the ratio of their expectation even if the two variables are independent. Therefore, to calculate E(xm� |xd) 
we first need to calculate the joint density of random variables 𝑢𝑑𝑠�  and   𝑢𝑑𝑏� + 𝑥𝑑 or or the expectation of 
the ratio distribution 𝑢𝑑
𝑠�
𝑢𝑑
𝑏�+𝑥𝑑
. To make things worse, the probability of execution can never be greater than 
1. This makes us unable to follow the limited cases in which ratio distribution is well defined. So the best 
we can do is to express E(xm� |xd) as integrals.  For most distributions of  𝑢𝑑𝑠�  and  𝑢𝑑𝑏�, the integral is 
difficult or impossible to express in terms of a finite number of elementary functions. 
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equilibrium, which provides the intuitions for the results on price discovery, volatility, 
transaction costs and market share. 
 
The definition of equilibrium is as follows: 
Definition 2.1: A rational expectation equilibrium is an informed order submission 
strategy 𝑋𝑒 , 𝑋𝑑  and a market maker's pricing rule P such that the following two 
conditions hold: 
1. Profit Maximization: For any alternative strategy 𝑋𝑒′ , 𝑋𝑑′   and any realization v (or 
𝑣𝑔) 
 
𝐸[𝜋�(𝑋𝑒, 𝑋𝑑,𝑃|𝑣� = 𝑣] ≥ 𝐸[𝜋�(𝑋𝑒′ , 𝑋𝑑′   ,𝑃|𝑣� = 𝑣]; 
 
2. Market Efficiency: The random variable p satisfies 
𝑝�(𝑋𝑒, 𝑋𝑑,𝑃) =  𝐸[𝑣�|𝑦� = 𝑥𝑒� + 𝑢𝑒�] 
There are two additional comments regarding the market efficiency condition. First, the 
market efficiency condition implies 𝑝� =  𝐸[𝑣�|𝑦�]  instead of  𝑝� =  𝐸[𝑣𝑔�|𝑦�]  because 
commission in the exchange is not part of the price. The market maker sets a price equal 
to 𝐸[𝑣�|𝑦�]  and also collects the commission. Second, the market maker needs to 
conjecture not only the informed strategy in the exchange but also the informed trader's 
strategy in the crossing network. In the rational expectation equilibrium, the market 
maker's conjecture on the informer trader's strategies needs to be correct. Therefore, 
although the market maker can only observe 𝑦�, he can infer  𝑥𝑒� as well as 𝑣� and  𝑥𝑑� 
based on his correct belief of  𝑋𝑒 and 𝑋𝑑. 
 
I then solve for the equilibrium 𝑋𝑒 and 𝑋𝑑 as well as the pricing rule P by guessing and 
verifying. Suppose that 𝑥𝑒 = 𝑋𝑒(𝑣) = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑣  and 𝑃(𝑦) = 𝜇 + 𝜆𝑦 , which are both 
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linear functions. As I will show in the proof, the functional form and coefficient of  𝑋𝑑 
is uniquely defined by 𝑋𝑒 and  P. 
 
2.3.3.1 Expected Profit 
The risk-neutral informed trader wants to maximize his expected profit. Since informed 
buying and selling are separable and symmetric in the model, I currently focus on the 
case in which 𝑣𝑔 ≥ 𝑝0 + 𝑐 (𝑣 ≥ 𝑝0), which represents a scenario in which the informed 
trader wants to buy.  Suppose that the informed trader chooses {𝑥𝑒 ,𝑥𝑑}. Then he expects 
that the market maker will set the price at  𝑝� = 𝜇 + 𝜆(𝑥𝑒 + 𝑢𝑒�). His expected profit per 
executed share then becomes 𝐸�𝑣𝑔 − 𝑝�� = 𝑣𝑔 − 𝜇 − 𝜆𝑥𝑒 because E(𝑢𝑒�) = 0. Therefore, 
his expected profit in the exchange is: 
𝐸(𝜋𝑒�) = 𝐸 ��𝑣𝑔 − 𝜇 − 𝜆(𝑥𝑒 + 𝑢𝑒�)� 𝑥𝑒 − 𝑐𝑥𝑒� = �𝑣𝑔 − 𝜇 − 𝜆𝑥𝑒�𝑥𝑒 − 𝑐𝑥𝑒 =(𝑣 − 𝜇 − 𝜆𝑥𝑒)𝑥𝑒               ( 2.4) 
To determine his expected profit in the crossing network, we first must find the 
relationship between submitted shares (𝑥𝑑) and executed shares 𝑥𝑚� .  𝑥𝑚�   depends on 
both 𝑥𝑑  and the realization of 𝑢𝑑𝑠� . If 𝑥𝑑 is larger than the liquidity sell order flow 𝑢𝑑𝑠� , 
then 𝑢𝑑𝑠�  shares are executed; otherwise, 𝑥𝑑  shares are executed. Therefore, 
𝑥𝑚��𝑢𝑑
𝑠 ,� 𝑥𝑑� = � 𝑢𝑑𝑠�       𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛  𝑢𝑑𝑠� ≤ 𝑥𝑑
𝑥𝑑        𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛   𝑢𝑑𝑠� > 𝑥𝑑                (2.5) 
Thus, the expected number of executed shares conditional on 𝑥𝑑 is  
𝐸(𝑥𝑚� |𝑥𝑑) = ∫ 𝑧𝑓𝑠(𝑧)𝑑𝑧𝑥𝑑0 + 𝑥𝑑 ∫ 𝑓𝑠(𝑧)𝑑𝑧+∞𝑥𝑑      (2.6) 
 Lemma 2.1 states the relationship between the numbers of submitted shares and 
executed shares. 
Lemma 2.1:  𝐸(𝑥𝑚� |𝑥𝑑) is increasing in 𝑥𝑑, and if  𝑥𝑑 ≠ 0 the probability of execution 
𝐸(𝑥𝑚� |𝑥𝑑)
𝑥𝑑
 decreases with 𝑥𝑑.  
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Proof: Let 𝐺(𝑥𝑑) =  𝐸(𝑥𝑚� |𝑥𝑑). Then  
𝐺′(𝑥𝑑) = 𝑥𝑑𝑓𝑠(𝑥𝑑) − 𝑥𝑑𝑓𝑠(𝑥𝑑) + � 𝑓𝑠(𝑧)𝑑𝑧+∞
𝑥𝑑
= � 𝑓𝑠(𝑧)𝑑𝑧+∞
𝑥𝑑
> 0 
 (𝐺(𝑥𝑑)
𝑥𝑑
)′ = 𝐺′(𝑥𝑑)𝑥𝑑−𝐺(𝑥𝑑)
𝑥𝑑
2 = 𝑥𝑑 ∫ 𝑓𝑠(𝑧)𝑑𝑧 −∫ 𝑧𝑓𝑠(𝑧)𝑑𝑧𝑥𝑑0 −𝑥𝑑 ∫ 𝑓𝑠(𝑧)𝑑𝑧+∞𝑥𝑑+∞𝑥𝑑 𝑥𝑑2 = −∫ 𝑧𝑓𝑠(𝑧)𝑑𝑧𝑥𝑑0 𝑥𝑑2 <0 
The proof does not depend on the functional form of  𝐸(𝑥𝑚� |𝑥𝑑).  The proof holds as 
long as 𝑓𝑠(𝑧) > 0 almost surely when z∈[0,+∞). Lemma 2.1 captures the probability 
impact of the order 𝑥𝑑: as the informed trader increases the order size in the crossing 
network, the expected volume increases but the execution probability decreases. As the 
matching price is independent of quantity,  his total expected revenue increases but his 
marginal expected revenue decreases. 
 
The crossing network matches orders based on the price in the exchange,  𝑣𝑔 − 𝜇 −
𝜆(𝑥𝑒 + 𝑢𝑒�). Thus, the informed trader's expected profit in the crossing network is 
𝐸(𝜋𝑑�) = 𝐸[� 𝑣𝑔 − 𝜇 − 𝜆(𝑥𝑒 + 𝑢𝑒�)� 𝑥𝑚��𝑢𝑑𝑠 ,� 𝑥𝑑� − 𝑐𝑥𝑑] = ( 𝑣𝑔 − 𝜇 − 𝜆𝑥𝑒)𝐸(𝑥𝑚� |𝑥𝑑) − 𝑐𝑥𝑑 = ( 𝑣𝑔 − 𝜇 − 𝜆𝑥𝑒)(∫ 𝑧𝑓𝑠(𝑧)𝑑𝑧 + 𝑥𝑑 ∫ 𝑓𝑠(𝑧)𝑑𝑧)+∞𝑥𝑑𝑥𝑑0 − 𝑐𝑥𝑑   (2.7) 
 
 
The informed trader's optimization problem is to choose {𝑥𝑑 , 𝑥𝑒} to maximize his two-
period profit. That is, 
 Max
𝑥𝑑,𝑥𝑒 𝐸(𝜋�) = 𝐸(𝜋𝑑� + 𝜋𝑒�) = (𝑣 − 𝜇 − 𝜆𝑥𝑒)𝑥𝑒 + ( 𝑣𝑔 − 𝜇 − 𝜆𝑥𝑒)(∫ 𝑧𝑓𝑠(𝑧)𝑑𝑧 + 𝑥𝑑 ∫ 𝑓𝑠(𝑧)𝑑𝑧)+∞𝑥𝑑𝑥𝑑0 − 𝑐𝑥𝑑  (2.8) 
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2.3.3.2 Equilibrium Order Submission Strategy and Pricing Rule 
Equation (2.8) has two first-order conditions. The first-order condition with respect to 
𝑥𝑑 is 
𝜕𝐸(𝜋�)
𝜕𝑥𝑑
= ( 𝑣𝑔 − 𝜇 − 𝜆𝑥𝑒)� 𝑧𝑓𝑠(𝑧)𝑑𝑧+∞
𝑥𝑑
− 𝑐 = 0 
⇒ ( 𝑣𝑔 − 𝜇 − 𝜆𝑥𝑒)(1 − 𝐹𝑠(𝑥𝑑)) = 𝑐 
⇔ ( 𝑣𝑔 − 𝜇 − 𝜆𝑥𝑒)𝑃𝑟(𝑢𝑑𝑠� > 𝑥𝑑) = 𝑐              (2.9) 
Equation (2.9) has a very intuitive explanation. The term  ( 𝑣𝑔 − 𝜇 − 𝜆𝑥𝑒) represents 
the informed trader's per unit profit conditional on execution, and 𝑃𝑟(𝑢𝑑𝑠� > 𝑥𝑑) is the 
probability that the 𝑥𝑑𝑡ℎ unit is executed. The informed trader chooses 𝑥𝑑  such that the 
marginal profit ( 𝑣𝑔 − 𝜇 − 𝜆𝑥𝑒)𝑃𝑟(𝑢𝑑𝑠� > 𝑥𝑑) = is equal to the order submission cost c. 
The first-order condition with respect to 𝑥𝑒 is 
 
𝜕𝐸(𝜋�)
𝜕𝑥𝑒
= 𝑣 − 𝜇 − 𝜆𝑥𝑒 − 𝜆𝑥𝑒 − 𝜆 �� 𝑧𝑓𝑠(𝑧)𝑑𝑧𝑥𝑑
0
+ 𝑥𝑑 � 𝑓𝑠(𝑧)𝑑𝑧 +∞
𝑥𝑑
� = 0 
⇔  𝑣 − 𝜇 − 𝜆𝑥𝑒 = 𝜆𝑥𝑒 + 𝜆𝐸(𝑥𝑚� |𝑥𝑑)          (2.10) 
 
Equation (2.10) also has an intuitive explanation. 𝑣 − 𝜇 − 𝜆𝑥𝑒 is exactly the same as the 
Kyle model. 𝑣 − 𝜇 − 𝜆𝑥𝑒  captures the gain from buying one more share due to the 
increase in volume. The increase in volume, however, leads the market maker to 
increase the price by  𝜆 causing the informed trader to lose 𝜆𝑥𝑒 . Therefore, the informed 
trader in the Kyle model chooses the optimal 𝑥𝑒 based on the trade-off of the volume 
and the price impact. The crossing network adds another trade-off to the model. The 
informed trader's order not only has a price impact on the exchange, but also affects his 
profit in the crossing network. In this sense, his trade in the exchange creates some 
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"externality" for his trade in the crossing network. By trading one more unit in the 
exchange, the informed trader's expected profit in the crossing network decreases by  𝜆𝐸(𝑥𝑚� |𝑥𝑑). It is this "externality" that drives the result of the model. 
 
To solve for 𝑥𝑑, the expression of 𝐹𝑠(𝑥𝑑)is plugged into (2.9).  The optimal level of 𝑥𝑑, 
denoted as 𝑥𝑑∗ , is  ( 𝑣𝑔 − 𝜇 − 𝜆𝑥𝑒)(� 𝑘𝑥𝑑∗ + 𝑘) = 𝑐 
⇒ 𝑥𝑑
∗ = 𝑘
𝑐2
( 𝑣𝑔 − 𝜇 − 𝜆𝑥𝑒)2 − 𝑘 
⇒ 𝑥𝑑
∗ = 𝑘
𝑐2
(𝑣 + 𝑐 − 𝜇 − 𝜆𝑥𝑒)2 − 𝑘        (2.11) 
When 𝑣𝑔 ≤ 𝑝0 − 𝑐 (𝑣 ≤ 𝑝0) , it is easy to show that the informed strategy is 𝑥𝑑∗ =
−
𝑘
𝑐2
( 𝜇 + 𝜆𝑥𝑒 − 𝑣𝑔)2 + 𝑘 = − 𝑘𝑐2 (𝜇 + 𝜆𝑥𝑒 − 𝑣 + 𝑐)2 + 𝑘. The informed strategies take 
different forms when 𝑣 ≤ 𝑝0  and when 𝑣 ≥ 𝑝0,   but the expected executed shares, 
𝐸(𝑥𝑚� |𝑥𝑑∗), and the expected profit in the crossing network 𝐸(𝜋𝑑∗�), , have the same 
functional form in 𝑣.  The intuition is that the discontinuity we create for 𝑣𝑔  finally 
cancels out with c. The following lemma summarizes the result. 
 
 
Lemma 2.2 The informed trader's order submission strategy is 
�
𝑥𝑑
∗ = 𝑘
𝑐2
(𝑣 + 𝑐 − µ − 𝜆𝑥𝑒)2 − 𝑘     𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑣 ≥ 𝑝0
𝑥𝑑
∗ = − 𝑘
𝑐2
(µ + 𝜆𝑥𝑒 − 𝑣 + 𝑐)2 + 𝑘     𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑣 < 𝑝0 . 
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which leads to  𝐸(𝑥𝑚� |𝑥𝑑∗) = 2 𝑘𝑐 (𝑣 − 𝜇 − 𝜆𝑥𝑒) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐸(𝜋𝑑∗) = 𝑘𝑐 (𝑣 − 𝜇 − 𝜆𝑥𝑒)2  
 
Proof. see the appendix 
 
Lemma 2.2 states that the informed trader's optimal strategy 𝑥𝑑∗  is a quadratic function 
of 𝑣 . This quadratic strategy leads to a linear relationship between the expected 
executed shares 𝐸(𝑥𝑚� |𝑥𝑑∗) and  𝑣. The expected profit in the crossing network is then a 
quadratic function of v.  The linear relationship between 𝐸(𝑥𝑚� |𝑥𝑑∗)and 𝑣 is the key to 
obtaining a close-formed solution for the model. This relationship enables my model to 
merge with the workhorse structure of the rational expectation model, that is, the linear 
normal framework developed by Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) and Kyle (1985). 
Therefore, I extend this literature to a market without guaranteed execution. 
 
To solve for the optimal 𝑥𝑒 , the expression of 𝐸(𝑥𝑚� |𝑥𝑑∗)  is substituted into (2.10), 
giving 
 
𝑣 − 𝜇 − 𝜆𝑥𝑒 − 𝜆𝑥𝑒 − 2𝜆 𝑘𝑐 (𝑣 − 𝜇 − 𝜆𝑥𝑒) = 0      (2.12) 
    Denote 𝐾 = (𝑘/𝑐) and the expression for the optimal value of 𝑥𝑒 is 
 
𝑥𝑒
∗ = 1−2𝜆𝐾
2𝜆−2𝜆2𝐾
𝑣 −
1−2𝜆𝐾
2𝜆−2𝜆2𝐾
𝜇        (2.13) 
Comparing the coefficient with the conjecture 𝑥𝑒 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑣 yields 
 
𝛽 = 1−2𝜆𝐾
2𝜆−2𝜆2𝐾
                        (2.14) 
 71  
 
𝛼 =  −𝛽𝜇.                           (2.15) 
 
    The market maker sets the clearing price equal to the conditional expectation of 𝑣. 
 
 𝑝 = 𝜇 + 𝜆𝑦 = 𝐸{𝑣�|𝑥�𝑒 + 𝑢�𝑒 = 𝑦} = 𝐸{𝑣�|𝛼 + 𝛽𝑣� + 𝑢�𝑒 = 𝑦}.     (2.16) 
 
The normality of 𝑣� and 𝑢�𝑒  makes the conditional expectation linear, and the Projection 
Theorem yields 
 
𝜆 =  𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑣� ,𝑦�)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑦�) =  𝛽𝜎𝑣2𝛽²𝜎𝑣2+𝜎𝑒2 =  𝛽𝛽²+𝜎𝑒2/𝜎𝑣2 = 𝛽𝛽²+𝑅         (2.17) 
𝜇 =  𝑝₀ − 𝜆(𝛼 + 𝛽𝑝₀).                                           (2.18) 
 
where I define 𝑅 = 𝜎𝑒2
𝜎𝑣
2 to simplify the notation. Combining (2.15) and (2.18) yields 
 (𝜆𝛽 − 1)(𝑝₀ − 𝜇) = 0.               (2.19) 
 
    From Equation (2.17), we know 𝜆𝛽 = (𝛽²)/(𝛽² + 𝑅) < 1, which implies that 
 
𝜇 = 𝑝₀ and 𝛼 = −𝛽𝑝₀.                   (2.20) 
𝜆 can then be solved for by substituting (2.14) into (2.17) to give 
λ = 1−2λK2λ−2λ²K( 1−2λK
2λ−2λ2K
)2+𝑅  ⇒ 
𝑅(2𝜆 − 2𝜆²𝐾)² =  (1 − 2𝜆𝐾).      (2.21) 
𝛽 is uniquely defined by (2.14) for any 𝜆. In turn, 𝛼 is uniquely defined by (2.15). Then 
the key to solve the model is to solving (2.21), which is a depressed quartic equation in 
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𝜆 . 44
 
 Closed form solutions can be obtained using the Ferrari method. However, 
analytical forms of the solutions are not presented explicitly because they are 
overwhelmingly complex in 𝑅 and 𝐾. It is easier to prove the existence and uniqueness 
of the solution and conduct comparative statics by analyzing (2.14) and (2.21). The 
analytical forms of the solutions are available upon request from the author. 
When 𝐾 = 0, meaning that the crossing network does not exist, the model degenerates 
into the Kyle model. It is easy to see from (2.14) and (2.21) that there is a unique 
solution 𝛽 = √𝑅 = 𝜎𝑒
𝜎𝑣
 and 𝜆 =  (1/(2√𝑅)) =  𝜎𝑒
𝜎𝑣
. For 𝐾 > 0 , the existence and 
uniqueness of the solution is established by the following two Lemmas. 
 
Lemma 2.3 Existence of real solutions: for any 𝐾 > 0 , there are exactly two real 
solutions 𝜆₁ ∈ (0,1/2𝐾)  and 𝜆₂ ∈ (−∞, 0)  for (2.21). 𝛽₁  that corresponds to the 
solution 𝜆₁ > 0 is also greater than 0; β₂ that corresponds to the solution 𝜆₂ < 0 is also 
smaller than 0. For 𝐾 = 0 , there is a unique solution 𝛽₁ = √𝑅 = 𝜎𝑒
𝜎𝑣
 and  𝜆₁ =
 (1/(2√𝑅)) = 𝜎𝑣
2𝜎𝑒
. 
Proof. see the appendix  
 
Next, Lemma 2.4 states the uniqueness of the linear equilibrium. The solution 𝛽₂ <0 corresponds to "bluffing", a scenario in which the informed trader trades in the wrong 
direction to mislead the price and then benefits from the resulting mispricing by 
                                                 
44 A depressed quartic equation is a quartic equation with no cubic term. In the 16th century, Italian 
mathematician Lodovico Ferrari found the formula to express the solution of any depressed quartic 
equation in terms of its coefficients. 
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matching orders in the crossing network. "Bluffing" does not constitute an equilibrium 
in my framework because under the rational expectation framework, the market maker 
should have correct beliefs of the informed trader's strategies. If the informed trader is 
bluffing, the market maker should know that the informed trader is bluffing and should 
set 𝜆₂ < 0, meaning that the market maker decreases the price with the net buy order 
flow and raises the price by observing the net sell order flow. However, conditional on 
𝜆₂ < 0,𝛽₂ < 0 is not optimal for the informed trader. 
 
Lemma 2.4 Uniqueness of the solution: for 𝐾 > 0, only the solution with 𝜆₁ > 0,𝛽₁ >0 constitutes an equilibrium. 
 
Proof. see the appendix 
Lemmas 2.3 and 2.4 and (2.14), (2.20) and (2.21) establish the unique linear 
equilibrium in this model, which is characterized by the unique solutions 𝛽∗ = 𝛽₁ and 
𝜆∗ = 𝜆₁: 
 
Theorem 2.1 There exists a unique linear equilibrium in which: the informed trader 
trades 𝑋𝑒(𝑣) = 𝛽∗(𝑣 − 𝑝₀),  𝑋𝑑(𝑣) = � 𝑘𝑐2 (𝑣 + 𝑐 − 𝑝₀ − 𝜆∗𝑥𝑒)2 − 𝑘     𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑣 ≥ 𝑝0
−
𝑘
𝑐2
(𝑝₀ + 𝜆∗𝑥𝑒 − 𝑣 + 𝑐)2 + 𝑘     𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑣 < 𝑝0  , 
and the price function is 𝑃(𝑦) = 𝑝₀ + 𝜆∗𝑦.  𝜆∗  is the unique positive solution of the 
equation 𝑅(2𝜆∗ − 2𝜆∗2𝐾)² = (1 − 2𝜆∗𝐾). 𝛽∗ = 1−2𝜆∗𝐾
2𝜆∗−2𝜆∗2𝐾
. 𝑅 = 𝜎𝑒2
𝜎𝑣
2 > 0  and 𝐾 = 𝑘𝑐 ≥ 0 
are the parameters of the model.    
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2.3.4 Comparative Statics 
The equilibrium of the model is characterized by 𝛽∗ and  𝜆∗. Lemma 2.5 provides the 
comparative statics for 𝛽∗, 𝜆∗and 𝑥𝑑∗ .These comparative statics provide the intuition to 
explain the results on price discovery, transaction costs and market share. 
 
Lemma 2.5 The informed trader trades in both markets unless 𝑣 = 𝑝₀. 𝛽∗ increases in 
𝜎𝑒 and decreases in 𝑘 and 𝜎𝑣; 𝜆∗ decreases in 𝑘 and 𝜎𝑒 and increases in 𝜎𝑣; the size of 
informed trader's order in the crossing network, |𝑥𝑑∗ |,  increases in 𝑘  and 𝜎𝑣  and 
decreases in 𝜎𝑒. 
 
Unless the signal is of zero value (𝑣 = 𝑝₀), the informed trader always trades in both 
markets for the following reason. When the informed trader does not trade in the 
exchange, the price impact of the trade is zero. Therefore, the informed trader always 
finds it profitable to trade at least some small amount in the exchange. Similarly, the 
execution probability in the crossing network approaches 1 when the informed trader 
only wants to trade an infinitesimal amount. Therefore, the informed trader always 
trades in both markets when the signal is valuable. 
Because the informed trader always trades in the exchange when 𝑣 ≠ 𝑝0,  the market 
maker can infer the informed trader's signal through the order flow. However, compared 
to the case without crossing network (𝑘 = 0), the informed trader wants to trade less in 
the exchange when a crossing network exists because the price impact of his trade in the 
exchange imposes a negative externality on his profit in the crossing network. 
Therefore, 𝛽∗  decreases, and the aggregated order flow becomes less informative. 
Meanwhile, the price impact 𝜆∗  decreases due to a decrease in the level of informed 
trading in the exchange. 
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An increase in the fundamental value uncertainty increases the informed trader's order 
size in the crossing network but decreases his order size in the exchange, because an 
increase in the fundamental value uncertainty increases the value of the information for 
the informed trader. Therefore, the informed trader has a greater incentive to hide in the 
crossing network. 
 
2.4 Price Informativeness and Volatility   
2.4.1 Price Discovery 
One of the most important functions of the securities market is to provide price 
discovery (O'Hara, 2003). This subsection will show that the crossing network reduces 
price discovery, which is an intuitive result. Because the price impact of trading in the 
exchange creates an externality affecting the informed trader's profit in the crossing 
network, the informed trader chooses to trade less in the exchange. Therefore, the order 
flow becomes less informative, and price discovery is impeded. Next, I will give a 
formal proof of this result and also study the determinants of the size of the effect. 
 
The market maker sets the price based on y, which is the signal he receives. 
𝑦 = 𝑥𝑒∗� + 𝑢𝑒� = 𝛽∗(𝑣� − 𝑝0) + 𝑢𝑒�     (2.22) 
 
Rearranging terms yields 
𝜃 ≡
𝑦
𝛽∗
+ 𝑝0 = 𝑣� + 𝑢𝑒�𝛽∗                         (2.23) 
 
where θ is an informationally equivalent transformation of the observed order flow y 
that has the same mean as the underlying asset. Conditional on 𝑣, 𝜃 is distributed as 
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𝑁(𝑣, 𝜎𝑒2
𝛽∗2
) .The externality of the price impact on the crossing network results in a 
decrease of 𝛽∗ and an increase of 𝜎𝑒
2
𝛽∗2
. 
 
Price informativeness is defined in the same way as that in the Kyle model, which is 
equal to 1 minus the ratio of the posterior variance of 𝑣� to the prior variance of 𝑣�, 
denoted 
 
𝑒 = 1 − 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑣�|𝑝�)
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑣�)           (2.24) 
Note that 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑣�|𝑝�) = 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑣�|𝑦�) = 𝑣𝑎𝑟�𝑣��𝜃��  because 𝜃� , 𝑝�  and 𝑦�  are informationally 
equivalent. 
 
When the price is perfectly informative, 𝑒 = 1. When the price is pure noise, 𝑒 =  0. 
Bayes' rule states that the posterior variance 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑣�|𝑝�)  can be expressed as the 
following function of the prior variance and the variance of the signal45
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑣�|𝑝�) = 𝑣𝑎𝑟�𝑣��𝜃�� = � 1
𝜎𝑣
2 + 𝛽∗2𝜎𝑒2 �−1 = 𝜎𝑣21+𝛽∗2𝜎𝑣2
𝜎𝑒
2
             (2.25) 
:  
    Plugging equation (2.14) and (2.21) into (2.25), I obtain 
𝑒 = 1 − 11 + 𝛽∗2𝜎𝑣2𝜎𝑒2 = 1 − 11 + ( 1 − 2𝜆∗𝐾2𝜆 − 2𝜆∗2𝐾)2 𝜎𝑣2𝜎𝑒2 = 1 − 1
1+𝑅(1−2𝜆∗𝐾)1
𝑅
= 1 − 1
2−2𝜆∗𝐾
                (2.26) 
 
                                                 
45 For a derivation of the formula, see O'Hara (1995) appendix to Chapter 3. 
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When 𝐾 ≡ 𝑘/𝑐 = 0, 𝑒 reaches its maximum, and its value is 0.5 for any value of 𝑅. A 
non-empty crossing network changes these two results. When 𝐾 > 0, then 𝑒 < 0.5, 
meaning that the crossing network always makes the price less informative. 
 
Theorem 2.2 states the relationship between price discovery and the four exogenous 
variables in the paper. 
 
Theorem 2.2 The crossing network harms price discovery as the price informativeness 
measure, e, reaches its maximum when 𝑘 = 0. If 𝑘 = 0, 𝑒 is independent of 𝜎𝑒 ,c,and 𝜎𝑣; 
otherwise, 𝑒 is uniquely determined by 𝜎𝑒𝑐
𝑘𝜎𝑣
 and increases in 𝜎𝑒𝑐
𝑘𝜎𝑣
 . 
Proof. see the appendix. 
 
Theorem 2.2 has two interesting implications. First, when 𝑘 = 0, my model degenerates 
into the Kyle model. Therefore, the information revelation is independent of 𝜎𝑣 and 𝜎𝑒. 
The existence of a crossing network changes this prediction. Second, the four 
exogenous variables in the model (the levels of liquidity trading in the crossing network 
and the exchange, the fundamental value uncertainty and the up-front submission cost) 
all affect price discovery, and the degree to which these variables affect price discovery 
is determined by the ratio  𝜎𝑒c
𝑘𝜎𝑣
 . If, for example, both 𝜎𝑒  and 𝑘  double, the level of 
information revelation does not change. Additionally, an increase in the level of 
liquidity trading k is equivalent to a similar increase in the value of 𝜎𝑣  in terms of their 
impact on price discovery, because it is the product of these two variables that 
determines price discovery. 
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Theorem 2.2 is proven under the assumptions that the crossing network attracts 
additional liquidity traders and that the liquidity order flow in the exchange remains the 
same. Suppose that the crossing network not only creates its own liquidity traders, but 
also steals some liquidity traders from the exchange. Then 𝜎𝑒  will decrease and k will 
increase. Price discovery will be further reduced because Theorem 2.2 states that a 
decrease of liquidity trading in the exchange and an increase in liquidity trading in the 
crossing network reduce price discovery. 
 
Information revelation is less for stocks with higher values of 𝜎𝑣 , because the 
information on 𝑣� is more valuable for stocks with higher fundamental value uncertainty. 
Therefore, the informed trader has a greater incentive to hide his information in the 
crossing network, thereby decreasing the informativeness of the price. 
 
Figure 2.3 illustrates the relationship between e and exogenous parameters 𝜎𝑒, k and 𝜎𝑣. 
The graphs of 𝑘 and 𝜎𝑣 are identical, meaning that an increase in the liquidity trading in 
the crossing network has the same effect as an increase in the fundamental value 
uncertainty. 
 
2.4.2 Volatility 
The price volatility is measured by 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑝�). Under my framework, 𝑒 and 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑝�) have 
the following relationship: 
Lemma 2.6   𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑣�) = 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑣�|𝑝�) + 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑝�)𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑝�) = 𝑒𝜎𝑣2  
Proof. see the appendix 
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Figure 2.3: This figure demonstrates the information revealed through trade. 𝜎𝑒 is the 
proxy for liquidity trading in the exchange; 𝜎𝑣  is the fundamental value uncertainty; 
and k is the proxy for liquidity trading in the crossing network. For all three panels, 
𝜎𝑒=100,  𝜎𝑣  =1, k=1 and c=0.01 unless otherwise specified. 
 
Lemma 2.6 states the relationship between the price volatility and price discovery. The 
Projection Theorem decomposes the prior variance of 𝑣� into two parts: the part that can 
be explained by 𝑝�, 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑣�|𝑝�), and the part that can not be explained by 𝑝�, 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑝�). More 
efficient price discovery means that 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑣�|𝑝�) should be smaller, which implies that 
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑝�) is higher. 
 
The comparative statics of 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑝�) are summarized in Corollary 2.1 and Figure 2.4. 
Corollary 2.1 shows that price volatility is positively correlated with fundamental value 
uncertainty, meaning that the observed price volatility can serve as a proxy for the 
underlying fundamental value uncertainty. 
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Figure 2.4: This figure demonstrates the price volatility. 𝜎𝑒 is the proxy for liquidity 
trading in the exchange; 𝜎𝑣  is the fundamental value uncertainty; and k is the proxy for 
liquidity trading in the crossing network. For all three panels, 𝜎𝑒=100,  𝜎𝑣  =1, k=1 and 
c=0.01 unless otherwise specified. 
 
However, in a two-period setup, Corollary 2.1 establishes a very surprising relationship 
between 𝜎𝑣  and 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑝�).When there is a crossing network, no matter how large the 
fundamental value uncertainty, price volatility can never be higher than 𝜎𝑒
2𝑐²
4𝑘²  , a constant 
that is independent of 𝜎𝑣. The pattern can be seen clearly in the bottom left panel in 
Figure 2.4. In the benchmark Kyle model, price volatility is linear in the fundamental 
value uncertainty. The result changes when there is a crossing network. When 𝜎𝑣 is low, 
an increase in 𝜎𝑣 causes a substantial increase in the price volatility, though the increase 
is less than a linear increase. The price volatility still increases in 𝜎𝑣when 𝜎𝑣 is high,  
but the change is minuscule and approaches 0 as 𝜎𝑣 increases. 
Corollary 2.1  𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑝�) = 𝜆∗2(2 − 2𝜆∗ 𝑘
𝑐
)𝜎𝑒2  . The crossing network decreases price 
volatility because 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑝�)  is largest when 𝑘 = 0 . When 𝑘 ≠ 0 , 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑝�)decreases in 
𝜎𝑒𝑐
𝑘
and increases in 𝜎𝑣. However, for ∀ 𝜎𝑣, 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑝�)<𝜎𝑒2𝑐²4𝑘²   
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Proof. see the appendix 
 
This surprising result, however, has an intuitive explanation under the two-period setup. 
Higher 𝜎𝑣  values indicate that information regarding the fundamental value becomes 
more valuable for the informed trader. The informed trader then has a greater incentive 
to hide his information in the crossing network and trade less in the exchange. 
Therefore, the information revelation e decreases, which counteracts the increase in 𝜎𝑣. 
The overall effect is that 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑝�) cannot be greater than 𝜎𝑒2𝑐²
4𝑘²  because 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑝�)=𝑒𝜎𝑣2. A 
more intuitive way to understand this is to consider the realization of 𝑣�  as "private 
news". When there is a deep crossing network, the informed trader will hide his trade in 
the crossing network. In the short run, the market maker may not even know that some 
"news" actually took place, nor is the market marker able to tell whether the news was 
positive or negative. Therefore, he is not able to adjust quotes in the short run, and thus 
we can see a decrease in the price volatility. 
 
In conclusion, the crossing network reduces both price discovery and price volatility. In 
the framework of this paper, it is impossible for the crossing network to both harm price 
discovery and increase price volatility, because lower price discovery directly implies 
lower price volatility. 
 
2.5 Liquidity and Transaction Costs 
This section addresses three questions. I first analyze price impact, the measure I 
employ to capture the liquidity and transaction cost of the exchange. Next, liquidity and 
transaction cost of the crossing network as measured by the non-execution probability 
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are analyzed. The final part of this section analyzes the relationship between price 
impact and non-execution, both of which are endogenous in this model. 
 
2.5.1 Price Impact 
For the exchange, 𝜆∗  serves as the inverse measure of the liquidity or as a direct 
measure of price impact. Theorem 2.3 shows the relationship between 𝜆∗  and the 
exogenous variables 𝑘
𝑐
 and 𝜎𝑒2
𝜎𝑣
2. 
 
Theorem 2.3. The existence of a crossing network puts an upper limit on 𝜆∗in that 
𝜆∗ < 𝑐
2𝑘
 for any 𝜎𝑒
2
𝜎𝑐
2. 𝜆∗ is decreasing in 
𝜎𝑒2
𝜎𝑐
2 and 
𝑘
𝑐
. 
Proof. See the appendix. 
 
In the benchmark Kyle model, the price impact can go to infinity. This possibility is 
ruled out by a crossing network because of the externality of price impact on the 
crossing network.  This externality makes the informed trader trade less aggressively, 
decreases the information asymmetry problem in the exchange, and thereby leads the 
market maker to set a less aggressive price. Figure 2.5 compares  𝜆∗ and 𝛽∗ with the 
corresponding parameters in the Kyle model. Note that 𝜆∗ is always smaller than the 
Kyle 𝜆. In addition, the Kyle 𝜆 converges to infinity as 𝜎𝑒
𝜎𝑣
→ 0, whereas in this model 
𝜆∗ →
𝑐
2𝑘
= 1
2𝑘
= 1
2𝐾
 as 𝜎𝑒
𝜎𝑣
→ 0. 
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Figure 2.5: This figure compares the equilibrium λ and β with their counterparts in the 
Kyle model. I choose K≡(k/c)=1 to fit λ and β in the same graph. 
 
Theorem 2.3 states that the crossing network improves the liquidity of the exchange if it 
can attract new liquidity traders. Dönges and Heinemann (2006), Degryse, Achter and 
Wuyts (2009) and Hendershott and Mendelson (2000) all show that crossing networks 
can attract liquidity traders who are unwilling to trade in the exchange. Hendershott and 
Mendelson (2000) also show that the crossing network may improve the liquidity of the 
exchange by attracting new liquidity traders. The Hendershott and Mendelson model, 
however, assumes exogenous informed traders. Therefore, the mechanism driving their 
result is that a fixed amount of informed order flow is diluted by an increase of liquidity 
order flow. My result shows that even if the informed trader can choose how much to 
trade, the crossing network can still benefit the exchange if it can attract new liquidity 
traders. 
 
Certainly, what I find is only one mechanism, and there are other mechanisms working 
against the mechanism I find. The claim that crossing networks definitely harm the 
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exchanges is usually based on the implicit assumption of so called "cream-skimming", 
in which crossing networks draw liquidity traders away from exchanges, leaving mostly 
informed traders trade in the exchange. However, there are at least two factors working 
against cream-skimming. First, when the liquidity traders move to the crossing network, 
the informed trader will follow them. Additionally, new trading mechanisms may attract 
new liquidity traders who are unwilling to trade in other platforms. 
 
Empirically, cream-skimming has been rejected. Gresse (2006) finds that more crossing 
trading decreases the transaction costs of the exchange. Fong, Madhavan and Swan 
(2004) also do not find that crossing networks have an adverse effect on the exchange. 
Both papers suggest that cream-skimming, if it exists, must be counteracted by some 
other effects. This paper provides one possible explanation to their findings.46
 
 
2.5.2 Non-execution 
The traditional measures of transaction costs, bid-ask spread and price impact, are 
irrelevant for the crossing networks. A measure of transaction cost in the crossing 
network is non-execution. Interestingly, though non-execution in the crossing network 
and price impact in the exchange are different dimensions of execution costs, they share 
the same underlying factor - order imbalance. In the crossing network, orders fail to 
execute because of the imbalance between buy and sell orders. Larger order imbalances 
lead to higher non-execution probabilities. In classical models of exchanges, the 
transaction costs is also an implicit function of order imbalance. This imbalance may be 
caused by non-informational factors, which are the focus of inventory models such as 
Ho and Stoll (1983). Order imbalance can also be caused by informational factors. On 
                                                 
46 An alternative explanation is that competition cause the exchange to decrease the trading cost and 
increase the liquidity. 
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one side of the market, there are both liquidity and informed traders, and on the other 
side there are only liquidity traders. In the models of Glosten and Milgrom (1985), 
Easley and O'Hara (1987), and Kyle (1985), orders would be imbalanced without the 
intervention of the market maker. In both inventory- and information-based models, 
order imbalances are positively correlated with transaction costs. The only difference 
between the crossing network and the exchange is that there is no market maker to clear 
the order imbalance in the crossing network. Therefore, instead of causing a higher 
price impact, a higher order imbalance in the crossing network leads to a lower 
execution probability. 
 
As with order imbalance, non-execution can also be explained by non-informational and 
informational factors. It is important to separate these two parts is important because 
they have different implications. In a world without information asymmetry, the 
expected price change is 0 after each trade. Conversely, non-execution caused by 
informational sources has an adverse selection effect: the future price is more likely to 
move in the unfavorable direction of the executed orders because the executed orders 
are more likely to be on the wrong side of the market. 
 
Previous literature on non-execution has focused on non-informational factors. In 
Dönges and Heinemann (2006) and Hendershott and Mendelson (2000), non-execution 
is primarily a function of liquidity externality.47
                                                 
47 Informed traders in Hendershott and Mendelson (2000) have a passive role. 
 In these models, buy and sell order 
flows follow independent geometric distributions. As the mean of the geometric 
distribution increases, the non-execution probability decreases because it is easier to 
find a potential match in a deep market. These two models imply that the major task for 
the crossing network is to attract more liquidity traders. Crossing networks that cannot 
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attract enough liquidity traders will fail due to a low execution probability, whereas 
crossing networks with many liquidity traders will attract even more liquidity traders. 
 
This paper supplements the Hendershott and Mendelson model and the Dönges and 
Heinemann model by focusing on the informational causes of non-execution.48
 
 When 
non-execution is caused by the informed trader, the execution probability may decrease 
as the amount of liquidity trading increases. This is because the information asymmetry 
problem cannot be mitigated simply by an increase in liquidity trading. The present 
paper shows that an increase in the liquidity order flow leads to a greater increase in the 
informed order flow, which results in a lower execution probability. Therefore, a 
crossing network cannot increase its execution probability only by attracting more 
liquidity traders. It also requires anti-gaming strategies to defend itself from informed 
traders. More discussions of anti-gaming strategies can be found in section 2.7. 
Before continuing, an important distinction must be emphasized. There are two 
measures of non-execution. The probability of non-execution for the informed trader's 
order depends on three random variables: 𝑣�, 𝑢𝑒� and the liquidity volume on the opposite 
side. The informed trader considers this probability in his optimization problem. The 
non-execution probability of the entire market also involves the liquidity trader on the 
same side as the informed trader. The proof presented here is based on the non-
execution probability for the informed trader. The non-execution probability for the 
entire market depends on the four random variables 𝑣, 𝑢�𝑒  , 𝑢�𝑑𝑏  and 𝑢�𝑑𝑠  and cannot be 
solved analytically. However, the simulated results are explained by the theorems 
presented in this subsection because liquidity traders are passive players in this model. 
                                                 
48 The noninformational causes of non-execution does not play a role in my model. Suppose that there are 
no informed traders in this model; then the execution probability is independent of k. 
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Theorem 2.4 first states the relationship between execution probability and two 
endogenous variables: price discovery and price impact. This theorem also relates the 
execution probability to the exogenous variables. The proof is conditional on the 
realization of the fundamental value 𝑣. However, the result of Theorem 2.4 also holds 
unconditionally.49
 
  
Theorem 2.4 The probability of execution for the informed trader conditional on 𝑣, 
𝑒𝑥𝑒𝑖 = 𝐸(𝑥𝑚� |𝑥𝑑∗ ,𝑣)𝑥𝑑∗ ,has the following form 
 𝑒𝑥𝑒𝑖 = 2𝑐2𝑐+|(𝑣−𝑝0)|(1−𝜆∗𝛽∗) = 2𝑐2𝑐+|(𝑣−𝑝0)|(1−𝑒). 
The probability of execution, 𝑒𝑥𝑒𝑖 , decreases in upfront submission cost 𝑐  and 
realization of fundamental value 𝑣, and increases in 𝜎𝑒
𝑘𝜎𝑣
. 
 
Proof. See the appendix 
 
In my model, price impact, information revelation and non-execution are endogenously 
determined. Theorem 2.4 establishes the relationship between these values. For 
example, when price discovery 𝑒 increases, 𝑒𝑥𝑒𝑖 decreases, reflecting the intuition that 
more information revelation in the exchange causes the informed trader to move his 
trading from the exchange to the crossing network, which increases the order imbalance 
and leads to lower execution probability. Theorem 2.4 also relates 𝑒𝑥𝑒𝑖 , to the 
                                                 
49 It is very straightforward to see that the results of Theorem 2.4 holds unconditionally for 𝑐, 𝜎𝑒and 𝑘 
because they are true for any realization of 𝑣.  The result for 𝜎𝑣 is less obvious, because by changing𝜎𝑣 , 
the distribution of 𝑣� is also altered, thus making it impossible to compare the result state-by-state. 
Therefore, I can only compare the result by simulation. The result is not presented here because of space 
considerations and because it is very similar to that in Figure 2.6. 
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exogenous variables. An increase in v increases the profit per matched unit, which 
decreases 𝑒𝑥𝑒𝑖, because now the informed trader demands a lower execution probability 
to break even. The informed trader's information is more valuable for stocks with higher 
fundamental value uncertainty 𝜎𝑣 . Therefore, he has a greater incentive to hide his 
information in the crossing network, which leads to a lower execution probability. The 
execution probability increases with 𝜎𝑒because an increase in liquidity trading in the 
exchange attracts part of the informed order flow from the crossing network to the 
exchange. 
 
The most surprising result is that the execution probability decreases with the level of 
liquidity trading in the crossing network, a prediction opposite of that suggested by 
Dönges and Heinemann (2006) and Hendershott and Mendelson (2000). In these two 
models, an increase in liquidity trading has two effects. The first effect provides a 
network externality, and the second effect dilutes a fixed amount of informed order 
flow. However, when the informed trader optimizes, he will increase his order size 
more than the increase in liquidity order flow. This paper provides two mathematically 
rigorous proofs of this result. One is based on comparative statics, which is shown 
under the proof for Theorem 2.4. The other proof is to decompose the total impact of an 
increase in liquidity trading into two effects: volume effect and price effect. Details of 
these two proofs can be found in Appendix A and B. However, the reason why the 
execution probability decreases with the level of liquidity trading in the crossing 
network can be understood intuitively. The key to explain this result is the difference in 
market structure. While the market maker in the exchange can actively adjust quotes to 
protect himself from the informed trader, a crossing network with a fixed allocation rule 
is passive. As liquidity trading in the crossing network increases, the informed trader 
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considers the crossing network more favorable and moves even more trades to the 
crossing network than the liquidity traders do. 
 
The non-execution probability for the entire market depends on three degrees of 
uncertainty: 𝑥𝑑∗�(or 𝑣�), 𝑢𝑑𝑏�  and 𝑢𝑑𝑠�  .To obtain the non-execution probability for the entire 
market, I first define the matched volume as: 
 
𝑉𝑜𝑙� 𝑑 = �2 min ��𝑥𝑑∗� + 𝑢𝑑𝑏�� , �𝑢𝑑𝑠���   𝑓𝑜𝑟  𝑥𝑑∗� > 0 2 min ��𝑥𝑑∗� + 𝑢𝑑𝑠��, �𝑢𝑑𝑏���   𝑓𝑜𝑟  𝑥𝑑∗� ≤ 0      (2.27) 
 
When 𝑥𝑑� > 0, the informed trader wants to buy. In this case, the buy side has both 
informed and liquidity orders, while the sell side only has liquidity traders. The number 
of matched shares is equal to twice the number of shares on the side with fewer 
submitted shares. The definition is similar when 𝑥𝑑� ≤ 0. The probabilities of execution 
for the entire market are then defined as 
 
𝑒𝑥𝑒� 𝑤 = 𝑉𝑜𝑙� 𝑑
�𝑥𝑑
∗��+�𝑢𝑑
𝑏��+�𝑢𝑑
𝑠� �
                           (2.28) 
The non-execution probability is simply 1 minus the execution probability. 
 
𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑒� 𝑤 = 1 − 𝑒𝑥𝑒� 𝑤                         (2.29) 
Figure 2.6 demonstrates the pattern of non-execution probability for the entire market 
with respect to the exogenous variables. The non-execution probability for the entire 
market also decreases in the level of liquidity trading in the exchange and increases in 
fundamental value uncertainty. Figure 2.6 also shows that non-execution for the entire 
market is a decreasing function of the liquidity trading in the crossing network. 
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Therefore, a crossing network cannot increase its execution probability only by 
attracting more liquidity traders; the crossing network also needs anti-gaming strategies 
to defend itself from informed traders. A discussion of anti-gaming strategies can be 
found in Section 2.7. 
  
Figure 2.6: This figure demonstrates the simulated non-execution probability. 𝜎𝑒 is the 
proxy for liquidity trading in the exchange; 𝜎𝑣  is the fundamental value uncertainty; 
and k is the proxy for liquidity trading in the crossing network. For all three panels, 
𝜎𝑒=100,  𝜎𝑣  =1, k=1 and c=0.01 unless otherwise specified. 
 
 
2.5.3 The Relation between Price Impact and Non-execution 
Due to its ability to characterize both price impact and non-execution, this model 
generates predictions on the relationship between these two transaction costs. Figure 2.7 
illustrates the patterns of 𝜆∗ and of simulated 𝐸(𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑒� 𝑤)with respect to exogenous 
variable 𝜎𝑣 ,
50
                                                 
50  𝐸(𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑒� 𝑤)  is the average of one million simulated 𝐸(𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑒� 𝑤)  For each simulation, four 
realizations of 𝑣�, 𝑢𝑒  , 𝑢𝑑𝑏  and 𝑢𝑑𝑠  are independently drawn, 𝑥�𝑑   is  obtained using the informed trader's 
optimal strategy of (2.11) and 𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑒� 𝑤 is obtained by Equations (2.27), (2.28) and (2.29) 
  which is consistent with the empirical findings of Næs and Skjeltorp 
(2003) that stocks that are hard to execute in the crossing network are more volatile than 
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stocks that are easy to execute in the crossing network51
 
 and that the non-execution 
probability is positively correlated with the price impact. My model shows that both 
price impact and non-execution probability increase as 𝜎𝑣  increases and that price 
impact and non-execution probability are positively correlated. This positive correlation 
can be easily understood through the informed trader's effort to balance his trading cost 
in these two markets. 
 
Figure 2.7: This figure illustrates the pattern of price impact and simulated non-
execution probability with respect to fundamental value uncertainty 𝜎𝑣. I set 𝜎𝑒=100, 
k=1 and c=0.01  
 
 
Figure 2.7 also sheds some light on the research on competition between different 
trading mechanisms. Because price impact and non-execution probability are highly 
correlated, they may provide limited insight in studying the competition between the 
exchange and the crossing network. Conditional on execution, stocks with a higher 
                                                 
51 Certainly, the volatility in their empirical model is observable price volatility, but 𝜎𝑣 in my model is the 
unobservable fundamental value uncertainty. However, Corollary 2.1 states that the observable price 
volatility and the unobservable fundamental value uncertainty are positively correlated. Therefore, price 
volatility can serve as a proxy for 𝜎𝑣 . 
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price impact may result in larger savings by trading in the crossing network. However, 
this potential savings may be offset by lower execution probability. Therefore, the 
relationship between price impact, non-execution and market share is ambiguous. Two 
verifications of this conjecture are presented in Ready (2009). First, Ready (2009) finds 
that the bid-ask spread, described by Amihud (2002) as price impact for "standard-size 
transactions", cannot explain the market share of crossing networks. Additionally, 
Ready finds that crossing network volumes are not the highest in the highest volume 
stocks, where the likelihood of finding a counterpart should be the highest. Both 
findings suggest that transaction costs may be poor explanatory variables for 
competition between the exchange and the crossing network. I will examine other 
explanatory variables in the section on market share. 
 
2.6 The Order Splitting Strategy and Market Share 
The results on market share are driven by the informed trader's order splitting strategy 
as well as the liquidity trading in each market. The first part of this section will focus on 
the order splitting strategy of the informed trader. This order splitting strategies is the 
key to understanding the simulated results regarding market share in the second 
subsection. 
 
2.6.1 The Order Splitting Strategy 
At equilibrium, the informed trader submits 𝑥𝑒∗ to the exchange and 𝑥𝑑∗  to the crossing 
network. However, the market share depends on 𝐸(𝑥𝑚� |𝑥𝑑∗) because only part of the 
order 𝑥𝑑∗  is executed. Theorem 2.5 states the order splitting strategy. 
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Theorem 2.5 𝐸(𝑥𝑚� |𝑥𝑑∗ )
𝑥𝑒
∗ = 1 − 11−2𝜆∗𝐾 .     𝐸(𝑥𝑚� |𝑥𝑑∗ )𝑥𝑒∗   is uniquely determined by 𝜎𝑒𝑐𝑘𝜎𝑣 and 
decreases with 𝜎𝑒𝑐
𝑘𝜎𝑣
. For a given  𝜎𝑒𝑐
𝑘𝜎𝑣
, 𝐸(𝑥𝑚� |𝑥𝑑∗ )
𝑥𝑒
∗  is independent of 𝑣. 
Proof. See the appendix 
 
Theorem 2.5 states that an increase in 𝜎 leads the informed trader to submit relatively 
more shares to the exchange, whereas an increase in 𝑘 makes him submit relatively 
more shares to the crossing network. If 𝜎𝑒 and 𝑘 increase at the same rate, the informed 
trader maintains the ratio of trades made in these two markets. An increase in 𝑐 
discourages informed trading in the crossing network, while an increase in fundamental 
value uncertainty encourages trading in the crossing network, because an increase in 
fundamental value uncertainty provides the informed trader with a higher incentive to 
hide information in the crossing network. Interestingly, while an increase in 𝜎𝑣 makes 
the informed trader trade relatively more in the crossing network, an increase in the 
realization of 𝑣  would not. This is because an increase in 𝑣  would cause similar 
increases in 𝐸(𝑥𝑚� |𝑥𝑑∗) and 𝑥𝑒∗, as both are linear functions of 𝑣. 
 
2.6.2 Market Share 
The market share of the crossing network follows the intuition behind the informed 
trader's order splitting strategy, and the result can be obtained through simulation. The 
prerequisite to study the market share is to define the volume in each market. 
 
In the exchange, if the informed and liquidity order flow are on the same side of the 
market (buy or sell), the market maker must trade with both the informed and the 
liquidity traders. Thus, the volume is the absolute value of the sum of the informed and 
liquidity order flows. If the informed order flow and the liquidity order flow are on 
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different sides of the market, they can trade with each other and the market maker only 
needs to offset the imbalance between these two order flows. Thus, the volume is equal 
to the side with the larger order flow. Therefore, the volume of the exchange is 
 
𝑉𝑜𝑙� 𝑒 = � |𝑥𝑒∗� + 𝑢�𝑒|     𝑥𝑒∗� ∗ 𝑢�𝑒 > 0 max(|𝑥𝑒∗�|, |𝑢�𝑒|)   𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑥𝑒∗� ∗ 𝑢�𝑒 ≤ 0    (2.30) 
 
The volume of the crossing network has already been defined by (2.27). Thus, the 
market share of the crossing network is defined as 
 
𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑 = 𝐸( 𝑉𝑜𝑙� 𝑑𝑉𝑜𝑙� 𝑒+𝑉𝑜𝑙� 𝑑)                    (2.31) 
 
An increase in 𝑘 or 𝜎𝑒 first causes an exogenous increase in liquidity volume in the 
crossing network or the exchange, respectively, and the results are enhanced by an 
increase in the informed volume based on Theorem 2.5. Therefore, it is very 
straightforward to see that 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑 increases with 𝑘 and decreases with 𝜎𝑒. 
 
The relationship between 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑 and 𝜎𝑣 is shown in Figure 2.8. In the previous section, 
it was demontrated that non-execution and price impact both increase in 𝜎𝑣 .An increase 
in the fundamental value uncertainty 𝜎𝑣 , however, gives a comparative advantage to the 
crossing network, because the informed trader has a high incentive to hide his 
information for stocks with high 𝜎𝑣. 
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Figure 2.8: This figure illustrates the market share of the crossing network with respect 
to the exogenous variable 𝜎𝑣 . The non-execution probability is also in this figure. 
𝜎𝑒=100,  𝜎𝑣  =1, k=1 and c=0.01  
 
Conversely, the Dönges and Heinemann model predicts that the crossing network has a 
smaller market share for stocks with higher volatility. In their model, the disutility of 
unexecuted orders is higher for stocks with higher volatility. Therefore, traders prefer to 
trade higher volatility stocks in the exchange because of the guaranteed execution. The 
Dönges and Heinemann model, however, assumes a fixed trading cost in the exchange, 
whereas my model has an endogenous trading cost in the exchange. An increase in 𝜎𝑣 
leads to an increase of transaction costs both in the exchange and in the crossing 
network, but during these increases, the crossing network has a comparative advantage 
over the exchange. Empirically, Ready (2009) finds that crossing networks have a 
higher market share for stocks with higher volatility, which supports theoretical 
prediction made herein. 
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2.7 Alternative Allocation Rules 
The analyses in the previous four sections is based on the informed-first rule. This rule 
can be understood as the crossing network having a time priority rule, and that the 
informed trader, who monitors the market more frequently and has better order 
submission technology, reacts to the market faster than do the liquidity traders. The 
assumption of an informed-first rule gives an upper limit to the informed trader's 
maximum impact in the crossing network. As shown in the section on the non-execution 
probability, the informed-first rule leads to a low execution probability and this problem 
cannot be mitigated by increasing the number of liquidity traders participating in the 
crossing network. In reality, crossing networks tend to minimize the impact of informed 
traders by using a variety of anti-gaming strategies. Of particular importance are 
strategies that exclude potentially informed traders from the market, or at least give 
such traders lower priority. One way to do so is to restrict the crossing networks' 
customers to buy-side traders, especially traders with passive portfolios. 52  Some 
crossing networks provide "watchdogs" to detect patterns of abuse.53 Other crossing 
networks provide credibility rating reports that allow investors to see their 
counterparties' track records and to opt out of interacting with certain investors.54
Let us consider a case in which all liquidity traders manage to trade before the informed 
trader. Therefore, the liquidity order flow available to the informed trader decreases and 
can potentially be zero. This provides a lower bound to the informed trader's impact 
 
                                                 
52 Chris Heckman, managing director if ITG, said, "More than anything, we pride ourselves on the 
constituency of POSIT, which is 95% buy-side to buy-side." He also said that "All POSIT participants are 
effectively passive in nature, searching for natural liquidity." in "Fair game?", The Trade Magazine, 
April-June 2008. 
53 For example, Liquidnet constantly monitors its system to look for patterns of abuse and to notify 
members when a trader appears to be gaming. During its seven-year history, the 500-member venue has 
suspended approximately 100 members. in "Fair game?", The Trade Magazine, April-June 2008. 
54For example, BIDS trading provides score cards that track the past trading behavior of its users and 
enable members to filter out counter-parties with suspect behavior. "Big Traders Dive Into Dark Pools" in 
Business Week, October 3, 2007. 
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when there is "fair access". Other allocation rules, like the pro rata rule, lie in between 
the informed-first rule and the liquidity-first rule. Solving the problem for other 
allocation rules is a formidable task, but at least it is known that the market outcome for 
other rules should fall between those of the informed-first rule and the liquidity-first 
rule. A sketch of the proofs of the theorems under the liquidity-first rule can be obtained 
from the author. These proofs follow exactly from the proofs of all of the theorems 
under the informed-first rule, except that the liquidity order flow available to the 
informed trader is smaller. 
 
Two findings emerge from the liquidity-first rule, which are summarized in Figures 2.9 
and 2.10. First, the qualitative results for the informed-first rule still hold for the 
liquidity-first rule, suggesting that the results presented in the previous sections are 
robust under different allocation rules. Intuitively, the only effect of the liquidity-first 
rule is to decrease the liquidity trading available to the informed trader. Quantitatively, 
this is equivalent to a decrease in the value of k. The qualitative results of the model are 
driven by two mechanisms: the externality of the price impact in the exchange on the 
crossing network and the choice of the informed trader between price impact and 
probability impact. Both will hold as long as k≠0. The left panel of Figure 2.9 shows 
that the non-execution probability decreases in the level of liquidity trading in the 
exchange and increases in the fundamental value uncertainty under the liquidity-first 
rule, both of which are consistent with the prediction of Theorem 2.4. The right panel of 
Figure 2.9 shows that price impact under liquidity first rule decreases in the level of 
liquidity trading in the exchange and increases in fundamental value uncertainty, which 
is also the same as the result established under the informed-first rule. Figure 2.10 
shows that price discovery under the liquidity-first rule is less than price discovery 
without a crossing network. Additionally, price discovery is higher for stocks with 
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higher liquidity trading in the exchange, lower for stocks with higher fundamental value 
uncertainty, and lower for stocks with higher liquidity trading in the crossing network; 
these results are the same as those established by Theorem 2.2. Because the impact of 
the informed trader with respect to other allocation rules lies between the informed-first 
rule and the liquidity-first rule, it is expected that the qualitative results should be the 
same for other allocation rules as well. 
 
 
Figure 2.9: This figure illustrates the transaction costs of the crossing network and the 
exchange under three different allocation rules. The figure shows that non-execution 
probability is the lowest when the informed trader is excluded from the crossing 
network. However, the price impact is the highest when the informed trader is excluded 
from the crossing network. On the contrary, the informed-first rule leads to the lowest 
price impact in the exchange but the highest non-execution in the crossing network. The 
liquidity-first rule is in the middle. I choose (k/c)=10 to fit all the three lines in the same 
figure. 
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Figure 2.10: This figure demonstrates information revealed through trade under three 
different allocation rules. 𝜎𝑒 is the proxy for liquidity trading in the exchange; 𝜎𝑣  is the 
fundamental value uncertainty; and k is the proxy for liquidity trading in the crossing 
network. For all three panels, 𝜎𝑒=100,  𝜎𝑣   =1, k=1 and c=0.01 unless otherwise 
specified. 
 
The second finding is that the liquidity-first rule leads to quantitatively different results 
from the informed-first rule. Figure 2.9 demonstrates that the liquidity-first rule leads to 
a decrease in the non-execution probability and an increase in the price impact 
compared to those of the informed-first rule. Under the liquidity-first rule, the liquidity 
order flow available to the informed trader decreases, which causes the informed trader 
to decrease his order size in the crossing network and increase his order size in the 
exchange. Compared to the informed-first rule, the adverse selection problem in the 
exchange increases and the adverse selection problem in the crossing network 
decreases. Figure 2.10 demonstrates that price discovery is higher under the liquidity-
first rule than under the informed-first rule. Under the liquidity-first rule, the informed 
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trader faces a decrease of liquidity order flow in the crossing network. Therefore, he 
chooses to trade more aggressively in the exchange, hence revealing more information 
and increasing price discovery as compared to the informed-first rule. 
 
The liquidity-first rule imposes a lower limit on the informed trader's impact when the 
crossing network is open to all. The crossing network, however, can be even more 
aggressive to the informed trader. Because crossing networks are not public exchanges, 
they can select their customers and exclude others from the market, a practice seen as 
unfair by their opponents. Currently, the SEC is considering regulation to enforce "fair 
access" to crossing networks. 
 
Figure 2.9 shows that the non-execution probability under the informed-excluded rule is 
even lower than it is under the liquidity-first rule; the transaction cost in the crossing 
network is the lowest under the informed-excluded rule. However, the informed-
excluded rule corresponds to the highest price impact in the exchange. As the informed 
trader cannot trade in the crossing network, the price impact in the exchange does not 
create any externality for his profit in the crossing network. Therefore, the informed 
trader will trade more aggressively than he does when he has access to the crossing 
network. In turn, the adverse selection problem in the exchange increases and so does 
the price impact. The aggressive trading of the informed trader in the exchange, 
however, leads to more information revelation compared to the informed-first and 
liquidity-first rules. Figure 2.10 shows that if the crossing network can exclude the 
informed trader, price discovery is e=(1/2), which is the same as price discovery 
without the crossing network. When the informed trader is excluded from the crossing 
network, this model degenerates to the Kyle model. Therefore, price discovery is equal 
to (1/2) no matter how much liquidity order flow the crossing network attracts or how 
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large the fundamental value uncertainty is.55
 
 Now that the informed trader's order in the 
exchange does not create any externality for his profit in the crossing network, he trades 
more aggressively in the exchange and reveals more information. 
What would happen if the crossing network mistakenly excludes some liquidity 
traders? 56
 
 Theorem 2.2 predicts that price discovery is enhanced by lower liquidity 
trading in the crossing network. In conclusion, excluding traders always increases price 
discovery compared to price discovery under "fair access". 
Figures 2.9 and 2.10 also show an interesting pattern: the execution probability is 
positively correlated with price discovery under different allocation rules. The crossing 
network has incentive to limit the impact of the informed trader with the intention of 
increasing its execution probability. These anti-gaming strategies, at the same time, also 
enhance price discovery. Therefore, the strategies to defend the crossing network's self-
interests also minimize the negative impact of the crossing network on price discovery. 
However, the proposed policy change to enforce "fair access" will have two negative 
effects. First, price discovery is harmed. Second, fair access will increase the 
information asymmetry problem in the crossing network. 
 
2.8 Conclusion 
 
This paper studies the impact of the crossing network (dark pool) on the public 
exchange by extending the Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) and the Kyle (1985) 
                                                 
55 An exception is the extreme case in which all liquidity traders are in the dark pool, which cannot be 
sustained as an equilibrium. 
56 If all liquidity traders are excluded, the crossing network collapses because no one will trade with the 
informed trader. Thus, the model again degenerates to the Kyle model. 
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frameworks to multiple markets, including one without guaranteed execution. A number 
of testable hypotheses are generated; some of these hypotheses have been verified, but 
others are yet to be tested. 
 
This paper also sheds some light on a recent policy debate. For example, passionate 
opponents of crossing networks argue that excluding some traders from crossing 
networks is unfair. However, if "fair" is defined as giving different classes of traders 
(liquidity and informed alike) the same terms of trade, public exchanges also lack this 
kind of fairness. It is well documented that exchanges provide inferior quotes to 
potentially informed traders (Barclay, Hendershott and McCormick, (2003)). As 
crossing networks do not have the ability to adjust quotes, they can only rely on the 
allocation rules to protect themselves from informed traders. One extreme rule is to 
exclude informed traders altogether. 
 
It was also shown that the crossing network harms price discovery if the informed trader 
can trade in the crossing network. Interestingly, although the crossing network harms 
price discovery, it is in the crossing network's best interest to minimize this negative 
impact. Informed trading in the crossing network causes lower execution probability 
and decreases the competitiveness of the crossing network. The crossing network has an 
incentive to change its allocation rules to limit the impact of the informed trader, which 
simultaneously limits its negative impact on price discovery. 
 
This paper also provides explanations for several surprising empirical findings. The 
literature on cream-skimming predicts that crossing networks will increase the 
transaction costs of the exchange, which is rejected empirically by Fong, Madhavan and 
Swan (2004) and Gresse (2006). This paper shows one possible mechanism to drive that 
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result: the existence of a crossing network creates an externality for the informed 
trader's order in the exchange, which makes the informed trader trade less in the 
exchange and thus decreases the adverse selection problem. Also, Dönges and 
Heinemann (2006) predict that the crossing network should have a lower market share 
for stocks with higher volatility, but this very intuitive result is rejected by Ready 
(2009). The prediction made in this paper differs from that of Dönges and Heinemann, 
because my model endogenizes the trading cost of the exchange and because volatility 
in this model has information content. 
 
Several other theoretical predictions remain to be tested. This paper emphasizes non-
execution and its association with the transaction costs in the exchange, an area with 
very limited existing literature. An important area for future research is the exploration 
of the patterns and determinants of non-execution because most traditional measures of 
transaction costs are irrelevant for crossing networks. The simplest and most natural 
question to ask is the following: does non-execution, like transaction costs in the 
exchange, also contain both non-informational and informational factors? Næs and 
Skjeltorp (2003) find some evidence of information-based non-execution by studying 
the abnormal cumulative return, but a more direct way to test this hypothesis is to see 
whether proxies for liquidity externality, such as trading volume, and proxies for 
information asymmetry, such as probability of informed trading (PIN) (Easley, Kiefer 
and O'Hara (1996)), both have explanatory power for non-execution. Additionally, one 
may ask the following question: because the informed trader tends to "arbitrage" 
transaction costs in different markets, does this arbitrage finally equalize transaction 
costs of different markets? This would lead the non-execution probability to follow the 
same patterns of price impact. Although patterns of price impact are well studied (Chan 
and Lakonishok (1993,1995 and 1997), Keim and Madhavan (1995,1996,1997 and 
 104  
 
1998),  Madhavan and Cheng (1997) and Stoll (2000) ), the empirical research on non-
execution probability has just begun. Exploring this new line of research should prove 
fruitful. Also, the prediction that the crossing network harms price discovery and 
decreases price volatility can be tested using an event study or by constructing matched 
stock samples. 
 
Several theoretical extensions can be made from this paper. First, this model can be 
extended to multiple periods. In reality, crossing networks are "dark" because they 
provide pre-trade opaqueness. The executed volume, however, needs to be reported to 
the consolidated tape. Then the market maker will be able to observe some signal in the 
crossing network and draw a new inference regarding the fundamental value, which 
may change the prediction of this model. Second, including multiple informed traders in 
the framework of Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) may also generate new 
predictions. The result may also change when the model includes endogenous signal 
acquisition instead of an exogenous signal. Third, the liquidity traders are passive in the 
model. It would be interesting to see what happens if they can react to price impact and 
non-execution probability. Finally, my model rules out the bluffing equilibrium, in 
which the informed trader trades in the wrong direction so as to mislead the price and 
then benefits from the mispricing created by matching orders in the crossing network. 
However, bluffing may be possible under some other circumstances. An analysis of the 
conditions under which bluffing exists would make a very interesting study. 
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APPENDIX 2.A 
Proof. for Lemma 2.2 
The expected volume for any 𝑥𝑑  is 𝐸(𝑥𝑚� |𝑥𝑑) = ∫ 𝑧𝑓𝑠(𝑧)𝑑𝑧𝑥𝑑0 + 𝑥𝑑 ∫ 𝑓𝑠(𝑧)𝑑𝑧+∞𝑥𝑑 =
∫ 𝑧 ∗
1
2
𝑘
1
2(𝑧 + 𝑘)−32 𝑑𝑧𝑥𝑑
0
+ 𝑥𝑑 ∫ 12 𝑘12(𝑧 + 𝑘)−32𝑑𝑧+∞𝑥𝑑 = 𝑘12 �(𝑧 + 𝑘)12 + 𝑘(𝑧 +
𝑘)−12�|0𝑥𝑑 − 𝑥𝑑𝑘12(𝑧 + 𝑘)−12|𝑥𝑑+∞ = 2𝑘12(𝑥𝑑 + 𝑘)12 − 2𝑘 
Therefore 
𝐸(𝑥𝑚� |𝑥𝑑∗) = 2𝑘12(𝑥𝑑∗ + 𝑘)12 − 2𝑘 = 2 𝑘𝑐 �𝑣𝑔 − 𝜇 − 𝜆𝑥𝑒� − 2𝑘 =  2 𝑘𝑐 �𝑣𝑔 − 𝜇 − 𝜆𝑥𝑒 −
𝑐) = 2 𝑘
𝑐
(𝑣 − 𝜇 − 𝜆𝑥𝑒)  
𝐸(𝜋𝑐∗) = 𝐸(𝑝�)𝐸(𝑥𝑚� |𝑥𝑑∗) − 𝑥𝑑∗ ∗ 𝑐 = �𝑣𝑔 − 𝜇 − 𝜆𝑥𝑒� 2𝑘𝑐 (𝑣 − 𝜇 − 𝜆𝑥𝑒) − � 𝑘𝑐2 �𝑣𝑔 − 𝜇 −
𝜆𝑥𝑒)2 − 𝑘� 𝑐 = �𝑣𝑔 − 𝜇 − 𝜆𝑥𝑒� 2𝑘𝑐 (𝑣 − 𝜇 − 𝜆𝑥𝑒) − 𝑘𝑐 ��𝑣𝑔 − 𝜇 − 𝜆𝑥𝑒�2 − 𝑐2� =
𝑘
𝑐
�2𝑣𝑔 − 2𝜇 − 2𝜆𝑥𝑒�(𝑣 − 𝜇 − 𝜆𝑥𝑒) − 𝑘𝑐 �𝑣𝑔 − 𝜇 − 𝜆𝑥𝑒 + 𝑐��𝑣𝑔 − 𝜇 − 𝜆𝑥𝑒 − 𝑐� =
𝑘
𝑐
�2𝑣𝑔 − 2𝜇 − 2𝜆𝑥𝑒�(𝑣 − 𝜇 − 𝜆𝑥𝑒) − 𝑘𝑐 �𝑣𝑔 − 𝜇 − 𝜆𝑥𝑒 + 𝑐�(𝑣 − 𝜇 − 𝜆𝑥𝑒) =
𝑘
𝑐
�2𝑣𝑔 − 2𝜇 − 2𝜆𝑥𝑒 − �𝑣𝑔 − 𝜇 − 𝜆𝑥𝑒 + 𝑐�� (𝑣 − 𝜇 − 𝜆𝑥𝑒) = 𝑘𝑐 (𝑣 − 𝜇 − 𝜆𝑥𝑒)2  
 
Proof. for Lemma 2.3 
Define function 𝑦 = 𝑓(𝜆) = (1−2𝜆𝐾)(2𝜆−2𝜆2𝐾)2 
𝑓(𝜆) is continuous on (−∞, 0) ∪ �0, 1
𝐾
� ∪ �
1
𝐾
, +∞� 
𝑓′(𝜆) = �−2𝐾�2𝜆−2𝜆2𝐾�2−(1−2𝜆𝐾)∗2∗�2𝜆−2𝜆2𝐾�(2−4𝜆𝐾)(2𝜆−2𝜆2𝐾)4 �  
The denominator is equal to 0 when 𝜆 = 0 or 𝜆 = 1
𝐾
, and greater than 0 otherwise, the 
numerator = (2𝜆 − 2𝜆2𝐾)[−2𝐾(2𝜆 − 2𝜆2𝐾) − (1 − 2𝜆𝐾) ∗ 2 ∗ (2 − 4𝜆𝐾)] =
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(2𝜆 − 2𝜆2𝐾)(−12𝜆2𝐾2 + 12𝜆𝐾 − 4) = 24(𝜆2𝐾 − 𝜆) �𝜆2𝐾2 − 𝜆𝐾 + 1
3
� =
24𝜆(𝜆𝐾 − 1) ��𝜆𝐾 − 1
2
�
2 + 1
12
� 
So it is easy to see 
⎩
⎨
⎧
𝑓′(𝜆) > 0 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝜆 < 0
𝑓′(𝜆) < 0 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 0 < 𝜆 < �1
𝐾
�
𝑓′(𝜆) > 0 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝜆 > �1
𝐾
�
   
In addition, lim𝜆→−∞ 𝑓(𝜆) = 0, lim𝜆→0⁻ 𝑓(𝜆) = +∞, lim𝜆→0+ 𝑓(𝜆) = +∞, lim𝜆→�1
𝐾
�
− 𝑓(𝜆) = −∞, lim
𝜆→�
1
𝐾
�
+ 𝑓(𝜆) = −∞, lim𝜆→+∞ 𝑓(𝜆) = 0 
and 𝑓 � 1
2𝐾
� = 0 
So 𝑦 = 𝑓(𝜆) = 𝑅, (𝑅 > 0) has two real solutions, 𝜆1∗ ∈ �0, 12𝐾� and 𝜆2∗ ∈  (−∞, 0) 
𝛽 = � 1−2𝜆𝐾
2𝜆−2𝜆2𝐾
� = 𝑅(2𝜆 − 2𝜆2𝐾) = 2𝜆𝑅(1 − 𝜆𝐾).  when 𝜆 ∈ (−∞, 0), 𝛽 < 0,  when 
𝜆 ∈ �0, 1
2𝐾
� , 𝛽 > 0 
 
Proof. for Lemma 2.4 
Denote 𝜋 = 𝐸(𝜋𝑑� + 𝜋𝑒�) and the second order derivatives of 𝜋 are 
�
𝜕2𝜋
𝜕𝑥𝑒
2� = −2𝜆, �𝜕2𝜋𝜕𝑥𝑑2� = −�𝑣𝑔 − 𝜇 − 𝜆𝑥𝑒�𝑓𝑠(𝑥𝑑∗), and � 𝜕2𝜋𝜕𝑥𝑑𝜕𝑥𝑒� = −𝜆∫ 𝑓𝑠(𝑧)𝑑𝑧+∞𝑥𝑑 . So 
the Hessian of 𝜋 is 
�
−2𝜆 −𝜆 ∫ 𝑓𝑠(𝑧)𝑑𝑧+∞𝑥𝑑
−𝜆 ∫ 𝑓𝑠(𝑧)𝑑𝑧+∞𝑥𝑑 −�𝑣𝑔 − 𝜇 − 𝜆𝑥𝑒�𝑓𝑠(𝑥𝑑∗)�  For 𝜆2∗  ∈  (−∞, 0) , the first-order 
principle minor is positive. Therefore, the Hessian matrix with 𝜆2∗  can not be negative 
semidefinite and the necessary condition for profit maximization is violated. 
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When  𝜆 ∈ �0, 1
2𝐾
�,  the first-order principle minor is negative. Now I need to show that 
the second order principle minor is positive, that is: 
−2𝜆 (−�𝑣𝑔 − 𝜇 − 𝜆𝑥𝑒�𝑓𝑠(𝑥𝑑∗)) − �−𝜆 ∫ 𝑓𝑠(𝑧)𝑑𝑧+∞𝑥𝑑 �2 > 0  
Combining (2.3) and (2.11) yields 
𝑓𝑠(𝑥𝑑∗) = 12 𝑘12 � 𝑘𝑐2 �𝑣𝑔 − 𝜇 − 𝜆𝑥𝑒�2 − 𝑘 + 𝑘�−32 = 𝑐32𝑘 (𝑣𝑔 − 𝜇 − 𝜆𝑥𝑒)⁻³  
 
So −2𝜆 (−�𝑣𝑔 − 𝜇 − 𝜆𝑥𝑒�𝑓𝑠(𝑥𝑑∗)) − (−𝜆∫ 𝑓𝑠(𝑧)𝑑𝑧+∞𝑥𝑑 )² = −2𝜆 (−�𝑣𝑔 − 𝜇 −
𝜆𝑥𝑒) 𝑐32𝑘 �𝑣𝑔 − 𝜇 − 𝜆𝑥𝑒�−3 − �−𝜆 � 𝑐�𝑣𝑔−𝜇−𝜆𝑥𝑒���2 = 𝜆 𝑐3𝑘 �𝑣𝑔 − 𝜇 − 𝜆𝑥𝑒�−2 −
𝜆2𝑐2�𝑣𝑔 − 𝜇 − 𝜆𝑥𝑒�
−2 = 𝜆 𝑐3
𝑘
�𝑣𝑔 − 𝜇 − 𝜆𝑥𝑒�
−2
�1 − �𝑘
𝑐
� 𝜆� 
Because 𝜆 ∈ �0, 1
2𝐾
� and 𝑘
𝑐
≡ 𝐾, �1 − 𝑘
𝑐
𝜆� > 0. Also 𝜆 > 0 and 𝑐3
𝑘
�𝑣𝑔 − 𝜇 − 𝜆𝑥𝑒�
−2 >
0. Therefore, the second principle minor for 𝜆1∗  ∈ �0, 12𝐾� is greater than 0. So Hessian 
for 𝜆1∗  is negative definite, which is the sufficient condition for profit maximization. 
 
Proof. for Lemma 2.5 
The proof of Lemma 2.5 is divided by three parts. First, I will prove that both 𝛽∗ and 𝑥𝑑∗  
are positive unless 𝑣 = 𝑝0 . Then I will show the comparative statics of 𝜆∗  and 𝛽∗ . 
Finally, I will show the comparative statics of 𝑥𝑑∗ . 
𝛽∗ > 0 follows from Lemma 2.3. For 𝑥𝑑∗ , I focus the proof on the case when 𝑣 > 𝑝0, 
and the case for 𝑣 < 𝑝0is simply symmetric. 
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When 𝑣 > 𝑝0 , 𝑥𝑑∗ = 𝑘𝑐2 (𝑣 + 𝑐 − 𝑝0 − 𝜆∗𝑥𝑒)² − 𝑘 = 𝑘𝑐2 (𝑣 − 𝑝₀ − 𝜆∗𝛽∗(𝑣 − 𝑝0) + 𝑐)² −
𝑘 = 𝑘
𝑐2
((𝑣 − 𝑝0)(1− 𝜆∗𝛽∗) + 𝑐)² − 𝑘. 
From equation (2.17), we know that 𝜆∗𝛽∗ = 𝛽∗2
𝛽∗
2+𝑅
< 1 . Therefore, (𝑣 − 𝑝0)(1−
𝜆∗𝛽∗) + 𝑐 > 𝑐 when 𝑣 > 𝑝0. So 
𝑥𝑑
∗ = 𝑘
𝑐2
�(𝑣 − 𝑝0)(1− 𝜆∗𝛽∗) + 𝑐�2 − 𝑘 > 𝑘𝑐2 (𝑐)² − 𝑘 = 0  
The comparative statics of 𝜆∗ and 𝛽∗ follow from the implicit function rule. Equations 
(2.14) and (2.21) defines two implicit functions 𝜆∗(𝑅,𝐾)  and 𝛽∗(𝑅,𝐾) , where 𝑅 =
𝜎𝑒2
𝜎𝑣
2and 𝐾 = 𝑘𝑐. Fix 𝑐, the sign of 𝜕𝜆∗𝜕𝐾  is the same as 𝜕𝜆∗𝜕𝑘 , and the sign of 𝜕𝛽∗𝜕𝐾  is the same as 
𝜕𝛽∗
𝜕𝑘
. 
Denote 
�
𝐹1(𝜆∗,𝛽∗;𝑅,𝐾) = (2𝜆∗ − 2𝜆∗2𝐾)𝛽∗ − (1 − 2𝜆∗𝐾) = 0
𝐹2(𝜆∗,𝛽∗;𝑅,𝐾) = 𝑅(2𝜆∗ − 2𝜆∗2𝐾)² − (1 − 2𝜆∗𝐾) = 0   
Take total derivatives with respect to 𝑅 and 𝐾 I get 
�
(2𝜆∗ − 2𝜆∗2𝐾) (2 − 4𝜆∗𝐾)𝛽 + 2𝐾0 2𝑅(2𝜆∗ − 2𝜆∗2𝐾)(2 − 4𝜆∗𝐾) + 2𝐾� �𝜕𝛽∗𝜕𝑅 𝜕𝛽∗𝜕𝐾𝜕𝜆∗
𝜕𝑅
𝜕𝜆∗
𝜕𝐾
� =
�
0 2𝜆∗2𝛽 − 2𝜆∗
−(2𝜆∗ − 2𝜆∗2𝐾)² 2𝑅(2𝜆∗ − 2𝜆∗2𝐾)2𝜆∗2 − 2𝜆∗�  
Therefore, 𝜕𝜆
∗
𝜕𝑅
= �2𝜆∗−2𝜆∗2𝐾�2
2𝑅(4𝜆∗𝐾−2)(2𝜆∗−2𝜆∗2𝐾)−2𝐾). 
For 𝐾 > 0 𝑅 > 0 and 𝜆∗ ∈ �0, 1
2𝐾
� ⇒  �2𝑅(4𝐾𝜆∗ − 2) < 02𝜆∗ − 2𝜆∗2𝐾 > 0
−2𝐾 < 0   
So 2𝑅(4𝐾𝜆∗ − 2)(2𝜆∗ − 2𝜆∗2𝐾) − 2𝐾 < 0 ⇒ 𝜕𝜆∗
𝜕𝑅
< 0 
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𝜕𝛽∗
𝜕𝑅
= (4𝜆∗𝐾−2)𝛽−2𝐾(2𝜆∗−2𝜆∗2𝐾) 𝜕𝜆∗𝜕𝑅 , where (4𝜆∗𝐾 − 2)𝛽 − 2𝐾 = (4𝜆∗𝐾 − 2) 1−2𝜆∗𝐾2𝜆∗−2𝜆∗2𝐾 − 2𝐾 =
−(1−2𝜆∗𝐾)2
2𝜆∗−2𝜆∗2𝐾
− 2𝐾. 
For 𝐾 > 0, 𝜆∗ ∈ �0, 1
2𝐾
� , 2𝜆∗ − 2𝜆∗2𝐾 > 0 ⇒ −(1−2𝜆∗𝐾)2
2𝜆∗−2𝜆∗2𝐾
− 2𝐾 < 0 ⇒ (4𝜆∗𝐾−2)𝛽−2𝐾(2𝜆∗−2𝜆∗2𝐾) <0 
So 𝜕𝛽
∗
𝜕𝑅
= (4𝜆∗𝐾−2)𝛽−2𝐾(2𝜆∗−2𝜆∗2𝐾) 𝜕𝜆∗𝜕𝑅 > 0 
𝜕𝜆∗
𝜕𝐾
= 2𝑅�2𝜆∗−2𝜆∗2𝐾�(2𝜆∗2−2𝜆∗)
2𝑅(2𝜆∗−2𝜆∗2𝐾)(2−4𝜆∗𝐾)+2𝐾  
from equation (2.21) I know that 𝑅 = (1−2𝜆∗𝐾)(2𝜆∗−2𝜆∗2𝐾)2 
⇒
2𝑅�2𝜆∗−2𝜆∗2𝐾�2𝜆2−2𝜆
2𝑅(2𝜆∗−2𝜆∗2𝐾)(2−4𝜆∗𝐾)+2𝐾 = −𝜆∗3𝐾3𝜆∗2𝐾2−3𝜆∗𝐾+1 = − 𝜆∗3𝐾3��𝜆∗𝐾−1
2
�
2
+�
1
12
��
< 0  when 𝐾 > 0  and 
𝜆∗ ∈ (0, 1
2𝐾
) 
𝜕𝛽∗
𝜕𝐾
= 2𝜆∗2𝛽∗−2𝜆∗+[(4𝜆∗𝐾−2)𝛽∗−2𝐾]�𝜕𝜆∗𝜕𝐾�(2𝜆∗−2𝜆∗2𝐾)  where 2𝜆∗2𝛽∗ − 2𝜆∗ = 2𝜆∗2 1−2𝜆∗𝐾(2𝜆∗−2𝜆∗2𝐾) − 2𝜆∗ = −2𝜆∗2(2𝜆∗−2𝜆∗2𝐾)  [(4𝜆∗𝐾 − 2)𝛽∗ − 2𝐾] 𝜕𝜆∗
𝜕𝐾
= �(4𝜆∗𝐾 − 2) � 1−2𝜆∗𝐾(2𝜆∗−2𝜆∗2𝐾)� − 2𝐾� 𝜕𝜆∗𝜕𝐾 = �(4𝜆∗𝐾 −2) � 1−2𝜆∗𝐾(2𝜆∗−2𝜆∗2𝐾)� − 2𝐾� 𝜕𝜆∗𝜕𝐾 = −4𝜆∗2𝐾2+4𝜆∗𝐾−22𝜆∗−2𝜆∗2𝐾 ∗ −𝜆∗3𝐾3𝜆∗2𝐾2−3𝜆∗𝐾+1 =
4𝜆∗5𝐾3−4𝜆∗4𝐾2+2𝜆∗3𝐾(2𝜆∗−2𝜆∗2𝐾)(3𝜆∗2𝐾2−3𝜆∗𝐾+1)  
𝜕𝛽∗
𝜕𝐾
= 2𝜆∗2𝛽∗−2𝜆∗+[(4𝜆∗𝐾−2)𝛽∗−2𝐾]�𝜕𝜆∗𝜕𝐾�(2𝜆∗−2𝜆∗2𝐾) = −2𝜆∗2(2𝜆∗−2𝜆∗2𝐾)2 + 4𝜆∗5𝐾3−4𝜆∗4𝐾2+2𝜆∗3𝐾(2𝜆∗−2𝜆∗2𝐾)2(3𝜆∗2𝐾2−3𝜆∗𝐾+1) =
4𝜆∗5𝐾3−10𝜆∗4𝐾2+8𝜆∗3𝐾−2𝜆∗2(2𝜆∗−2𝜆∗2𝐾)2(3𝜆∗2𝐾2−3𝜆∗𝐾+1) = 2𝜆∗𝐾−12(3𝜆∗2𝐾2−3𝜆∗𝐾+1) < 0 when 𝜆∗ ∈ �0, 12𝐾� 
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Finally, we need to prove that 𝜕𝑥𝑑
∗
𝜕𝑅
 , we focus on the case when 𝑣 > 𝑝0. The case when 
𝑣 < 𝑝0 can be proved symmetrically 
𝜕𝑥𝑑
∗
𝜕𝑅
= 𝑘
𝑐2
2[(1 − 𝜆∗𝛽∗)(𝑣 − 𝑝₀) + 𝑐][(𝑣 − 𝑝₀)(−𝜆∗ 𝜕𝛽∗
𝜕𝑅
− 𝛽∗
𝜕𝜆∗
𝜕𝑅
)] .  As 𝜆∗𝛽∗ = 𝛽∗2
𝛽∗2+𝑅
<
1 and 𝑣 − 𝑝0 > 1, the sign of 𝜕𝑥𝑑∗𝜕𝑅  is determined by �−𝜆∗ 𝜕𝛽∗𝜕𝑅 − 𝛽∗ 𝜕𝜆∗𝜕𝑅 � 
We know that 𝜕𝛽
∗
𝜕𝑅
= (4𝜆∗𝐾−2)𝛽−2𝐾(2𝜆∗−2𝜆∗2𝐾) 𝜕𝜆∗𝜕𝑅 . Therefore, �−𝜆∗ �𝜕𝛽∗𝜕𝑅 � − 𝛽∗ �𝜕𝜆∗𝜕𝑅 �� =
�−𝜆∗ �
(4𝜆∗𝐾−2)𝛽−2𝐾(2𝜆∗−2𝜆∗2𝐾) � − 𝛽∗� 𝜕𝜆∗𝜕𝑅 = 2𝐾(1−𝜆∗𝛽∗)2−2𝜆∗𝐾 𝜕𝜆∗𝜕𝑅  
Because 𝜆∗𝛽∗ = 𝛽∗2
𝛽∗2+𝑅
< 1, 𝜆∗ ∈ �0, 1
2𝐾
� and  𝜕𝜆
∗
𝜕𝑅
< 0 , 𝜕𝑥𝑑∗
𝜕𝑅
< 0 
To know the sign of 𝜕𝑥𝑑
∗
𝜕𝑘
, we only need to know the sign of 𝜕𝑥𝑑
∗
𝜕𝐾
 when 𝑐 is fixed 
Note that 𝑥𝑑∗ = 𝑘𝑐2 �(1 − 𝜆∗𝛽∗)(𝑣 − 𝑝0) + 𝑐�2 − 𝑘 = 𝐾𝑐 (𝑣 + 𝑐 − 𝑝0 − 𝜆𝑥𝑒)2 − 𝐾𝑐 
So 𝜕𝑥𝑑
∗
𝜕𝐾
= 1
𝑐
�(1 − 𝜆∗𝛽∗)(𝑣 − 𝑝0) + 𝑐�2 − 𝑐 + �𝐾
𝑐
2�(1 − 𝜆∗𝛽∗)(𝑣 − 𝑝0) +
𝑐� �−
𝜕𝜆∗
𝜕𝐾
𝛽∗ − 𝜆∗
𝜕𝛽∗
𝜕𝐾
�� 
Note that 1
𝑐
((1 − 𝜆∗𝛽∗)(𝑣 − 𝑝₀) + 𝑐)² − 𝑐 = 1
𝑐
[((1 − 𝜆∗𝛽∗)(𝑣 − 𝑝₀) + 𝑐)² − 𝑐²] =
1
𝑐
[((1− 𝜆∗𝛽∗)(𝑣 − 𝑝₀))((1− 𝜆∗𝛽∗)(𝑣 − 𝑝₀) + 2𝑐)] > 0 
𝐾
𝑐
2((1 − 𝜆∗𝛽∗)(𝑣 − 𝑝₀) + 𝑐)(−𝜕𝜆∗
𝜕𝐾
𝛽∗ − 𝜆∗
𝜕𝛽∗
𝜕𝐾
) > 0  because �(1 − 𝜆∗𝛽∗)(𝑣 − 𝑝0) +
𝑐� > 0, 𝜕𝜆∗
𝜕𝐾
< 0, 𝜕𝛽∗
𝜕𝐾
< 0, 𝛽∗ > 0 and 𝜆∗ > 0. Therefore, 𝜕𝑥𝑑∗
𝜕𝐾
> 0 
 
Proof. for Lemma 2.6 
Because 𝑝� = 𝑝0� + 𝜆𝑦� , 𝑝�  is informationally equivalent to 𝑦� , implying 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑣�|𝑝�) =
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑣�|𝑦�) . Because 𝑝� = 𝐸(𝑣�|𝑦�) , 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑝�) = 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝐸(𝑣�|𝑦�)) . 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑣�) = 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑣�|𝑦�) +
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𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝐸(𝑣�|𝑦�)) follows directly from the Projection Theorem, where the variance of 𝑣� is 
decomposed into two parts: the part that can be explained by 𝑦�, 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝐸(𝑣�|𝑦�)), and the 
part that can not be explained by 𝑦� , 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑣�|𝑦�) . Therefore, 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑣�) = 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑣�|𝑝�) +
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑝�) and 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑝�) = 𝑒𝜎𝑣2 follows (2.24) 
 
Proof. for Theorem 2.2 
From (2.26) 𝑒  is uniquely determined by 2 − 2𝜆∗𝐾 . Denote 2 − 2𝜆∗𝐾 ≡ 𝑙 , then 
𝜆∗ = 2−𝑙
2𝐾
. So 
𝑅(2𝜆∗ − 2𝜆∗2𝐾)² = (1 − 2𝜆∗𝐾) ⇒ 𝑅𝜆∗2(2− 2𝜆∗𝐾)² = (1 − 2𝜆∗𝐾) 
⇒ 𝑅 �
2 − 𝑙2𝐾 �2 𝑙2 = 𝑙 − 1 ⇒ 𝑅4𝐾2 (2 − 𝑙)2𝑙2 = 𝑙 − 1 ⇒ 14 𝜎𝑒2𝑐2𝑘2𝜎𝑣2 (2 − 𝑙)2𝑙2 = 𝑙 − 1 
The last step shows that the solution of l only depends on 𝑅
𝐾2
= �𝜎𝑒𝑐
𝑘𝜎𝑣
�
2
. There are 
multiple solution for the equation, but as 2 − 2𝜆∗𝐾 ≡ 𝑙  and that 𝜆∗  is unique. There 
should be only one solution satisfies optimization conditions set up the model. 
Therefore,  𝑙  is uniquely determined by 𝑅
𝐾2
= �𝜎𝑒𝑐
𝑘𝜎𝑣
�
2
 
From equation (2.26), 𝑒 = 1
2
 when 𝑘 = 0. 
When 𝑘 ≠ 0, we know that 𝑙  is uniquely determined by 𝜎𝑒𝑐
𝑘𝜎𝑣
. Denote 𝜎𝑒𝑐
𝑘𝜎𝑣
= 𝑁 . Then  
1
4
𝜎𝑒2𝑐2
𝑘2𝜎𝑣
2 (2 − 𝑙)²𝑙² = 𝑙 − 1 ⇔ 14𝑁² = 𝑙−1(2−𝑙)2𝑙2 
Totally differentiate both side of the equation results in 1
2
𝑁𝑑𝑁 = (2−𝑙)𝑙�3𝑙2−6𝑙+4�(2−𝑙)4𝑙4 𝑑𝑙 ⇒
𝑑𝑙
𝑑𝑁
= 1(2−𝑙)3𝑙3𝑁
2(3𝑙2−6𝑙+4). 
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𝑙 ≡ 2 − 2𝜆∗𝐾 , 2 − 𝑙 = 𝜆∗
2𝐾
 and 𝜆∗ ∈ �0, 1
2𝐾
� ⇒ (2 − 𝑙)3 > 0  and 𝑙3 > 0 . Also 𝑁 > 0 
and (3𝑙² − 6𝑙 + 4) = 3(𝑙 − 1)² + 1 > 0. So 𝑑𝑙
𝑑𝑁
> 0 and 𝑙 is increasing in 𝑁. It is easy 
to see from (2.26) that 𝑒 increases in 𝑙. So 𝑒 increases in 𝑁 ≡ 𝜎𝑒𝑐
𝑘𝜎𝑣
. 
 
Proof. for Theorem 2.3 
From Lemma 2.3, we know that 𝜆∗ ∈ �0, 1
2𝐾
� so 𝜆∗ < 𝑐
2𝑘
. 
The relationship between 𝜆∗ and exogenous variables is proved in Lemma 2.5. 
 
Proof. for Theorem 2.4 
We prove for the case where 𝑣 ≥ 𝑝0. From Lemma 2.2 and 𝜇 = 𝑝0 
𝐸�𝑥𝑚� �𝑥𝑑
∗ �
𝑥𝑑
∗ = 2𝑘𝑐(𝑣−𝑝0−𝜆∗𝑥𝑒∗)𝑘
𝑐2
(𝑣+𝑐−𝑝0−𝜆∗𝑥𝑒∗)2−𝑘  = 2𝑐(𝑣−𝑝0−𝜆∗𝑥𝑒∗)(𝑣+𝑐−𝑝0−𝜆∗𝑥𝑒∗)2−𝑐2 = 2𝑐(𝑣−𝑝0−𝜆∗𝑥𝑒∗)(𝑣+𝑐−𝑝0−𝜆∗𝑥𝑒∗+𝑐)(𝑣+𝑐−𝑝0−𝜆∗𝑥𝑒∗−𝑐) =
2𝑐
2𝑐+𝑣−𝑝0−𝜆∗𝑥𝑒
∗  
For 𝑥𝑒∗ = 𝛽∗(𝑣 − 𝑝0), 𝐸�𝑥𝑚� �𝑥𝑑∗ �𝑥𝑑∗ = 2𝑐2𝑐+(𝑣−𝑝0)(1−𝜆∗𝛽∗) 
From (2.14), (2.26) and Lemma 2.6. 𝜆∗𝛽∗ = 𝜆∗ 1−2𝜆∗𝐾
2𝜆∗−2𝜆∗2𝐾
= 1−2𝜆∗𝐾
2−2𝜆∗𝐾
= 𝑒 = 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑝�)
𝜎𝑣
2  
It is straightforward to see 𝑣 ↑ ⇒  2𝑐 + (𝑣 − 𝑝0)(1 − 𝜆∗𝛽∗) ↑ ⇒ 2𝑐2𝑐+(𝑣−𝑝0)(1−𝜆∗𝛽∗) ↓. 
The comparative statics for 𝜎𝑒
𝑘𝜎𝑣
 follows Theorem 2.2. 𝜎𝑒
𝑘𝜎𝑣
↑ ⇒  𝑒 ↑⇒ 2𝑐 + (𝑣 − 𝑝0)(1−
𝑒) ↓ ⇒ 2𝑐
2𝑐+(𝑣−𝑝0)(1−𝜆∗𝛽∗) ↑. 
To find the relationship between 𝑐 and 𝑒𝑥𝑒𝑖, notice that 
1
𝑒𝑥𝑒𝑖
= 2𝑐+(𝑣−𝑝0)(1−𝜆∗𝛽∗)
2𝑐
= 1 +
(𝑣−𝑝0)(1−𝜆∗𝛽∗)
2𝑐
= 1 + (𝑣−𝑝0)
2𝑐(2−2𝜆∗𝐾) = 1 + (𝑣−𝑝0)4(𝑐−𝜆∗𝑘) 
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Now we prove that (𝑐 − 𝜆∗𝑘) increases in 𝑐: 𝜕(𝑐−𝜆∗𝑘)
𝜕𝑐
= 1 − 𝑘 𝜕𝜆∗
𝜕𝑐
 = 1 − 𝑘 𝜕𝜆∗
𝜕𝐾
𝜕𝐾
𝜕𝑐
 
For 𝐾 = 𝑘
𝑐
, 𝜕𝐾
𝜕𝑐
= − 𝑘
𝑐2
, from proof of Lemma 2.5 we know 𝜕𝜆
∗
𝜕𝐾
= −𝜆∗3𝐾
3𝜆∗2𝐾2−3𝜆∗𝐾+1
⇒
𝜕(𝑐−𝜆∗𝑘)
𝜕𝑐
= 1 − 𝑘 −𝜆∗3𝐾
3𝜆∗2𝐾2−3𝜆∗𝐾+1
�−
𝑘
𝑐2
� = 1 − 𝜆∗3𝐾� 𝑘𝑐2�𝑘
3𝜆∗2𝐾2−3𝜆∗𝐾+1
= 1 − 𝜆∗3𝐾3
3𝜆∗2𝐾2−3𝜆∗𝐾+1
=
−𝜆∗3𝐾3+3𝜆∗2𝐾2−3𝜆∗𝐾+1
3𝜆∗2𝐾2−3𝜆∗𝐾+1
= (1−𝜆𝐾)3
3��𝜆∗𝐾−�
1
2
��
2
+�
1
12
��
 
For 𝜆∗ ∈ �0, 1
2𝐾
� , (1 − 𝜆𝐾)3 > 0  and 𝜕(𝑐−𝜆∗𝑘)
𝜕𝑐
> 0 . So 𝑐 − 𝜆∗𝑘  increases in 𝑐  and 
1
𝑒𝑥𝑒𝑖
= 1 + (𝑣−𝑝0)
4(𝑐−𝜆∗𝑘) decreases in 𝑐, and 𝑒𝑥𝑒𝑖 is  increasing in 𝑐. 
 
Proof. for Theorem 2.5 
𝐸�𝑥𝑚� �𝑥𝑑
∗ �
𝑥𝑒
∗ = 2𝑘𝑐(𝑣−𝑝0−𝜆∗𝑥𝑒∗)𝑥𝑒∗ = 2𝐾�𝑣−𝑝0−𝜆∗𝛽∗(𝑣−𝑝0)�𝛽∗(𝑣−𝑝0) = 2𝐾(1−𝜆∗𝛽∗)�𝑣−𝑝0�𝛽∗(𝑣−𝑝0) = 2𝐾(1−𝜆∗𝛽∗)𝛽∗  plug 
(2.14) into the equation I obtain 
𝐸�𝑥𝑚� �𝑥𝑑
∗ �
𝑥𝑒
∗ = 2𝐾�1−𝜆∗� 1−2𝜆∗𝐾2𝜆∗−2𝜆∗2𝐾��
�
1−2𝜆∗𝐾
2𝜆∗−2𝜆∗2𝐾
�
= 2𝐾(𝜆∗)
1−2𝜆∗𝐾
= 1
1−2𝜆∗𝐾
− 1  
From the proof of Theorem 2.2 we know that 𝑙 ≡ 2 − 2𝜆∗𝐾 is uniquely determined by 
𝜎𝑒𝑐
𝑘𝜎𝑣
 and increases in 𝜎𝑒𝑐
𝑘𝜎𝑣
. Therefore 𝑙 − 1 ≡ 1 − 2𝜆∗𝐾 is also uniquely determined by 𝜎𝑒𝑐
𝑘𝜎𝑣
 
and increases in 𝜎𝑒𝑐
𝑘𝜎𝑣
. So 𝐸�𝑥𝑚� �𝑥𝑑
∗ �
𝑥𝑒
∗ = 11−2𝜆∗𝐾 − 1  is uniquely determined by 𝜎𝑒𝑐𝑘𝜎𝑣  and 
decreases in 𝜎𝑒𝑐
𝑘𝜎𝑣
. 
 
Proof. for Corollary 2.1 
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑝�) = 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑝0 + 𝜆∗𝑦�) = 𝜆∗2𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑦�) = 𝜆∗2𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝛽∗𝑥𝑒� + 𝑢𝑒�) = 𝜆∗2(𝛽∗2𝜎𝑣2 + 𝜎𝑒2)  
 114  
 
From (2.14) 𝛽∗ = 1−2𝜆∗𝐾
2𝜆∗−2𝜆∗2𝐾
 
𝜆∗2(𝛽∗2𝜎𝑣2 + 𝜎𝑒2) = 𝜆∗2(� 1−2𝜆∗𝐾2𝜆∗−2𝜆∗2𝐾�2 𝜎𝑣2 + 𝜎𝑒2)  
from (2.21) we know � 1−2𝜆
∗𝐾
2𝜆∗−2𝜆∗2𝐾
�
2 = 𝑅(1 − 2𝜆∗𝐾), and 𝑅 = 𝜎𝑒2
𝜎𝑣
2 so 
𝜆∗2(� 1−2𝜆∗𝐾
2𝜆∗−2𝜆∗2𝐾
�
2
𝜎𝑣
2 + 𝜎𝑒2) = 𝜆∗2(𝑅(1 − 2𝜆∗𝐾)𝜎𝑣2 + 𝜎𝑒2) = 𝜆∗2((1 − 2𝜆∗𝐾)𝜎𝑒2 +
𝜎𝑒
2) = 𝜆∗2(2 − 2𝜆∗𝐾)𝜎𝑒2  
Denote 𝑓(𝜆∗;𝜎𝑒2,𝐾) = 𝜆∗2(2 − 2𝜆∗𝐾)𝜎𝑒2 so 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑝�) = 𝑓(𝜆∗;𝜎𝑒2,𝐾) 
𝜕𝑓
𝜕𝜆
= (4𝜆∗ − 6𝜆∗2𝐾)𝜎𝑒2 = 4𝜆∗ �1 − 32 𝜆∗𝐾�𝜎𝑒2  
Therefore 𝜕𝑓
𝜕𝜆
> 0 when 𝜆∗ ∈ �0, 2
3𝐾
� 
From Lemma 2.3 and Lemma 2.4, 𝜆∗ ∈ �0, 1
2𝐾
�. Therefore, 
𝑓(𝜆∗;𝜎𝑒2,𝐾) < 𝑓( 12𝐾 ;𝜎𝑒2,𝐾) = � 12𝐾�2 �2 − 2 12𝐾 𝐾�𝜎𝑒2 = 𝜎𝑒24𝐾2 = 𝑐2𝜎𝑒24𝑘2  . 
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APPENDIX 2.B 
 
This part provides another way to understand why the informed trader increases order 
size more than the liquidity order flow. 
 
Theorem 2.6 Suppose {𝜆∗(𝑘₁), 𝑥𝑒∗(𝑘₁), 𝑥𝑑∗(𝑘₁)}  and {𝜆∗(𝑘₂), 𝑥𝑒∗(𝑘₂),𝑥𝑑∗(𝑘₂)}  are 
optimal solutions for 𝑘1 < 𝑘2. An increase from 𝑘1 to 𝑘2 can be decomposed into the 
following two effects: 
 
Volume effect: suppose that the informed trader's strategy in the exchange is fixed as 
𝑥𝑒
∗(𝑘1), then the price impact remains as 𝜆∗(𝑘1) and the expected profit per matched 
unit does not change. Denote 𝑥𝑑′(𝑘2) as the optimal choice of the informed trader in 
the crossing network conditional on 𝜆∗(𝑘₁)  and 𝑥𝑒∗(𝑘₁) . Then 𝐸�𝑥𝑚� �𝑥𝑑′ �𝑘2��𝑥𝑑′ (𝑘2) =
𝐸�𝑥𝑚� �𝑥𝑑
∗ (𝑘1)�
𝑥𝑑
∗ (𝑘1) , meaning that the execution probability does not change. 
 
Price effect: 𝑣𝑔 − 𝑝₀ − 𝜆∗(𝑘1)𝑥𝑒∗(𝑘₁) < 𝑣𝑔 − 𝑝₀ − 𝜆∗(𝑘₂)𝑥𝑒∗(𝑘₂)  , meaning that the 
optimal profit per matched share is higher with k₂, which implies  
𝐸�𝑥𝑚� �𝑥𝑑
′ (𝑘₂)�
𝑥𝑑
′ (𝑘₂) >
𝐸�𝑥𝑚� �𝑥𝑑
∗ (𝑘₂)�
𝑥𝑑
∗ (𝑘₂) . 
Combining the volume effect and price effect results in
𝐸�𝑥𝑚� �𝑥𝑑
∗ (𝑘1)�
𝑥𝑑
∗ (𝑘1) > 𝐸�𝑥𝑚� �𝑥𝑑∗ (𝑘₂)�𝑥𝑑∗ (𝑘₂) . 
Proof. Volume effect: Suppose we fix 𝑥𝑒′(𝑘₂) = 𝑥𝑒∗(𝑘₁) . Because 𝑥𝑒∗ = 𝛽∗(𝑣 −
𝑝0),𝑥𝑒′ (𝑘₂) = 𝑥𝑒∗(𝑘1) is equivalent to 𝛽′(𝑘2) = 𝛽∗(𝑘1). From (2.17)  we know 𝜆′(𝑘₂) =
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𝜆∗(𝑘₁)  when both 𝛽∗  and 𝑅  are fixed. So 𝑣𝑔 − 𝑝₀ − 𝜆′(𝑘2)𝑥𝑒′(𝑘₂) = 𝑣𝑔 − 𝑝₀ −
𝜆∗(𝑘1)𝑥𝑒∗(𝑘₁). 
 
Denote 𝑣𝑔 − 𝑝₀ − 𝜆∗(𝑘₁)𝑥𝑒∗(𝑘₁) = 𝜋₁ . First-order condition (2.11) and Lemma 2.2 
implies that 
𝑥𝑑
∗(𝑘₁) = 𝑘1
𝑐2
𝜋1
2 − 𝑘1 and 𝐸(𝑥𝑚� |𝑥𝑑∗(𝑘1)) = 2 𝑘1𝑐 (𝜋1 − 𝑐)  
𝑥𝑑
′ (𝑘2) = 𝑘2𝑐2 𝜋12 − 𝑘2 and 𝐸(𝑥𝑚� |𝑥𝑑′ (𝑘2)) = 2 𝑘2𝑐 (𝜋1 − 𝑐)  
 
Therefore �
𝐸�𝑥𝑚� �𝑥𝑑
′ (𝑘2)�
𝑥𝑑
′ (𝑘2) � = �𝐸�𝑥𝑚� �𝑥𝑑∗ (𝑘1)�𝑥𝑑∗ (𝑘1) � = 21𝑐𝜋11𝑐2𝜋12−1 = 2𝑐𝜋1+𝑐 . So execution probability 
does not change. 
Price effect: Denote 𝜋2 = 𝑣𝑔 − 𝑝0 − 𝜆∗(𝑘2)𝑥𝑒∗(𝑘2) = 𝑣𝑔 − 𝑝0 − 𝜆∗(𝑘2)𝛽∗(𝑘2)(𝑣 −
𝑝0). 
 
Theorem 2.3 implies that 𝜆∗(𝑘2) < 𝜆∗(𝑘1)  and 𝛽∗(𝑘2) < 𝜆∗(𝑘2)  when 𝑘2 > 𝑘1 . So 
𝜋2 > 𝜋1. 
First-order condition (2.11) and Lemma 2.2 implies that 
𝑥𝑑
∗(𝑘2) = 𝑘2𝑐2 𝜋22 − 𝑘2 and E(𝑥𝑚� |𝑥𝑑∗(𝑘2)) = 2(𝑘2𝑐 )(𝜋2 − 𝑐) 
So 
𝐸�𝑥𝑚� �𝑥𝑑
∗ (𝑘2)�
𝑥𝑑
∗ (𝑘2) = 2𝑘2𝑐 (𝜋2−𝑐)𝑘2
𝑐2
𝜋2
2−𝑘2
= 2𝑐
𝜋2+𝑐
< 2𝑐
𝜋1+𝑐
= 𝐸�𝑥𝑚� �𝑥𝑑′ (𝑘2)�
𝑥𝑑
′ (𝑘2)  
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Combining volume effect and price effect we get 
𝐸�𝑥𝑚� �𝑥𝑑
∗ (𝑘2)�
𝑥𝑑
∗ (𝑘2) < 𝐸�𝑥𝑚� �𝑥𝑑′ (𝑘2)�𝑥𝑑′ (𝑘2) =
𝐸�𝑥𝑚� �𝑥𝑑
∗ (𝑘1)�
𝑥𝑑
∗ (𝑘1) . So an increase of liquidity trading in the crossing network decreases 
execution probability. 
 
The volume effect implies that if the profit per matched unit does not change, the 
informed trader increases his order size at the same ratio as the increase in liquidity 
trading. Then the probability of execution remains the same. This can be seen from the 
first-order condition (2.9). The informed trader's optimization problem in the crossing 
network is to choose the execution probability so that his expected marginal profit, 
which is the product of profit per matched unit and execution probability, is equal to up-
front submission cost 𝑐. When profit per matched unit and 𝑐 are the same, the informed 
trader will choose the same execution probability, that is, he will increase his order size 
at the same ratio as the liquidity traders. 
 
What drives the result is the price effect. As the liquidity trading in the crossing network 
increases, the informed trader finds that the externality of price impact on the crossing 
network increases. Therefore, he chooses to trade less in the exchange and more in the 
crossing network. His smaller order size in the exchange decreases the adverse selection 
problem in the exchange and causes a smaller price impact of trade. Therefore, his 
profit per matched unit increases. When the profit per matched unit increases, the 
informed trader requires a lower execution probability to make marginal revenue equal 
to marginal cost in the crossing network. 
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CHAPTER 3 
TRANSACTION COSTS AND MARKET SHARE OF CROSSING NETWORKS 
 
3.1. Introduction 
A major research topic in market microstructure is the measurement of transaction costs 
and the examination of their patterns. In his presidential address to the American 
Financial Association, Stoll (2000) provides seven measures of transaction costs 
(quoted spread, effective spread, traded spread, covariance of price changes, covariance 
of quote changes, price impact of trade and opening volatility) and examines their 
relationships. Yet all seven of these measures seem irrelevant for crossing networks, 
defined by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as "systems that allow 
participants to enter unpriced orders to buy and sell securities. Orders are crossed at a 
specific time at a price derived from another market."57 (SEC, 1998). Crossing networks 
have grown exponentially in the past several years and account for 15.19% of average 
daily U.S. security trading volume. 58  Recently, this kind of trading platform has 
received even more public attention, not only because of two requests for comments 
from the SEC on crossing networks, but also because of “the industry's curious choice 
of the name ‘dark pool.’”59
                                                 
57 Crossing networks have begun to allow limit orders, however, the fact that crossing networks cross 
orders using prices derived from other markets has not been changed. Limit orders in the crossing 
networks will not participate in the cross if the cross price is not as good as the limit price. 
  Despite their importance, there is very limited study of 
transaction costs in crossing networks. The purpose of this paper is to provide an 
empirical measure of transaction costs in crossing networks from publicly available 
data, to examine the pattern of transaction costs in crossing networks, and to study the 
58 Rosenblatt Securities Monthly Dark Liquidity Tracker, April 27, 2010, pp2.  
59 "Exchanges should unite to end flash orders," by Nasdaq CEO Robert Greifeld, Financial Times, 
August 6, 2009. 
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competition between crossing networks and traditional trading platforms, such as stock 
exchanges and electronic communication networks.   
 
The traditional measures of transaction costs are less relevant for crossing networks 
because of their unique trading mechanism. Crossing networks usually use the price set 
by other markets to match buy and sell orders. The match is conducted anonymously, 
and crossing networks have proprietary allocation rules to decide the priorities of 
trading when buy and sell orders are not balanced. Therefore, the price impact of trade 
is technically 0 for crossing networks because price is determined in other markets and 
is independent of order size. The effective spread is also 0 if buy and sell orders are 
matched using quoted-midpoint, which is the business model of many crossing 
networks. The other five measures of transaction costs in Stoll (2010) are either 0 or do 
not exist at all for crossing networks. 60
 
 
The major transaction cost of crossing networks is non-execution: only the side with 
fewer shares gets full execution, while the side with more shares does not get full 
execution. Theoretical studies on crossing networks (Hendershott and Mendelson 
(2000), Dönges and Heinemann (2006), Degryse, Van Achter and Wuyts, (2009) and 
Ye (2010)) all focus on the choice between guaranteed execution with a higher bid-ask 
spread, or the price impact of trade in exchanges and a lower bid-ask spread or price 
impact but lower execution probability in crossing networks. However, non-execution 
probability is a missing piece in most empirical work on crossing networks due to the 
                                                 
60 We cannot calculate quoted spreads from crossing networks because they do not have their own quotes. 
For the same reason, we cannot compute covariance of quote changes for crossing networks. The traded 
spread is also 0 because buy and sell orders are matched using the same price. We cannot compute 
covariance of price changes for crossing networks because they do not have their own prices. Opening 
volatility depends on opening price, which is again irrelevant for crossing networks because they do not 
have their own prices at all.   
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lack of data. A direct consequence of this omission is two empirical puzzles in the 
literature. First, Conrad, Johnson and Wahal (2003) and Keim and Madhavan (1998) 
find that crossing networks consistently have lower transaction costs than stock 
exchanges. Then, a natural question is why crossing networks are not more widely used 
(Conrad, Johnson and Wahal (2003) and Ready (2009). The regulator also has the 
concern that crossing networks will “continue to expand indefinitely.” (SEC, 2009) 
Second, Ready and Ray (2010) find that the market shares of crossing networks are not 
higher for stocks with higher bid-ask spreads, whose reductions in transaction costs 
should be higher in crossing networks.  Our paper shows that non-execution probability 
and its cross-sectional variation can address these empirical puzzles.    
 
We contribute to the literature first by constructing a measure of transaction costs of 
crossing networks, based on publicly available data. Probability of non-execution is 
derived from SEC 605 data, which in turn allow us to study the pattern and 
determinants of this dimension of transaction costs and explain the competition between 
crossing networks and stock exchanges. We find that execution probability in the 
crossing networks is only 4.11 percent for NYSE stocks and 2.17 percent for NASDAQ 
stocks, which is significantly lower than the fill rate of the stock exchange. This low fill 
rate can potentially offset the reduction in effective spread and price impact in crossing 
networks. 
  
We then extend the literature on cross-sectional variation of transaction costs (Stoll 
(2000) and Madahvan (2000)) to non-execution in crossing networks. Our empirical 
findings are consistent with the theoretical prediction of Ye (2010) that non-execution 
probability in crossing networks should follow a similar cross-sectional pattern as price 
impacts in stock exchanges. More broadly, non-execution should also follow the cross-
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sectional pattern of a bid-ask spread because the bid-ask spread can be observed as the 
“price impact of trading standard size order” (Amihud, 2002). The intuition of the Ye 
model is that rational traders would move their trades between crossing networks and 
stock exchanges until they are indifferent between non-execution probability in crossing 
networks and price impacts in exchanges. We employ three methods for testing this 
hypothesis. First, we show that non-execution, like bid-ask spread, can also be 
explained by informational and non-informational causes. Second, we show that non-
execution is positively correlated to the price impact of trade, that is, stocks with a 
higher price impact of trade have a higher non-execution probability. Finally, we show 
that cross-sectional variation of non-execution can be well explained by the same 
underlying trading characteristics that explain cross-sectional differences in effective 
spread and price impact. The close association between effective spread, price impact 
and non-execution provides an explanation for Ray (2010) and Ready (2009). Ray 
(2010) finds that crossing networks do not have a higher market share for stocks with 
higher effective spreads. This can be explained by the positive correlation between the 
bid-ask spread and non-execution. Conditional on execution, stocks with a higher bid-
ask spread should have a higher reduction in transaction costs in crossing networks. 
However, stocks with higher bid-ask spreads are also stocks with lower fill rates in 
crossing networks. Therefore, the higher potential saving conditional on trading success 
is counteracted by the higher failure rate of trade. Ready (2009) questions why crossing 
network volume is not higher for stocks with the highest volume, where the likelihood 
of finding counterparties should be highest. Our paper does show that the execution 
probability is increasing in trading volume, but it is well-known that bid-ask spreads 
also decrease with trading volume (Stoll (2000 and 2003) and Madahvan (2000)). 
Stocks with higher volume have lower transaction costs in both stock exchanges and 
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crossing networks. Therefore, there may not be a comparative advantage for crossing 
networks with higher volume stocks.   
 
The final question we ask is on the competition between exchanges and crossing 
networks. Particularly, we test the theoretical hypotheses of the competing models of 
Dönges and Heinemann (2006) and Ye (2010). The Dönges and Heinemann model 
predicts that market share of the crossing network decreases in the volatility of the 
stock, while the Ye model predicts the opposite. These two models have different 
results because they focus on two different aspects of competition. In Dönges and 
Heinemann, no traders have better information than other traders do. The disutility of 
missing the trading opportunity is higher for stocks with higher volatility. Therefore, 
traders move to the stock exchange for guaranteed execution when price volatility 
increases. The Ye model, however, includes a trader with better information about the 
true value of the stock. An increase in stock volatility increases the value of the 
information for the informed trader, giving the informed trader a higher incentive to 
hide in the crossing network. Certainly, Dönges and Heinemann (2006) and Ye (2010) 
only focus on one effect of an increase in volatility. In reality, both effects should play a 
role, and determining which force is stronger is an empirical issue. Using data from 
2005-2007, Ready (2009) finds that stocks with higher volatility have a higher market 
share, implying that the effect found by Ye (2010) is stronger in that sample period. 
Using the data from January 2010 – March 2010, we find that stocks with higher 
volatility have lower market shares in crossing networks.  This is consistent with the 
finding of Buti, Rindi and Werner (2010), which covers a more recent period but uses a 
different dataset.  We believe that the discrepancy between Ready (2009) and Buti, 
Rindi and Werner (2010) and Ye (2010) is due to differences in sample periods. 
Currently, crossing networks have better anti-gaming strategies to exclude traders with 
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private information or give them less priority to trade. Therefore, while the effect in Ye 
(2010) dominates the effect in Dönges and Heinemann (2006) from 2005-2007, 
informed traders play a relatively less important role now due to better anti-gaming 
strategies.  
 
Due to the limitation of data, there are very few empirical studies on non-execution and 
market share of crossing networks. To my knowledge, there are only three academic 
studies on non-execution probability based on proprietary datasets with limited sample 
coverage.  Gresse (2006) finds that aggregate execution probabilities in Posit Europe 
were 2.63% from July 1, 2000 to December 31, 2000 and 4.13% from January 1, 2001 
to June 30, 2001. However, no further analysis has been done on cross-sectional 
patterns of non-execution probability. Næs and Ødegaard (2006) and Næs and Skjeltorp 
(2003) examine non-execution probability, based on three days of trading data from one 
institutional trader (the Government Petroleum Fund in Norway), and the number of 
orders on one of these three days was “too small to perform reliable statistical tests.” 61
 
 
Because of data limitation, the study on competition between crossing networks and 
stock exchanges (Ready (2009) and Ray (2010)) have to reply on assumptions about 
transaction costs in crossing networks. Both papers assume that stocks with a higher 
effective spreads have higher reductions in effective spreads by trading in crossing 
networks. We show, however, that this assumption is not supported by empirical data 
for NASDAQ stocks.  
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 provides institutional details of 
crossing networks. Section 3.3 describes how this paper relates to the existing literature 
and develops the hypotheses to be tested. Section 3.4 describes our data and sample 
                                                 
61 Næs and Skjeltorp (2003), pp1789, footnote 16.  
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selection criteria. Section 3.5 provides preliminary result on the measurements of 
transaction costs in crossing networks and stock exchanges as well as the competition of 
these two trading platforms. Section 3.6 examines cross-sectional variation of non-
execution probability. Section 3.7 studies the competition between exchanges and 
crossing networks. Section 3.8 concludes the chapter. 
 
3.2. Institutional Details 
Crossing networks originated in the early 1970s as private, phone-based networks 
among buy-side traders. In the 1980s, with the introduction of Instinet and POSIT, the 
networks became electronic. Currently, there are about 40 crossing networks, which 
execute 15.76% of U.S. equity trading volume. The trading mechanism of crossing 
networks changes very fast, and there are many types of crossing networks. Some 
modern crossing networks do not even fit exactly into the traditional definition of 
crossing network in SEC (1998). However, there are three key elements that define 
crossing networks and distinguish their types. 
 
First, crossing networks all use prices from other markets to match buy and sell orders. 
These prices, which are often called benchmark prices, can be bid-ask midpoint, closing 
price, volume-weighted average price, or national best bid and offer price. Some 
crossing networks may have more than one benchmark price. For example, Goldman 
Sachs Sigma X has midpoint peg orders, which participate in the crossing at the quoted 
midpoint. It also has peg-at-bid and peg-at-ask orders. Orders in crossing networks, 
however, do not participate in the formation of prices but simply free-ride the price 
discovery in stock exchanges. Trading in crossing networks should have no direct price 
impact because price is determined before order matching: an increase of buy orders 
does not increase the price but simply increases the execution probability for sell orders 
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and decreases execution probability for buy orders. However, Ye (2010) shows that 
trading in crossing networks can impact price indirectly because the agent who sets the 
price has a rational expectation of other traders’ strategies in crossing networks.  
 
Second, because prices in crossing networks are derived from other markets, they do 
not have the market-clearing function.  Crossing networks need proprietary matching 
algorithms to determine the trading priority for the side with the larger quantity. 
Examples of basic allocation rules include the time priority rule and the pro rata rule; 
rules in reality may be complex functions of these basic rules and are mostly 
confidential. As crossing networks are not public exchanges, their customers can be 
selected, and some traders can be excluded. This can be considered an extreme 
allocation rule in which some traders always get 0 execution. Crossing networks' 
preferred customers are "buy-side" firms, particularly those who manage "passive 
portfolios" such as index funds. Two kinds of traders are often excluded from the 
crossing network. The first kind are the potentially informed traders, such as hedge 
funds, brokers and proprietary traders from sell-side firms; the second kind are traders 
who submit small orders to extract information contained in the order flow. SEC (2009) 
proposed a “free access rule,” such that every trader has access to crossing networks. 
However, whether or not “fair access” will increase market quality is still an open 
question.   
 
Finally, crossing networks differ in their matching frequency. In the past, most crossing 
networks only matched orders once or several times a day. Currently, more and more 
crossing networks conduct continuous matching.  
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There are several advantages to trade in crossing networks. First, trades also do not have 
direct price impacts, as their prices are independent of order sizes. Second, buyers 
(sellers) do not pay the bid-ask spread if their orders are matched at midpoint or the bid 
(ask) price. Conditional on execution, crossing networks usually have lower transaction 
costs than does the exchange (Keim and Madhavan (1998), Conrad, Johnson and Wahal 
(2003), Næs and Ødegaard (2006) and Sofianos and Jeria (2008)). In addition, 
institutional traders like to use crossing networks because they prevent information 
leakage. If information associated with an institutional order leaked out, opportunistic 
front-runners might trade in advance of the order in the same direction, thereby driving 
the price in an unfavorable direction. 
 
The three benefits of trading in crossing networks prompt Conrad, Johnson and Wahal 
(2003) and Ready (2009) to ask why crossing networks are not more widely used. The 
answer is that the probability of execution in crossing networks is significantly lower 
than that in the exchange. If we measure trading costs for both executed orders and non-
executed orders using the implement shortfall developed by Perold (1988), we can say 
that crossing networks have lower execution costs but higher opportunity costs. 
 
3.3. Related Literature 
The theoretical literature on transaction costs in stock exchanges can be classified into 
two lines (O’Hara, 1995). The first line is inventory models, such as Stoll (1978), Ho 
and Stoll (1981) and Amihud and Mendelson (1980), in which information is 
symmetric. More recent literature, such as Kyle (1985), Glosten and Milgrom (1985) 
and Easley and O'Hara (1987), focus on the transaction costs incurred by information 
asymmetry. Only recently has theoretical literature on transaction costs in crossing 
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networks been published, but it can also be divided into two lines similar to the 
literature on transaction costs in stock exchanges.  
 
Even if there is no information asymmetry, non-execution can still arise because of a 
random mismatch of buyers and sellers. Dönges and Heinemann (2006) and 
Hendershott and Mendelson (2000) 62
 
 emphasize the relationship between network 
externality and non-execution probability. All other things being equal, non-execution 
probability should decrease in order arrival rate. The more shares that arrive to the 
market, the higher the probability to find a potential match, and the lower the non-
execution probability. Non-execution can also be a consequence of information 
asymmetry: on one side of the market, there are both informed and uninformed traders, 
and on the other side, there are only uninformed traders. Therefore, an increase of 
informed trading relative to uninformed trading would increase non-execution 
probability. The non-execution caused by information asymmetry is the focus of Ye 
(2010). The Ye model also predicts that non-execution probability should increase when 
volatility increases.  
We first examine whether or not non-execution contains both informational and non-
informational causes by regressing non-execution probability on proxies of network 
externality (number of shares submitted to crossing networks and consolidated trading 
volume) and proxy of information asymmetry (the price impact of trade). Then, we test 
the following two hypotheses. Hypothesis 1 follows the prediction of network 
externality models such as Dönges and Heinemann (2006) and Hendershott and 
Mendelson (2000).  
                                                 
62 There are informed traders in the Hendershott and Mendelson model. However, those informed traders 
cannot choose how much and where to trade. Therefore, the results in the Hendershott and Mendelson 
model are driven by traders without private information.   
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Hypothesis 1: non-execution decreases as trading volume increases 
 
Hypothesis 2 is the implication of Ye (2010) model.  
Hypothesis 2: non-execution increases as volatility increases. 
 
Then, we want to examine the association between non-execution and measures of 
transaction costs in the exchange. In Dönges and Heinemann (2006) and Degryse, Van 
Achter and Wuyts (2009), non-execution is assumed to have 0 correlation with 
transaction costs in the exchange, whereas Ye (2010) predicts that non-execution should 
have a positive correlation with the price impact of trade because rational traders who 
can trade in both exchanges and crossing networks would move their trades until they 
are indifferent between these two dimensions of transaction costs. Therefore, we have 
hypothesis 3: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Non-execution probability is positively correlated with price impact. 
 
Finally, we examine the competition between crossing networks and exchanges. There 
are two papers on this topic. Ready (2009) finds that crossing networks’ market share is 
not higher for the highest volume stocks, where the likelihood of finding counterparty 
should be the highest. Ready’s explanation is that institutional trader’s face other 
constraints besides minimizing transaction costs. Of particular importance is the soft 
dollar constraint. Ray (2010) finds that the market shares of crossing networks also do 
not have a monotonic relationship with effective spread. Starting from stocks with the 
lowest effective spread, the market shares of crossing networks first increase and then 
decrease with effective spread. Ray explains that it is because people who use crossing 
networks have concerns of possible gaming for stocks with higher effective spread. 
 135  
 
Both of these papers, however, do not have data on transaction costs in crossing 
networks. Therefore, their analysis relies on assumptions about the transaction costs in 
crossing networks. For example, Ray (2010) implicitly assumes that the effective spread 
in crossing networks is 0, and Ready (2009) assumes that potential savings by using 
crossing networks is a fixed proportion of the spread. Both assumptions imply that 
effective spread in exchanges and the reduction in effective spread by trading in 
crossing networks should have correlation coefficient of 1. This hypothesis can 
certainly be tested using our data. However, we believe it is more informative to test 
whether the correlation efficient is positive or negative.  So we have hypothesis 4 and 
hypothesis 4’.  
 
Hypothesis 4: The reduction in effective spread by trading in crossing networks and 
effective spread in exchanges have  a correlation coefficient of 1. 
  
Hypothesis 4’: The reduction in effective spread by trading in crossing networks and 
effective spread in exchanges have a positive correlation coefficient 
 
Certainly, hypothesis 4’ is weaker than hypothesis 4. If hypothesis 4’ is rejected, so is 
hypothesis 4.  
 
Finally, we want to test the competing hypothesis of Dönges and Heinemann (2006) and 
Ye (2010) on the market share of crossing networks. In the Ye model, an increase in 
volatility increases the value of information for informed traders, giving them higher 
incentives to hide their trading in crossing networks. Therefore, an increase in volatility 
may increase the market share of crossing networks. The benefit of hiding information 
in crossing networks does not exist in Dönges and Heinemann model because no traders 
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have better information. The only effect of increased volatility is to increase the 
disutility of failed trade. Therefore, crossing networks have lower market shares for 
stocks with higher volatility. Due to the difficulty to model crossing networks, both the 
Ye model and the Dönges and Heinemann model can only focus on one side of the 
mechanism: Ye model has informed trader but passive uninformed trader whereas the 
Dönges and Heinemann model has no informed trader. We believe that both 
informational and non-informational factors should play a role in determining the 
market share of crossing networks, and this paper tests which effect plays a more 
important rule. The hypothesis is stated as follows: 
Hypothesis 5: Crossing networks have higher market shares for stocks with higher 
volatility.  
 
3.4 Data  
We apply four datasets in this study. SEC 605 data is used to calculate effective spread, 
the price impact of trade and non-execution probability. In the United States, each 
market center that is not registered as a stock exchange must post a link of its SEC 605 
report on the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) website. 63
 
 We compare 
the list of these market centers with the list of crossing networks in Domowitz, 
Finkelshteyn and Yegerman (2009) to identify our sample of crossing networks. CRSP 
data is used to identify the sample of stocks as well as the trading characteristics of 
those stocks.  
3.4.1 Measures of Transaction Costs and Market Share   
Five measures of transaction costs are generated through SEC 605 data: effective 
spread, realized spread, price impact, execution speed and non-execution probability. 
                                                 
63 http://apps.finra.org/datadirectory/1/marketmaker.aspx 
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Aside from non-execution probability, all other measures are widely studied in the 
literature, using SEC 605 data64, (Boehmer, Jennings and Wei (2007), Boehmer (2005), 
Bennett and Wei (2006), Lipson (2003), Bessembinder (2003), O’Hara and Ye (2010)). 
Effective spread measures the total price impact of trade (Boehmer, Jennings and Wei 
(2007)), which can be decomposed into temporary price impact (realized spread) and 
permanent price impact. The share-weighted average of effective spreads in the SEC 
605 report is calculated, for buy orders, as double the amount of difference between the 
execution price and the midpoint of the consolidated best bid and offer at the time of 
order receipt and, for sell orders, as double the amount of difference between the 
midpoint of the consolidated best bid and offer at the time of order receipt and the 
execution price. The realized spread excludes the effects of the information content of 
order flow. It is defined, for buy orders, as double the amount of difference between the 
execution price and the midpoint of the consolidated best bid and offer five minutes 
after the time of order execution and, for sell orders, as double the amount of difference 
between the midpoint of the consolidated best bid and offer five minutes after the time 
of order execution and the execution price. Price impact, the permanent component of 
effective spread, is defined as twice the change in the quote midpoint from order receipt 
to five minutes after the trade, or the difference between effective spread and realized 
spread. Execution speed is defined as the time between order receipt and execution. 65
Our paper is novel because of the measurement of non-execution of crossing networks 
obtained from SEC 605 data. Execution probability is defined as the ratio of executed 
 
                                                 
64 The data is also called Dash 5 data or SEC 11Ac1-5 data in early studies.  
65 Execution speed is not a variable in raw SEC 605 data, though some vendors of SEC 605 data provide 
execution speed data. We generate execution speed from raw SEC data using the same formula as those 
vendors, which is defined as the following weighted average: 
speed= (shares executed with price improvement*average speed for shares executed with price 
improvement shares + executed at the quote*average speed for shares executed at the quote + shares 
executed outside the quote*average speed for shares executed outside the quote)/(shares executed with 
price improvement + shares executed at the quote + shares executed outside the quote) 
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shares to covered shares in SEC 605 reports. SEC rules require each market center to 
report any market order or limit order (including immediate-or-cancel orders) received 
by a market center during regular trading hours at a time when a consolidated best bid 
and offer is being disseminated, and, if executed, is executed during regular trading 
hours, but shall exclude any order for which the customer requests special handling for 
execution. 66
eredshares covnumber of 
cutedshares exenumber of 1onNonexecuti −=
 Meanwhile, SEC 605 reports also require market centers to report the 
cumulative number of shares of covered orders executed at the receiving market center. 
Therefore, we have a measure of non-execution probability defined as follows. 
                             (3.1) 
The advantage of this measure is that it is calculated from public available data. As the 
dataset for crossing networks is very hard, if not impossible, to obtain, a measure based 
on public data provides an easy proxy for non-execution probability in empirical studies. 
This proxy allows us to answer some questions that are not addressed in the literature.  
We acknowledge, however, the proxy for non-execution, as well as the measures of 
effective spread, realized spread, price impact and execution speed has their limitations, 
which impose a constraint on the type of question we can ask. We focus on the cross-
sectional comparison of non-execution probability and market share across different 
stocks in this paper because of the following limitations in our data.  
First, our measures for non-execution, effective spread, realized spread, price impact 
and execution speed only cover certain sizes and types of orders received by each 
market center. Orders of 10000 shares or more are not in SEC 605 data.  More 
                                                 
66 The special handling orders include, but are not limited to, orders to be executed at a market opening 
price or a market closing price, orders submitted with stop prices, orders to be executed only at their full 
size, orders to be executed on a particular type of tick or bid, orders submitted on a "not held" basis, 
orders for other than regular settlement, and orders to be executed at prices unrelated to the market price 
of the security at the time of execution. 
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importantly, market centers now have some discretion on the types of orders they 
include in their SEC 605 report. The discretion comes from the fact that current order 
types, especially order types in crossing networks are much more complex than the 
order types defined in SEC 605 rule in 1998.67
Equation (3.1) also tends to overestimate non-execution probability because it does not 
account for shares cancelled before execution. An alternative measure is   
 As some new order types do not follow 
the standard definition of market or limit orders, market centers can choose whether 
they include them in the SEC 605 report or not. Therefore, while early works using SEC 
605 data focus on the comparison between execution qualities of different market 
centers, we take a different approach because it is possible now for some market centers 
to exclude some types of orders to improve their execution quality. Comparing the 
crossing sectional variation of execution statistics has much less problem: market 
centers may exclude some order types to improve their execution statistics, but they 
should manipulate their execution statistics in the some way for all the stocks. We 
assume that the way orders are excluded would not systematically affect the relative 
cost for different stocks.  
   
slled sharer of canceered-numbeshares covnumber of 
cutedshares exenumber of 1onNonexecuti −=           (3.1’) 
However, (3.1’) would greatly underestimate non-execution probability because several 
market centers in our sample treat all non-executed shares as canceled shares. 68
                                                 
67 For an introduction for the list of current order types, please see Johnson (2010). 
 
Therefore, there is not even cross-sectional variation in non-execution probability for 
these market centers because non-execution probability is always 0. Two other reasons 
68 This is mainly because of order types in crossing networks. For example, Liquidnet SEC 605 reports 
only include their Immediate or Cancel orders, while their time in force orders are exempt from SEC 605 
reporting requirements. Therefore, the execution probability is always 1 because orders are either 
executed immediately or cancelled. 
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make us choose measure (3.1) instead of measure (3.1’). First, equation (3.1) is the 
measure of the fill rate recommended by SEC 605 final rule69
Fortunately, non-execution is used as a dependent variable in all but one case for this 
paper. As long as the measurement error is not correlated with the explanatory variables, 
measurement error in dependent variable does not affect the consistency of the 
estimation of slope terms. 
. Second, the aggregated 
non-execution probability generated by excluding cancelled shares is much more 
consistent with previous literature (Gresse, 2006).   
70  There is only one place where we use non-execution as an 
independent variable.  In this case, measurement (3.1’) can potentially serve as an 
instrument for measurement (3.1). However, measurement (3.1’) is such a poor 
instrument that we cannot reject the hypothesis that they have 0 partial correlations 
measurement (3.1).71
                                                 
69 See footnote 51 of SEC 605 final rule.  
 This is due to the fact that non-execution measured by (3.1’) has 
very limited variation. Non-executions for many stocks are close to 1 because a number 
of market centers simply count non-executed shares as canceled shares.  Fortunately, 
measurement error does not change the answer for the question we want to ask.  Under 
classical errors-in-variables assumption, measurement error causes attenuation bias, in 
that it leads the estimated coefficient closer to 0 than the true value. In addition, the 
standard error of estimation increases. Therefore, even if non-execution has impact on 
the dependent variable, we may conclude it does not have an impact due to the 
measurement error. In section 3.6, we find that non-execution has impact on market 
share of crossing networks, and we believe the result would be stronger if there is no 
measurement error.  
70 Because equation (3.1) is an underestimate, we would get an underestimate of the intercept, which is 
rarely a cause for concern. (Wooldridge, 2006)   
71 Results are not reported for brevity but are available upon request.  
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We also exclude orders received by a market center but executed elsewhere. Because 
crossing networks sometimes route their unexecuted orders to other types of trading 
platforms, including orders routed to other market centers may exaggerate the execution 
probability for crossing networks. We do conduct the analysis including orders executed 
in other market centers, and the results are similar. 
We also obtain the market share of crossing networks from SEC 605 data, which is 
defined as  
tworksrossing necuted in cshares exeangesstock exchecuted in  shares ex
etworkscrossing necuted in  shares exremarket sha
+
=
 (3.2) 
Our market share data may also have some bias because of double counting. Market 
centers have different protocols for reporting their executed shares. Some market 
centers may report single-counted volume, where only the number of matched shares is 
reported. Some other market centers may report double-counted volume, where both 
buy and sell volume is counted.  Once again, focusing on crossing sectional variation 
will be less a problem. While double-counting in a market center may increase its 
market share relative to other market centers, we assume that it does not systematically 
affect the relative market share across different stocks.   
Our analysis focuses on all market and marketable limit orders in the SEC 605 data. We 
apply the filter in Bessembinder (2003) and eliminate an observation if the effective 
spread is greater than four dollars or less than -0.5 dollars. We also drop a stock if it has 
an average execution time greater than one trading day either in crossing networks or in 
stock exchanges. As our study focuses on a cross-sectional comparison, we aggregate 
the number of shares executed and the number of shares covered in all our sample 
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crossing networks and exchanges in equation (3.1), and we aggregate the number of 
shares executed in all sample crossing networks and exchanges in equation (3.2). Our 
choice for sample crossing networks and exchanges is specified in section 3.4.2 and 
3.4.3.    
3.4.2. Sample Crossing Networks  
To choose the sample crossing networks for this paper, we start from the list of crossing 
networks in Domowitz, Finkelshteyn and Yegerman (2009). 72
 
 Then we compare the 
list with the master file provided by Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), 
which has names of all the market centers reporting the SEC 605 data through the 
FINRA website. Because every market center that is not a stock exchange needs to post 
the links of their SEC 605 data on the FINRA website, theoretically, all the execution 
data for orders of size 9999 or less in the crossing networks is included in SEC 605 
data. However, data from several crossing networks are not available, either because 
their orders are exempt from SEC 605 reports or because the owners of those crossing 
networks merge their crossing networks data with execution data from other trading 
platforms they own. The complete list of crossing networks in Domowitz, Finkelshteyn 
and Yegerman (2009) and our filters to select the final sample are demonstrated in 
Table 3.1.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
72 See page 20 of Domowitz, Finkelshteyn and Yegerman (2009) for the list. Though the list is not 
complete, it includes all current major crossing networks.     
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Table 3.1: Sample of Crossing Networks 
This table shows the list of crossing networks in Domowitz, Finkelshteyn and Yegerman (2009) 
and our filters to choose the final sample of crossing networks. The sample period is January, 
2010 to March 2010.   
1. Orders are exempted from Sec 605 report for at least one month  
Pipeline,  Pulse Block Cross,  Bids and eSpeed Aqua  
2: Exchange owned crossing networks  
International Stock Exchange Midpoint Match, NASDAQ (End of Day Cross; Open; 
Intraday; Continuous) and NYSE Match Point  
3. Broker-dealer owned crossing networks that do not report independently  
Credit Suisse Cross Finder, Bloomberg BlockHunt, Citadel ExSvs, Citi Markets 
LIQUIFI, Fidelity CrossStream, Knight Securities Knight Match, Morgan Stanley 
(Trajectory Cross, MS Pool), Merrill Lynch (MLXN;AXP), State Street Lattice and 
UBS PIN  
4. Final sample  
Provider  Name  Rank 
Goldman Sachs  Sigma X  2  
Consortiums  Level  5  
Barclays  Barclays ATS  7  
ITG  Posit Now  10  
Instinet  Data contains multiple crossing 
networks operated by Instinet  11  
Liquidnet  Data contains multiple crossing 
networks operated by Liquidnet  12  
NYFIX  Millennium  13  
BNY ConvergEx  ConvergEx Cross  16  
  
In our sample period, all orders from Pipeline, Pulse Block Cross and Bids trading are 
exempted from SEC 605 reports, and the reports from eSpeed are empty for both 
January and February 2010. Therefore, we exclude these four crossing networks from 
our sample. We also need to exclude crossing networks owned by NYSE, NASDAQ 
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and International Stock Exchange from our sample because data of these crossing 
networks are not reported independently. For the same reason, we need to drop crossing 
networks owned by Bloomberg, Citadel, Citi Markets, Credit Suisse, Fidelity, Knight 
Securities, Merrill Lynch, State Street and UBS because their data is mixed with 
execution data of other trading platforms of the same market center.  
 
Our final sample includes eight crossing networks. Two are independent crossing 
networks: Level and Liquidnet. Goldman Sachs Sigma X, ITG POSIT Now, Instinet 
and Barclays ATS are broker-dealer-owned crossing networks but file their independent 
SEC 605 reports.73 BNY ConvergEx  group files two SEC 605 reports: BNY ConvergEx 
and ConvergEx's Millennium ATS.74  I also include these two market centers because 
both of them are crossing networks.  We compare our sample of 8 crossing networks 
with the report of Rosenblatt Securities on aggregated volume of crossing networks and 
find that our sample of crossing networks ranks 2, 5, 7, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 16 in all 17 
crossing networks they track, which is a pretty representative sample75
 
.   
3.4.3. Sample Exchanges  
Sirri (2008) divides trading venues into two categories based on whether or not they 
display quotes as an integral part of their business models. Roughly speaking, “quoted 
venues,” according to Sirri (2008), include exchanges and ECNs, even if they may offer 
one or more dark liquidity services through hidden orders or reserved orders. Because 
                                                 
73 Sigma X is reported as an independent center with a market center code SGMA, while orders executed 
under other platforms of Goldman Sachs is reported under the market center code GSCO. Barclays ATS 
has a market center code LATS, while the execution, through other trading platforms of Barclays Capital 
is reported in market center with a code LEHM. ITG reports its executions through Posit under the 
market center name Posititnow and market center code TACT. According to my conversation with the 
compliance office of Instinet, orders reported through the market center INCA are its crossing network 
execution reports.     
74 BNY ConvergEX files two reports because BNY ConvergEX acquired NYFIX Millennium in 2009. 
However, the latter still keeps its old market center code NYFX. 
75 Rosenblatt Securities Monthly Dark Liquidity Tracker, April 27, 2010, pp4. 
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the trading mechanisms of ECNs and exchanges are similar, and some ECNs, such as 
BATS, actually gained status as exchanges, we use the word “exchange” in this paper 
instead of “quoted venue,” for the sake of brevity. 
 
I collect the SEC 605 reports of all the stock exchanges that filed the reports from 
January 2010 to March 2010. 76 These include NYSE, NYSE Amex, NYSE ARCA, 
NASDAQ (including the acquired Boston Stock Exchange and Philadelphia Stock 
Exchange), National Stock Exchange, Chicago Stock Exchange, International Stock 
Exchange and Chicago Board of Option Stock Exchange. I also include data from Bats 
and Direct Edge in our sample. SEC (2010) shows that these market centers represented 
73.6% of total U.S. trading volume in September 2009, whereas other quoted venues 
only executed 1%. Therefore, we believe these trading platforms represent quoted 
venues as a whole.77
 
 
3.4.4.  Sample Stocks  
We use CRSP data to choose our sample of stocks and to measure the characteristics of 
different firms. To avoid the possibility that contemporaneous quarterly observations 
produce spurious associations, we apply the CRSP data from October 2009 to 
December 2009. I start from CRSP data, applying standard filters to remove non-
                                                 
76 NASDAQ recently acquired Boston Stock Exchange and Philadelphia Stock Exchange. Boston Stock 
Exchange still files SEC 605 reports, but there are no covered orders. Philadelphia Stock Exchange no 
longer files SEC 605 reports.    
77 One potential problem is that now exchanges also have their own crossing networks, which may be 
included in their SEC 605 reports. We believe that the impact of exchange-owned crossing network has 
very limited impact on the overall execution quality in SEC 605 data for exchanges. Firstly, the 
exchange-owned crossing networks only execute a small fraction of the exchanges’ volume. Furthermore, 
much of exchange-owned crossing networks’ volume is not included in SEC 605 data because SEC 605 
data excludes any order for which the customer requests special handling for execution, including, but not 
limited to, orders to be executed at a market opening price or a market closing price. SEC 605 data also 
excludes orders executed after regular trading. As much of the volume of exchange-owned crossing 
networks is executed through their after-market crossings based on closing prices, this further reduces the 
problem that exchange-reported data also includes exchanges’ executions through their crossing 
networks.    
 146  
 
common equities, dual class shares, REITS, and common stocks of non-US companies. 
There are 3,610 stocks in our CRSP sample. Following Boehmer (2005), we also drop 
304 stocks with average dollar volumes of less than $20,000, 501 stocks with average 
prices of less than $3 and three stocks with active trading days of two or less.  
Altogether, we have 1,151 NYSE stocks and 1,651 NASDAQ stocks in our sample.     
 
3.5.   Preliminary Results  
Bessembinder  (2003) and Boehmer, Jennings and Wei (2007) find that market centers 
competing with the listing exchanges only trade a small subset of stocks traded in the 
primary market. 78 Among the 2,802 stocks in our sample, there are 10 NYSE and 23 
NASDAQ stocks that have no SEC 605 coverage, both in sample crossing networks and 
sample exchanges. Therefore, we delete these 33 stocks from our sample. Among the 
remaining 2,769 stocks, there is only one stock (ISRL) with executed volume in 
exchanges but not in crossing networks. Therefore, our finding is closer to O’Hara and 
Ye (2010), who find that competing market centers virtually trade all the stocks.79
 
 Our 
data also shows that there are no stocks that trade in crossing networks but not 
exchanges, which is obvious because crossing networks need the exchange to provide 
the price. For convenience, we delete ISRL from our sample and expect that the result 
would not change because of the deletion.  
Our final sample has 1,141 NYSE stocks and 1,627 NASDAQ stocks. For each stock, 
we compute its effective spread, realized spread, price impact and executed speed in 
crossing networks as the weighted average of these variables across all crossing 
                                                 
78 Bessimbinder (2003) found that of the 500 NYSE listed stocks in his sample, other markets centers 
only traded between 77 and 163 stocks during his 2002 sample period. Boehmer, Jennings and Wei 
(2007) had 1,435 stocks in their sample, but only 258 traded continuously in market centers other than the 
listing market. 
79 O’Hara and Ye (2010) find that ECN and Alternative Trading System trade all stocks in their sample. 
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networks. Execution probability in crossing networks is defined as the ratio of all shares 
executed in crossing networks to all shares covered by crossing networks. Effective 
spread, realized spread, price impact, execution speed and execution probability across 
all exchanges are defined in a similar way.  
 
Table 3.2: Execution Quality in Crossing Networks and Exchanges 
This table demonstrates the average execution quality measure across our sample crossing 
networks and exchanges as well as their pairwise difference. The sample period is from January, 
2010 to March 2010.  The asterisks ***, **, and * indicate significance level of one percent, 
five percent or ten percent. 
Panel A: NYSE Stocks 
 Crossing Networks Exchanges 
Crossing 
Networks-
Exchanges 
p-value 
Effective Spread (in cents) 
T-test Mean 1.61 2.02 -0.41*** 0.0000 
Wilcoxon Signed 
Rank Test  
Median 0.97 1.27 -0.24*** 0.0000 
Effective Spread/Price (in Basis Points) 
T-test Mean 8.42 10.34 -1.92*** 0.0000 
Wilcoxon Signed 
Rank Test 
Median 4.64 5.77 -0.94*** 0.0000 
Price Impact (in cents) 
T-test Mean 0.80 1.86 -1.07*** 0.0000 
Wilcoxon Signed 
Rank Test  
Median 0.52 1.19 -0.64*** 0.0000 
Price Impact/Price (in Basis Points) 
T-Test Mean 4.66 9.45 -4.79 0.0000 
Wilcoxon Signed 
Rank Test 
Median 2.48 5.71 -2.92  
Average Speed (in Seconds) 
T-test Mean 32.10 13.29 18.81*** 0.0000 
Wilcoxon Signed 
Rank Test  
Median 21.25 4.39  15.02*** 0.0000 
Execution Probability  
T-test Mean 4.11 31.47 -27.36*** 0.0000 
Wilcoxon Signed 
Rank Test 
Median 3.69 30.52 -26.46*** 0.0000 
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Table 3.2 Panel B: NASDAQ Stocks  
 
Crossing 
Network
s 
Exchanges 
Crossing 
Networks-
Exchanges 
p-
value 
Effective Spread (in Cents) 
T-test Mean 4.47 4.72 -0.25** 0.0377 
Wilcoxon Signed 
Rank Test  
Median 1.49 2.25 -0.46*** 0.0000 
Effective Spread/Price (in Basis Points) 
T-test Mean 45.01 47.72 -2.71** 0.0114 
Wilcoxon Signed 
Rank Test  
Median 13.48 20.18 -3.76*** 0.0000 
Price Impact 
T-test Mean 1.55 2.73 -1.17*** 0.0000 
Wilcoxon Signed 
Rank Test  
Median 0.56 1.51 -0.73*** 0.0000 
Price Impact/Price (in Basis Points)  
T-test Mean 16.86 26.77 -9.92*** 0.0000 
Wilcoxon Signed 
Rank Test  
Median 4.39 13.99 -5.96*** 0.0000 
Average Speed 
T-test Mean 51.72 12.93 38.80*** 0.0000 
Wilcoxon Signed 
Rank Test  
Median 29.77 4.11 22.80*** 0.0000 
Execution Probability  
T-test Mean 2.17 26.48 -24.31*** 0.0000 
Wilcoxon Signed 
Rank Test 
Median 1.65 25.88 -23.40*** 0.0000 
  
Table 3.2 shows the summary statistics of effective spread, price impact, execution 
speed and execution probability in exchanges and crossing networks as well as their 
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pairwise comparison. 80  We provide a measure both in cents and in basis points 
(standardized by the average of closing prices). The first observation is that trading in 
the crossing network has a non-zero effective spread and price impact of trade 81
 
, 
although, technically, trading in crossing networks should have no price impact, and 
effective spread should also equal 0 if orders are matched using the quoted midpoint. A 
non-zero effective spread can easily be explained by order types in crossing networks. 
At Goldman Sachs Sigma X, for example, traders can enter orders pegged at mid-quote, 
but they can also enter orders pegged at bid and pegged at ask. If a buyer sends a 
pegged at ask order, he still needs to pay the spread. However, the price impact of trade 
in the crossing network should be 0 by definition (See Hasbrouck (2007)) and Gresse 
(2006)) because the price is determined before the quantity match.  The positive price 
impact of trade has two possible explanations. First, Ye (2010) predicts that trade in the 
crossing network has an indirect price impact because rational agencies should draw a 
correct inference on hidden order flows in the crossing network by observing the order 
flow in the exchange. Therefore, trading in the crossing network moves prices 
indirectly. Second, the impact of trade is measured based on the price five minutes after 
the trade. At that point, the trade is reported through the consolidated tape. Though the 
trader’s identity and the executed venues are not reported, the size of the trade still 
reveals some information and moves the price.    
Despite the non-zero effective spread and price impact, crossing networks do have 
lower effective spreads and price impacts. The average (proportional) effective spread 
in crossing networks is 0.41 cents (1.92 basis points) lower than that in exchanges for 
NYSE stocks, and average (proportional) effective spread is 0.25 cents (2.71 basis 
                                                 
80 I also do the comparison with the 33 stocks that are traded in the stock exchange but not in the crossing 
networks, and the results are similar.  
81 P value is equal to 0.0000 but not reported.  
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points) lower in crossing networks than that in exchanges for NASDAQ stocks. Median 
(proportional) effective spread in the crossing network is 0.24 cents (0.94 basis points) 
lower for NYSE stocks and 0.46 cents (3.76 basis points) lower for NASDAQ stocks. 
The reduction in the price impact of trade is economically more significant. Trading in 
crossing networks reduces the (proportional) price impact by 1.07 cents (4.79 basis 
points) in terms of the mean, and 0.64 cents (2.92 basis points) in terms of the median 
for NYSE stocks, and 1.17 cents (9.92 basis points) in terms of mean, and 0.73 cents 
(5.96 basis points) in terms of the median for NASDAQ stocks. The reason we find a 
larger reduction in price impact is because of the design of crossing networks. The 
major function of crossing networks is to reduce the price impact of trade because price 
is determined before the order match. Traders still need to pay a bid-ask spread if the 
match price is different from the mid-quote. Therefore, we see a larger effect on the 
price impact of trade than on effective spread. 82
 
 
However, trading in crossing networks also has downsides. First of all, crossing 
networks are slower than exchanges. On average, crossing networks take 18.81 more 
seconds to execute an NYSE order and 38.8 more seconds to execute a NASDAQ order. 
More importantly, the execution probability of crossing networks is significantly lower 
than that of the exchange. The average execution probability for crossing networks is 
only 4.11% for NYSE stocks and 2.17% for NASDAQ stocks, while in exchanges the 
mean execution probabilities are 31.47% and 26.48%, respectively.83
                                                 
82 The other possible explanation is that crossing networks cream-skim stock exchanges by picking the 
less informed orders to execute. Though cream-skimming provides explanations for the lower price 
impact of trade for dealers or Electronic Communication Networks competing with the exchange, it is 
less likely to be an explanation for the price impact of trade in crossing networks because crossing 
networks do not set their own prices.      
 Certainly, as we 
83 There are several reasons why execution probability of exchange is not close to 100%. First, we do not 
consider cancelled orders in our calculation. Second, the depth of the market is given. Therefore, a large 
order with a marketable limit price may be only partially filled because of the limited depth. Third, in 
SEC 605 data, an order is marketable when its price is better than the quote at the time of order receipt. 
However, price may move between the time of order receipt and order execution. Finally, Hasbrouck and 
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mentioned in Section 3.3, our measure tends to underestimate the execution probability. 
However, our execution probability for crossing networks is close to the finding in the 
previous literature (See Gresse (2006)). The results that crossing networks have lower 
execution speeds and execution probabilities are both statistically significant when we 
conduct t-tests for the mean and Wilcoxon signed rank tests for the median.   
 
Figure 3.1 shows the cross-sectional variation of market shares of crossing networks. 
Panel (a) shows that the market share of crossing networks, in terms of executed shares 
from market and marketable orders, ranges from 0.4% to 38.3%. The mean market 
share of crossing networks, in terms of executed market and marketable limit orders, is 
8.2%, and the median is 7.3%. However, measuring market share of crossing networks 
based on executed shares underestimates the true impact of crossing networks (Sirri 
(2008) and Hendershott and Mendelson (2000)). Panel (b) shows market shares of 
crossing networks in terms of submitted shares. The mean market share of submitted 
market and marketable limit orders in crossing networks is 51%, and the median market 
share is 52%, which implies that the number of shares in market or market limitable 
orders submitted to the crossing network is larger than their counterparts submitted to 
the exchanges.  
 
As is mentioned in section 3.4, different market center may select the types of orders 
that they report. By focusing on market and marketable limit orders, we mitigate this 
problem. Still, there might be different interpretation of “market and marketable limit 
orders” across different market centers.  As a result, our comparison between crossing 
networks and stock exchanges need to be explained with caution. Therefore, we will 
                                                                                                                                               
Saar (2009) find the wide use of fleeting orders, which are cancelled immediately if orders are not 
executed.    
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focus on crossing stock comparison but not cross market comparison because of the 
rationale we discussed in section 3.4.    
 
 
Figure 3.1. Market Share of Crossing Networks 
This figure shows cross sectional variation on market share of crossing networks for 
market and marketable limit orders. Panel (a) shows market share of executed shares 
and Panel (b) shows market share of covered shares. Our sample has 1141 NYSE stocks 
and 1627 NASDAQ stocks. The sample period is from January 2010 to March 2010 
 
3.6. Patterns of Non-execution Probability 
This section examines the pattern of non-execution. First, we examine whether or not 
both informational and non-informational factors account for cross-sectional variation 
of non-execution probability by regressing non-execution on a proxy for network 
externality and a proxy for information asymmetry. Then, we provide two tests for Ye’s 
(2010) hypothesis that non-execution follows similar patterns to price impact. The first 
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test is to examine the correlation between non-execution and price impact and effective 
spread. The second test examines whether or not variables that explain cross-sectional 
variation in effective spread and price impact also explain the cross-sectional variation 
in non-execution probabilities. 
 
3.6.1. Informational and Non-informational Factors of Non-execution  
An important line of research in the market microstructure literature models transaction 
costs incurred by non-informational and informational causes. Transaction costs 
incurred by non-informational factors are the focus of inventory models, such as those 
of Stoll (1978), Ho and Stoll (1981) and Amihud and Mendelson (1980).  The role of 
adverse information costs is emphasized by Copeland and Galai, Kyle (1985), Glosten 
and Milgram (1985) and Easley and O’Hara (1987). Following these theoretical works, 
Glosten and Harris (1988), Stoll (1989), Choi, Salandro and Shastri (1988), George, 
Kaul and Nimalendran (1991), Lin, Sanger and Booth (1995) and Huang and Stoll 
(1997) investigate the empirical methods to decompose bid-ask spreads into different 
components.  
 
Crossing networks have quite different mechanisms from markets with intermediates. 
However, we can still consider that transaction costs are due both to inventory factors 
and adverse information factors. Non-execution can occur for non-informational 
reasons. Even if there is no information asymmetry, non-execution exists because of 
random mismatches between buyers and sellers. The major difference between crossing 
networks and markets with intermediates is that there is no market-maker to bear the 
inventory holding cost in crossing networks. Therefore, a larger mismatch leads to a 
higher non-execution probability instead of a higher bid-ask spread. Hendershott and 
Mendelson (2000) and Dönges and Heinemann (2006) demonstrate that non-execution 
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caused by non-informational factors decreases as order arrival rates increase. The higher 
the arrival rate, the easier it is to find a potential match. Therefore, non-execution is 
inversely correlated with order arrival rate. Hendershott and Mendelson (2000) and Ye 
(2010), however, show that non-execution can also result from informational factors: 
while uninformed traders are equally likely to buy or sell, informed traders are always 
on one side of the market. Again, the major difference between crossing networks and 
markets with intermediates is that there are no market makers to offset this order 
imbalance. Therefore, higher information asymmetry results in a higher non-execution 
probability instead of a higher bid-ask spread or price impact. 
 
It is important to separate these two causes of non-execution because they have 
different implications. Suppose that non-execution is caused by non-informational 
factors. Then price is equally likely to go up or down. Therefore, non-execution would 
not be a cost for risk-neutral traders if they are patient. Surely, if traders are risk-averse 
or if they prefer immediate execution, non-execution would be a cost. The non-
execution caused by informational factors has a very different implication. Uninformed 
traders are equally likely to be on either side of the market, whereas traders with private 
information can only be on one side of the market. Non-execution caused by 
information asymmetry has the following implication. Orders on the correct side of the 
market are less likely to be executed. If an order is executed, it is more likely that it is 
on the wrong side of the market. Price tends to move in the opposite direction on 
executed shares.      
 
Ideally, if we have data for each order submitted to crossing networks, we can 
decompose the non-execution into informational and non-informational parts, following 
methods similar to decomposing the bid-ask spread. Because we only have aggregate-
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level data, we can only conduct the following test. We want to examine whether or not 
both proxies for network externality and information asymmetry have explanatory 
powers for cross-sectional variation in non-execution.  
 
As non-execution is a proportion defined as the ratio between executed shares and 
covered shares, it is bounded between 0 and 1. Therefore, we use standard logit 
transformation to transform the variable nonexe_c, which is defined as non-execution 
probability in crossing networks according to measurement 1. 84
)
cnonexe
cnonexeln(  xelogit_none
_1
_
−
=
  A new dependent 
variable logit_nonexe is defined as  
                              (3.3) 
This transformation maps the original variable, which was bounded by 0 and 1, to the 
real line. (See Fleiss, Levin and Paik (2003)). We also do the regression without logit 
transformation and the results are similar.   
 
We use the permanent price impact of trade of each stock in exchanges as a proxy for 
information asymmetry for each stock. The other proxy for information asymmetry is 
permanent price impact normalized by the stock price. Dummy variable NASDAQ is 
equal to 1 if the stock is listed in NASDAQ and is equal to 0 if the stock is listed in 
NYSE. We do have the data for number of shares submitted to the crossing networks, 
which may serve as a proxy variable for order arrival rate or network externality in 
crossing networks. However, the number of shares submitted to crossing networks has 
the following endogenity problem: while the number of shares submitted can affect 
non-execution probability, the causality can go to the opposite direction. Lower non-
                                                 
84 Kennedy (2003) consider “using a linear function form when the dependent variable is a fraction” as 
one of the common mistakes easily to be made. He recommends logistic transformation for dependent 
variables.   
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execution probability increases the attractiveness of crossing networks and thereby the 
number of shares submitted to crossing networks. To solve the endogenity problem, we 
use the consolidated volume traded in all exchanges as an instrument for total number 
of shares submitted to crossing network. Panel A of Table 3.3 first show that 
consolidated volume is highly correlation with number of shares submitted to crossing 
networks. There is also good reason to believe that consolidated volume is exogenous in 
this regression. Non-execution may affect the number of shares routed to crossing 
networks v.s. stock exchanges and it may even affect total number of shares routed to 
these two centers because of failed trades.  However, it is much less likely that non-
execution can affect the consolidated trading volume, which is determined by portfolio 
management purposes.   
 
Therefore, we run the following 2 regressions using both OLS and 2SLS with the log of 
consolidated volume in all trading venues as an instrument variable. 
iii2i1i NASDAQepimpactβnseβαxelogit_none εβ ++++= 3_log             (3.4) 
iii2i1i NASDAQepropimpactβnseβαxelogit_none εβ ++++= 3_log        (3.5) 
where nse is the number of shares entered into crossing networks, pimpact_e is price 
impact of trade of each stock in stock exchanges, and propimpact_e is the price impact 
of trade of each stock in stock exchanges divided by the price.  
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Table 3.3: Informational and Noninformational Factors of Non-execution 
Panel A examines the correlation of lognse and its instrument (lognse), and Panel B regresses 
non-execution on proxies for network externality and information asymmetry using both OLS 
and IV estimation. logit_nonexe is the logit transformation of Non-execution probability in 
crossing networks. logvol is the log of average trading volume of each stock, pimpact_e is the 
price impact of trade for each stock in exchanges and propimpact_e is price impact normalized 
by average closing price for the stock. lognse is the total number of shares entered into the 
crossing network. Dummy variable NASDAQ is equal to 1 if the stock is listed in NASDAQ 
and 0 if the stock is listed in NYSE. The sample period is from January, 2010 to March, 2010.    
Panel A: Partial Correlation between lognse and its instrument (logvol)  
   
COEFFICIENT lognse lognse 
pimpact_e -0.0331***  
 (0.00295)  
NASDAQ -0.290*** -0.263*** 
 (0.0244) (0.0249) 
logvol 0.993*** 1.010*** 
 (0.00691) (0.00748) 
propimpact_e  -0.00165*** 
  (0.000428) 
Constant 4.425*** 4.152*** 
 (0.0975) (0.105) 
Observations 2768 2768 
R-squared 0.925 0.922 
Panel B 
 OLS IV 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
COEFFICIENT logit_nonexe logit_nonexe logit_nonexe logit_nonexe 
     
pimpact_e 0.0100***  0.000830  
 (0.00338)  (0.00341)  
lognse -0.455*** -0.429*** -0.500*** -0.474*** 
 (0.00733) (0.00749) (0.00689) (0.00808) 
NASDAQ 0.0882*** 0.0717***  0.00831 
 (0.0280) (0.0274)  (0.0279) 
propimpact_e  0.00437***  0.00297*** 
  (0.000462)  (0.000474) 
Constant 11.48*** 11.00*** 12.31*** 11.81*** 
 (0.135) (0.137) (0.119) (0.148) 
Observations 2768 2768 2768 2768 
R-squared 0.705 0.713 0.700 0.709 
Standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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The coefficients for lognse in these four regressions are all negative and statistically 
significant, which is a strong indication of network externality effect. We also find after 
we control for proxy for network externality in crossing networks, we still find that 
information asymmetry play a role in explaining non-execution probability.  Table 3.3 
tell us that if two stocks have the same order arrival rate, the stock with higher price 
impact of trade has higher non-execution probability, which is an indication of 
informational cause of non-execution. However, the effect seems weaker because the 
coefficient is only statistically significant for 3 of the 4 specifications.     
 
3.6.2. Correlation between Non-execution, Price Impact and Effective Spread  
Ye (2010) predicts that the non-execution probability and (permanent) price impact of 
trade should have positive correlations, and Panel A in Table 3.4 demonstrates that it is 
indeed the case. The non-execution probabilities in crossing networks and price impacts 
of trade in exchanges have a positive correlation of 0.2842, and the correlation is 
statistically significant. We also do another robustness test: because we know from 
summary statistics that crossing networks also have a price impact of trade, and 
exchanges also have non-execution, we examine whether or not the difference between 
non-execution probability in crossing networks and stock exchanges is positively 
correlated with the difference between price impact in stock exchanges and crossing 
networks. We find that the correlation is 0.1742, meaning that stocks that have a higher 
reduction in price impact by trading in crossing networks also have a higher increase in 
non-execution probability in crossing networks. Therefore, the potential savings in price 
impact costs is counteracted by the lower fill rate. In conclusion, we cannot reject 
Hypothesis 3 that non-execution and price impact are positively correlated.   
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If we study the correlation between the effective spread, the sum of (permanent) price 
impact and realized spread (temporary price impact), the relationship becomes weaker. 
This is not surprising because Ye’s prediction is on the relationship between permanent 
price impact and non-execution. Our results show that when we add the temporary 
component of price impact, the correlation between transaction costs in exchanges and 
those in crossing networks becomes weaker.  Panel B and C in Table 3.4 demonstrates 
that stocks with higher effective spreads in exchanges also have higher non-execution 
probabilities in crossing networks. However, the results for their differences are weaker. 
For NYSE stocks, stocks with a higher reduction in effective spread by trading in 
crossing networks also a higher increase in non-execution probability in crossing 
networks. This result, however, is not true for NASDAQ stocks, where stocks with a 
higher reduction in effective spread actually have a lower increase in non-execution 
probability. This negative correlation may be a consequence of the other negative 
correlation: Table 3.4 demonstrates that stocks with higher effective spreads actually 
have a lower reduction in effective spread by trading in crossing networks.   
 
The negative correlation between effective spreads in exchanges and the reduction in 
effective spreads by trading in crossing networks is contrary to the assumption of Ready 
(2009) and Ray (2010). Ray assumes that trading in crossing networks has a 0 effective 
spread, and Ready (2010) assumes that the potential cost saving is a fixed proportion of 
the effective spread. Under these two assumptions, effective spread and the reduction in 
effective spread by trading in crossing networks should have a correlation coefficient of 
1. For NASDAQ stocks, however, Panel C shows that not only these two variables do 
not have correlation of 1, they do not even have a positive correlation. Therefore, both 
hypothesis 4 and hypothesis 4’ are rejected.  
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Table 3.4: Correlation between Non-execution, Price Impact and Effective Spread   
This table shows the cross-sectional measure among different measure of transaction costs. 
nonexe_c and nonexe_e are non-execution probability in crossing networks and exchanges, 
respectively. pimpact_c and pimpact_e are price impact of trade in crossing networks and stock 
exchanges, which are defined as the average effective spread minus the average realized spread 
in crossing networks and stock exchanges. espread_c and espread_e are average effective 
spread in crossing networks and stock exchanges. The sample period is from January, 2010 to 
March 2010. The asterisks ***, **, and * indicate significance level of one percent, five percent 
or ten percent.     
Panel A: Correlation between Non-execution and Price Impact 
 nonexe_c  pimpact_e nonexe_c- nonexe_e  
pimpact_e- 
pimpact_c 
nonexe_c 1.0000    
pimpact_e 0.2842*** (0.0000) 1.0000   
nonexe_c-nonexe_e 0.2136*** (0.0000) 
0.2739*** 
(0.0000) 1.0000  
pimpact_e-pimpact_c 0.1132*** 0.0000 
0.6124*** 
(0.0000) 
0.1742*** 
(0.0000) 1.0000 
Panel B: Correlation between Non-execution and Effective Spread: NYSE stocks  
 nonexe_c  espread_e nonexe_c- nonexe_e  
espread_e- 
espread_c 
nonexe_c 1.0000    
espread _e 0.2078*** (0.0000) 1.0000   
nonexe_c-nonexe_e 0.3397*** (0.0000) 
0.2928*** 
(0.0000) 1.0000  
espread_e-espread_c 0.1437*** 0.0000 
0.8219*** 
(0.0000) 
0.2277*** 
(0.0000) 1.0000 
Panel C: Correlation between Non-execution and Effective Spread: NASDAQ 
stocks  
 nonexe_c  espread_e nonexe_c- nonexe_e  
espread_e- 
espread_c 
nonexe_c 1.0000    
espread _e 0.3142*** (0.0000) 1.0000   
nonexe_c-nonexe_e 0.2772*** (0.0000) 
0.3066*** 
(0.0000) 1.0000  
espread_e-espread_c -0.0141 (0.5702) 
-0.2537*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0855*** 
(0.0006) 1.0000 
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3.6.3. Regression Result on Non-execution  
The relationship between characteristics of a stock and its transaction cost in the 
exchange is one of the strongest and most robust relations in finance. (Stoll, 2000 and 
2003).  If non-execution follows a similar pattern as price impact, we expect that trading 
characteristics that can explain cross-sectional variation of price impact can also explain 
cross-sectional variation of non-execution probability.   
 
Therefore, we run the following regression: 
ii6i4i3i2i1i NASDAQβsdβlogpriceβlogvolβlogmktcapβαxelogit_none ε++++++=  (3.6) 
where logit_nonexe is the logit transformation of non-execution probability in crossing 
networks. logmktcap is average market cap for each stock. logvol is the log of average 
trading volume of each stock, logprice is the log of average closing price. sd is the 
standard deviation of daily stock return. Market cap, volume, price and volatility are the 
control variable in Madhavan (2000), Boehmer (2005) SEC (2001). The latter two 
papers also find that transaction cost of NASDAQ is higher than that of NYSE after he 
controls market cap, volume, price and volatility. Therefore, we add NASDAQ as a 
dummy variable.85
 
     
Table 3.5 shows that large stocks and stocks with higher volume have lower non-
execution probabilities. This result is consistent with Hypothesis 1. We also find 
support for Hypothesis 2: stocks with higher volatility have higher non-execution 
probabilities. Interestingly, we demonstrate that stocks with higher prices have lower 
                                                 
85 Some other regressions on cross-sectional variation of transaction cost added more variables. Stoll 
(2000), for example, also adds number of trades and the imbalance between buy and sell side to his 
regression. We do not include the buy and sell imbalance because non-execution should be uniquely 
determined by buy and sell imbalance.   If we know the number of shares demanded and supplied, we 
know the execution probability. Number of trades suffers from endogenity issues: while number of trades 
can affect non-execution probability, non-execution probability affects number of trades. A high non-
execution probability may increase the number of partial filled orders and increases the number of trades.     
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non-execution probabilities. While it is easier to explain that large stocks, frequently 
traded stocks and lower volatility stocks are more likely to have lower non-execution 
probabilities, the association between price and non-execution probability is less 
obvious. We believe that it is because stocks with higher prices have lower transaction 
costs in stock exchanges, and non-execution probability follows a similar pattern to 
transaction cost in exchanges because rational agents can move their trades between 
exchanges and crossing networks to balance the trading costs in these two markets. We 
also find that NASDAQ stocks have higher non-execution probabilities than NYSE 
stocks. Again, these variables explain of cross-sectional variation in non-execution 
probability, which is also a strong result.  
 
Table 3.5: Regress Non-execution on Stock Characteristics 
This table demonstrates the relationship between stock characteristics and non-execution.  The 
sample period is from January, 2010 to March, 2010. logit_nonexe is the logit transformation of 
non-execution probability in crossing networks. logmktcap is average market cap for each 
stock. logvol is the log of average trading volume of each stock, logprice is the log of average 
closing price. sd is the standard deviation of daily stock return. Dummy variable NASDAQ is 
equal to 1 if the stock is listed in NASDAQ and 0 if the stock is listed in NYSE.  
COEFFICIENT logit_nonexe 
  
logmktcap -0.0414** 
 (0.0211) 
logvol -0.475*** 
 (0.0143) 
logprice -0.0765*** 
 (0.0249) 
sd 0.123*** 
 (0.0264) 
NASDAQ 0.0817*** 
 (0.0270) 
Constant 10.66*** 
 (0.122) 
Observations 2768 
R-squared 0.736 
Standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * 
p<0.1  
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3.7. Competition between Different Trading Platforms 
There are two empirical puzzles in previous literature on the competition between 
crossing networks and exchanges. The focus of these two puzzles is whether or not 
traders face other objectives or constraints besides minimizing transaction costs (Ready, 
2009). Ready (2009) finds that the market share of crossing networks does not have a 
monotonic relationship with the volume of the stocks. He questions why crossing 
networks do not have a higher market share for stocks with higher volume, which have 
a higher probability of finding a potential match. Ready ascribes this anomaly to soft-
dollar arrangements. Ray (2010) finds that the market share of crossing networks is not 
higher for stocks with higher effective spreads, and Ready (2009) finds that the market 
share of crossing networks in fact decreases with effective spread. Ray (2010) explains 
that it is because people who use crossing networks have concerns about possible 
gaming for stocks with higher effective spreads. Ready (2009) ascribes this pattern to 
soft-dollar arrangements. In conclusion, both Ready (2009) and Ray (2010) consider 
incentives other than minimizing transaction costs as explanations for these puzzles.   
Ready (2009) and Ray (2010) do not have data to measure the effective spread and non-
execution in crossing networks. Therefore, their analysis relies on assumptions about 
transaction costs in crossing networks: both papers assume that reductions in effective 
spreads by trading in crossing networks increases linearly with effective spread, and 
neither paper has an empirical measure of non-execution. After we account for the 
differences in effective spreads and non-execution in crossing networks, we find that 
minimizing transaction costs alone is able to explain the cross-sectional variation of 
market shares of crossing networks.    
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Similar to non-execution probability, our dependent variable in market share regression, 
is also a proportion. Therefore, we do the logit transformation to market share. The 
result without logit transformation is also similar. 
 
)
share
shareln(  elogit_shar
−
=
1
               (3.7) 
The market share regression, however, need to be run with caution because of 
endogenity and measurement error issues.  First, while non-execution probability and 
effective spread in different trading venues can affect order routing decision and market 
share, market share of crossing networks certainly can also affect non-execution 
probability and effective spread. To deal with the endogenity issue, we use the market 
share of crossing networks from April 2010 to June 2010 as the dependent variable, 
while the non-execution measure and effective spread measure are from January 2010 
to March 2010. Because the execution statistics comes with a two month lag, Boehmer, 
Jennings and Wei (2007) use execution statistics of previous month to explain order 
routing decisions.  
 
Column (1) in Table 3.6 regresses market shares of crossing networks on effective 
spreads in exchanges.  
iii1i NASDAQβeespreadβαelogit_shar ε+++= −− 1,21,_                             (3.8)
86
Column (2) in Table 3.6 also regresses market shares of crossing networks on effective 
spreads, but adds more control variable.   
 
                                                 
86 Technically, all the lagged independent variable we generate from SEC 605 data are from the first 
quarter of 2010, and all the lagged independent variables generated from CRSP are from the last quarter 
of 2009. CRSP data for the first quarter of 2010 is not available through CRSP yearly update when we 
conduct this study.  However, we believe that cross-sectional pattern of market cap, volume, price and 
listing venue would not change in three months.   
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iiiii
ii1i
NASDAQβsdβlogpriceβlogvolβ
logmktcapβeespreadβαelogit_shar
ε+++++
++=
−−−−
−−
1,61,51,41,3
1,21,_                         (3.9) 
 
We find a similar pattern to Ready (2009) and Buti, Rindi and Werner (2010): crossing 
network’s market share decreases in effective spreads. However, these two regressions 
do not consider the fact that crossing networks also have effective spread. Also, non-
execution is not in the regression. Therefore, we run the following regression with only 
difference in effective spread and non-execution as explanatory variable.  
iiii1i NASDAQβprobdespreaddβαelogit_shar εβ ++++= −−− ,__ 1,31,21,     (3.10) 
 
The result is summarized in column (3) of Table 3.6. It demonstrates that an increase of 
effective spread of exchanges, relative to crossing networks, and a decrease of non-
execution probability in crossing networks, relative to exchanges, decreases the market 
share of crossing networks. This simple regression demonstrates that the market shares 
of crossing networks are consistent with the incentive of cost minimization. Crossing 
networks attract traders when they offer relative higher reductions in effective spreads 
and have relatively low non-execution probabilities.   
 
Finally, we add stock characteristics in equation (3.10) and run regression (3.11).  
iiiii
iii1i
NASDAQβsdβlogpriceβlogvolβ
logmktcapβprobdespreaddβαelogit_shar
ε
β
++++
++++=
−−−−
−−−
1,71,61,51,4
1,31,21, __             (3.11) 
 
Still, we find that a decrease of non-execution probability in the crossing networks 
increases its market share. We also find that an increase of effective spread of 
exchanges relative to crossing networks increases market share of crossing networks, 
though the effective is not statistically significant, which may be because the 
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differences in effective spread can be explained by market cap, volume, volatility and 
price.  
Table 3.6: Market Shares of Crossing Networks  
This table demonstrates the relationship between market share of crossing networks and stock 
characteristics and transaction cost in both crossing networks and stock exchanges. The sample 
period is. logit_share is the logit transformation of market share of crossing networks from 
January, 2010 to March, 2010. espread_e-1 is the average effective spread in stock exchanges 
from January, 2010 to March, 2010. d_prob-1 is equal to nonexeution probability in crossing 
networks minus Non-execution probability in exchanges from January, 2010 to March, 2010. 
d_espread-1 is equal to effective spread in exchanges minus effective spread in crossing 
networks from January, 2010 to March, 2010. logmktcap-1 is average market cap for each stock. 
logvol-1 is the log of average trading volume of each stock, logprice-1 is the log of average 
closing price. sd-1 is the standard deviation of daily stock return. Dummy variable NASDAQ-1 
is equal to 1 if the stock is listed in NASDAQ and 0 if the stock is listed in NYSE. logmktcap-1, 
logvol-1, sd-1, logprice-1 and NASDAQ-1 are measured use CRSP data from October, 2009 to 
December, 2009.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
COEFFICIENT Logitshare Logitshare Logitshare Logitshare 
     
espread_e-1 -0.0241*** -0.0146***   
 (0.00167) (0.00191)   
Logmktcap-1  0.0114  -0.0330* 
  (0.0186)  (0.0186) 
Sd-1  -0.0591**  -0.0651*** 
  (0.0253)  (0.0246) 
Logvol-1  0.0759***  0.0936*** 
  (0.0133)  (0.0125) 
Logprice-1  0.111***  0.192*** 
  (0.0223)  (0.0234) 
NASDAQ-1 0.403*** 0.587*** 0.284*** 0.495*** 
 (0.0222) (0.0238) (0.0220) (0.0243) 
d_espread-1   0.00753*** 0.00410 
   (0.00281) (0.00264) 
d_prob-1   -0.0173*** -0.0162*** 
   (0.00117) (0.00131) 
Constant -2.696*** -4.242*** -2.273*** -3.676*** 
 (0.0170) (0.115) (0.0362) (0.127) 
Observations 2740 2740 2740 2740 
R-squared 0.141 0.230 0.146 0.256 
Standard errors in 
parentheses 
    
*** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1 
    
 
 167  
 
We find market shares of crossing networks are higher for stocks with higher volume, 
and that market shares of crossing networks are higher for high-priced stocks and 
NASDAQ stocks. In addition, Hypothesis 5 is rejected because we find that stocks with 
higher volatility have lower market shares in crossing networks, meaning that the effect 
of the informed trader hiding his trade (Ye, 2010) is not as significant as the effect 
found by Dönges and Heinemann (2006). This result is consistent with the time series 
pattern found by Rosenblatt Securities (2009 and 2010): that the aggregated market 
share of crossing networks decreases in volatility. Buti, Rindi and Werner (2010) also 
find the same pattern, using a different dataset from this study. On the contrary, Ready 
(2009) finds that stocks with higher volatility have a higher market share in the crossing 
network, using a sample from 2005 to 2007. One possible explanation is that now 
crossing networks have better anti-gaming strategies for excluding informed traders 
from their market (Ye, 2010). Therefore, informed trading in crossing networks now 
plays a less important role.  
 
3.8. Conclusion 
This paper examines non-execution and market shares of crossing networks. We verify 
the theoretical prediction of Ye (2010): that non-execution should follow similar 
patterns as price impact and non-execution increases in volatility of stocks. Non-
execution also decreases in trading volume, which supports the network externality 
argument in Dönges and Heinemann (2006) and Hendershott and Mendelson (2000). 
We also find that market shares of crossing networks decreases in volatility, suggesting 
that the effect modeled in Ye (2010) is not as strong as the effect modeled in Dönges 
and Heinemann (2006). Aside from testing the empirical predictions of theoretical 
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models, we also test whether or not the underlying assumptions in the literature (Ready 
(2009) and Ray (2010)) are supported by empirical data. We find that the reductions in 
effective spreads by trading in crossing networks are not positively correlated with 
effective spread. This contradiction provides alternative explanations for the puzzles 
found in empirical literature on competition between trading platforms.  
 
There are several possible extensions of the paper. One interesting question to ask is 
whether or not non-execution follows a similar time-series pattern as price impact, that 
is, whether or not non-execution is higher in months when the price impact of trade is 
higher. Competition among different crossing networks also raises interesting questions. 
Trading in the crossing network certainly has network externalities. Therefore, crossing 
networks have a natural tendency to consolidate. Crossing networks with the largest 
numbers of buyers and sellers should have the highest matching probability and then 
attract traders from other crossing networks, which results in an even higher execution 
probability. In reality, there are several competing crossing networks, which can be 
considered “peers.”  We need explanations for this coexistence conundrum. The most 
natural explanation is that crossing networks are in the process of consolidation. The 
way to test that hypothesis is to see whether or not the market share of leaders continues 
to increase and the market share of followers decreases. The second explanation is 
specialization. Although there are several peer crossing networks in total trading 
volume, there are no such relationships at the stock level.  There is a leader for each 
individual stock. Specialization can also be at the order level. Some crossing networks 
may have a comparative advantage in handling large orders, while some others 
specialize in small orders.  We defer these questions to our future work.  
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The key for us in addressing questions that are not answered in the literature is the new 
application of SEC 605 data – this paper is the first one to use data issued by crossing 
networks to compute an empirical measure of transaction costs in crossing networks. As 
this measure is from public data, it can be easily applied to other studies. On the other 
hand, however, the ability for us to address questions in the literature is constrained by 
the availability and quality of the data. We address some questions but provide limited 
or no answers to other questions. For example, we find evidence that non-execution has 
informational and non-informational causes, but we are not able to decompose these 
two factors because we do not have order-level data. In fact, if we had order-level data, 
the first thing we would do is polish the empirical measure proposed in this paper. Non-
execution is only a rough measure of transaction costs in crossing networks. We do not 
know the opportunity cost of unfilled orders based on the implement shortfall approach 
(Perold, 1988), and we cannot compare the difference between short-term alphas for 
filled and unfilled orders (Jeria and Sofianos, 2008). The SEC (2010) proposes a policy 
change on the transparency of crossing network data, and we expect new data will 
provide us with more insights on crossing networks.  
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